SATING HUNGER IN AN AGE OF PLENTY: THE GLOBAL FOOD GOVERNANCE SPACE AND ITS ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE FOOD SECURITY REGIME

Kathryn Smith

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD

at the

University of St Andrews

26 May 2017

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Sating Hunger In An Age of Plenty

Table of Contents

Sating Hunger In An Age of Plenty 2
Acknowledgements. 6
List of Tables. 7
List of Figures. 7
List of Appendices. 9
Abstract. 10
Chapter One: The Hunger Problem. 11
Introduction. 11
Research Objectives and Questions. 12
Scoping The Problem. 13
Disciplinary Locus of the Research. 16
Motivation for this Research and Biographical Position.. 17
Literature Review. 19
Three Main Discourses in Food Security. 20
Definitions from the Food Security Literature. 23
Definitions of Famine and Hunger. 25
The Integrated Food Security Classification scale and Famine Scales..... 26
Famine Scales. 28
Defining 'the Field'. 28
Defining Food Governance..... 29
Defining Effectiveness. 30
Global Governance. 32
The Global Food Governance 'Space'. 33
Theoretical Perspectives and Research Design. 38
The Research Design and Methods..... 38
Field Analysis: Mapping The Global Food Governance Field. 40
Qualitative Interviews..... 41

Case Studies. 41
Chapter Two The Lie of the Land: The Politics of Food security. 46
Political Contexts of Food Security. 46
The Politics of Hunger. 50
Locating Food Security in Human Security. 53
Critique of Human Security. 57
Food Insecurity: Crisis of Advanced Capitalism? 58
Neoliberalism. 59
The Context of Globalisation. 62
The Effect of the Washington Consensus. 66
The Global Economic Field. 68
The Autonomous Financial Field..... 70
The Individual and Food Insecurity. 72
Community-Level Food Security. 74
Governing the Global Food Economy. 75
Bourdieu's Field Theory. 79
Critique of Bourdieu's Field Analysis method. 85
Bourdieu and International Relations. 88
Research Design. 88
Method 1: Field Analysi.s..... 90
Method 2: Interview. 94
Method 3: Case Study..... 96
Conclusion. 98
Chapter Three: Setting out the Global Food Governance Field. 100
The Politics of Food Security Governance. 101
A Field Analysis of the Global Food Governance Field. 103
Setting Out The Field of Power.....104
Problems and Limitation of using Field Analysis. 105
Step One Conducting The Field Analysis. 106
Identifying the Sectors in the Global Food Governance Field. 107
Trans National Corporation Sector. 110
The International Organisation Sector. 115
Aid and Charitable Organisation Sector. 117
The Civil Society Sector. 119
Step Two Of The Field Analysis: Establishing The Capital. 121
Establishing Political Capital and Political Legitimacy. 125
Political Legitimacy..... 128

Step Three: A Field Analysis of Global Food Governance. 131
Economic Capital. 135
The Field Analyses. 139
Field Analysis 1 141
Field Analysis 2 143
Identifying the Global Governance Field. 145
Identifying the Dynamics of the Field. 147
Economic Capital Dynamic. 149
Political Capital Dynamic. 151
Political Legitimacy Dynamic. 153
Effectiveness in the Global Food Governance Field. 155
Conclusion. 157
Chapter Four: Views From The Field 159
Part 1. The Interviews. 160
A Semi Structured Interview Approach. 163
Research Process and Participant Selection. 165
The Interviewer's Approach. 167
Reflections on the Pilot Interview and the Questions. 169
Interview Themes. 170
Logistical Difficulties. 171
The Interview Data. 173
Interview Results Summary. 190
Interview Results Analysis. 195
Part II: Case Studies. 199
Case Study 1: Monsanto. 206
Case Study 2: The Gates Foundation. 210
Case Study 3: The World Food Programme. 216
Case Study Four: La Via Campesina. 220
Summary of the Case Studies. 224
Chapter Five: The Bitter Harvest. 228
Redefining the Food Security Problem. 228

Part 1: Reframing The Problem. 230
The Failure of the Current Food Governance System. 232
Representation Deficit. 234
Lack of Effective Governance. 236
Measures to Improve Food Security. 238
Part 2: Remedies and Recommendations. 240
Policy Recommendations. 243
Conclusion. 245
Appendices Section 254
Bibliography 259

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I dedicate this work to the world's hungry children.

List of Tables

Table 1: The Food Security Classification Scale.

Table 2: Famine Scales

Table 3 Food Insecurity Factors And Causes

Table 4: Factors Of Famine And Responses.

Table 5: Sen's Food-Related Welfare Economics Terms And Definitions.

Table 6: Interview Participants' Code by Sector

Table 7: Features of Global Food Governance Failure

List of Figures

Figure 1. Fields Within A Field. Applying Field Theory To The GFG Field.

Figure 2: Bourdieu's Social Field.

Figure 3 The Four Sectors Of Global Food Governance.

Figure 4: The Sectors Of Global Food Governance Weighted Annual Income Per Sector.

Figure 5: GFG Sectors By Percentage Of Combined Annual Income Of Top 4 Actors Per Sector

Figure 6: With Average Per Capita Annual Income Per Actor In Each Sector Calculated On Top Four Actors Only.

Figure 7: The Combined Annual Income Of Top Three Actors Per Sector With The Gates Foundation Removed (As An Outlier).

Figure 8: The Sectors Of Global Food Governance Weighted By Total Sectoral Annual Income

Figure 9: Political Capital Weighting Per Sector

Figure 10: Political Legitimacy Weighting Per Sector

Figure 11: Global Food Governance Field Analysis 1 (Political Capital)

Figure 12: Global Food Governance Field Analysis 1 (Political Capital, Gates Removed)

Figure 13: Global Food Governance Field Analysis 2 (Legitimacy Capital)

Figure 14: Global Food Governance Field Analysis 2 Legitimacy Capital, Gates Foundation Outlier Removed

Figure 15: Political Capital By Sector

Figure 16: Political Legitimacy Capital Score By Sector

Figure 17: Comparison Of Political Legitimacy Capital Vs. Political Capital Scores By Organisation

Figure 18: The Reframed Global Food Governance Field In Detail

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Newspaper Article On 2008 Food Crisis

Appendix 2 Barriers To Gender-Equal Food Security.

Appendix 3 List of Organisations Researched For Inclusion Into Field Analysis

Appendix 4: Table A: Symbolic Capital Table For Criteria And Measures Of Political Capital

Table B: Symbolic Capital Table For Criteria And Measures Of Political Legitimacy

Notes On Tables A & B: Constructing The Symbolic Capital Criteria

Appendix 5: The Economic Capital Of The Global Good Governance Major Actors (With Notes)

Appendix 6: Variables Tables for Political Capital

Appendix 7: Variables Table for Political Legitimacy

Appendix 8: Field Analysis Of Global Food Governance: Symbolic Capital, Criteria And Measures 1

Appendix 9: Appendices For Chapter 4

A: Pilot Version Of Interview Protocol

B: Final Version Of Interview Protocol

Appendix 10: Interview Records (On CD)

Abstract

Contextualised in food security literature and globalisation literature and NGO and agency reports on food security, Sating Hunger argues that ineffective global food governance is one of the causes of worsening global hunger, in addition to issues such as the commoditisation of food, climate change effects, the financialisation of agriculture and land degradation. The global food governance literature suggests that global governance is vital to establishing a stable and effective food security regime, yet to date, no overall description of the global food governance field exists and the dynamics of the field have remained largely unexamined. Bourdieu's Field Analysis is modified and used as a method to map out the current food governance field and identify key actors and their positions, according to measures of economic capital, political capital and 'democratic legitimacy' capital. Four sectors in the field are delineated; the 'agrifood' Trans National Corporation sector, the International Organisation sector, the Aid and Charitable Organisation sector and, marginalised at the outer limits of the field, Civil Society Organisations. The dominance of private actors in the global food governance space is revealed, and the Field Analysis also presents the Gates Foundation as a dominant governor in the field.

The results from the Field Analysis are combined with interviews with ten executives from these sectors to reveal a siloed food governance field with conflicting agendas. One organisation from each sector is also examined by case study to illustrate their practices and detail the attribution of the symbolic capitals in the Field Analysis.

The problem of food insecurity is then reframed and recommendations are made including establishing the Right to Food, regulation and scrutiny of agrifood corporations, reform of the food governance field and establishing a new central body in the governance space. Some policy recommendations are also made.

Chapter One: The Hunger Problem

"At the dawn of the twenty-first century, after fifty years of development policies…a third of humanity continues to live in abject poverty" (Thomas, 2000:10).

Introduction

The world's population is predicted to reach nine billion by 2050 and demand for food will increase substantially. A high proportion of the current global population of 7.5 billion already suffers from chronic food insecurity due to the iniquitous distribution of food and an increasing number suffer from transient food insecurity due to the global financial crisis. In 2009 more than one billion people were chronically hungry, more than any year since 1970 (McDonald, 2010: 80). With global food reserves at their lowest for 30 years, it is estimated that production of cereals alone needs to increase by 50% and meat production by 85% over the next 20 years to keep apace with demand (FAO, 2009). Organisations such as Oxfam suggest that food prices themselves may double in the next 20 years (Oxfam, 2012). Yet the picture is more complex. Chronic hunger is not due primarily to a lack of food. Spikes in hunger and famine do not necessarily directly correlate to food shortages but instead can reflect an "inequitable distribution of food outputs and a lack of political, social and economic entitlements" (Death, 2001: 35; see also Keen, 2008). In other words, "starvation is the characteristic of some people not having enough to eat. It is not the characteristic of there not being enough to eat" (Sen, 1981).

Exploring this rapidly growing size and scale of the problem is one of the imperatives for this research. The same number die every two years from hunger related causes as died in the nine years of World Wars One and Two (based on a calculation of 30 million world war casualties) (Thomas and Reader, 1997:109). Another imperative is that food crises can be both a cause and effect of state and civil violence, creating a hunger-violence vicious circle that drives the hungry deeper into conflict and further from a solution to starvation. The good governance of food is an issue that affects all and could avert further crises and avoid cataclysmic humanitarian catastrophe.

Research Objectives and Questions

The principal research question arising from this topic is 'how can global governance best address food insecurity? This research is an analytical study which argues that neoliberal ideology, the interests of corporate actors and the democratic deficits and lack of plurality in international governance are major obstacles to establishing food security. These factors will be analysed separately but consideration will also be given to how these factors relate to each other and combine to inhibit global governance.

This approach questions not only the practices and position of the governance members but investigates the need for reform of the global governance field itself is to establish food security. It is also proposed that the intensity and scale of future food insecurity and food crises may themselves be game-changers for global governance overall.

Implicit in the principal question are a number of subsidiary questions. For example, which actors currently govern food security? In whose interest do these international actors govern? Global food governance (GFG) is defined here as, "…[the] multiple governmental and intergovernmental efforts to 'organize and coordinate the production and consumption of food in the current era of globalization." (Cooke in Curran et al, 2010:2). As the primary, most relevant governance space for food security, the examination of GFG's performance in resolving the food security crisis to date is one of the key research objectives. There is also a normative question at the heart of this issue, namely, how should global food governance be reformed to address food insecurity? Global governance needs to mitigate the factors that cause food crises to perpetuate, so the overall question is what has to change to ensure so it can be effective in mitigating food insecurity, and how can any barriers or obstacles be overcome?

An assumption underpins this overall research question - that the *laissez faire* mechanism of neoliberalism will not resolve food insecurity, i.e. the free market will not 'fix' food insecurity. It is also important to state that the research as a whole is underpinned by a much more fundamental question and the most significant imperative for the research. With one in seven of the population already going hungry and this possibly set to increase to one in three by 2050[1] (should the current trend continue), what will be the human cost of *not* addressing the effective governance of food insecurity?

Scoping the Problem

To scope the problem it is useful to examine the background and extent of food insecurity. The world grows more fragile and unstable with the increasing volatility of food prices. Not only are one billion chronically hungry but more than two billion experience inconsistent food access and availability (Parry et al, 2009). Sharp rises in particular of the price of staple foods significantly affect the hungry both as food producers and food consumers (Food and Agricultural Organisation, 2011). The 2008 food crisis saw staple food prices rise dramatically (wheat by 130%, sorghum by 87% and rice 74%) (FAO, 2009) plus there were food riots in 36 countries and the government of Haiti was overthrown. This hunger-violence cycle exacerbates hunger further. 14 out of 53 African countries saw mass disturbances during the 2008 food crisis (Berazneva and Lee, 2011). Each erupted in response to lack of food access and perceived governmental corruption but varied in duration, organisation and severity (Berazneva and Lee, 2011). Food riots are repeated claims for local food security. In each case they are protests against hunger but because conflict is also a cause of food insecurity, ongoing conflict worsens food insecurity. There are also many examples from history of political elites manipulating food supplies and hunger for political objectives. So the 2008 food crisis had many consequences but it also revealed

[1] Author's calculation based on estimates of the number of hungry increasing by 20% by 2050 (Parry et al, 2009). It is currently one in seven (as at 2009-12). Based on 2009 figures of population of 6.8 billion = 0.97 billion). A 20% increase would give a ratio of just over one in three by 2050. Adjusted for a 2050 projected population estimate of 9 billion would mean just over 3 billion hungry in 2050 (estimates from UN population projection figures). For comparison, if the population were to stay the same, the number of hungry in 2050 would increase to 2.33 billion. If the ratio were to stay the same as 2009-12 levels (at one in seven) but with the population increase to 9 billion by 2050, the number of hungry would be 1.28 billion. Therefore the number at risk from hunger could triple over the coming generation/thirty-seven years). Any multiplier effect of the population increase itself worsening hunger have not been included in this illustration.

anomie at the heart of global food governance at a time when effective governance was needed more than ever to meet the demands of the present and the future degrading food insecurity situation. [2]

Over the short term recurring food price rises and crises offer unique opportunities to scope the structural and agency factors which determine the scale and frequency of these crises, to assess the corollary between food insecurity and global governance and to evaluate global food governance strategies to achieve food security. For the longer term, results of population forecast studies suggest that agricultural crisis will become severe after 2020, and critical from 2050 (Pimentel & Giampietro, 1994). Although others argue that the peaking of oil along with the peak of natural gas production could provoke an agricultural crisis much sooner than expected (INRAN, 2012). The impact of the global population 'explosion' on food security, however, has been criticised as a neo-Malthusian proposition by the food justice movement, who point out that the inequitable distribution and access to food is a key driver of food insecurity, rather than the population increase *per se* (Death, 2010).

Whilst the last century saw substantial increases in global per capita food production, this rate of growth is now slowing (World Resources Institute, 2012). The 'green revolution' did transform agriculture around the globe with world grain production increasing by 250% since the 1950s. Due to its dependence on fossil fuels for fertilisers and pesticides it was not sustainable and from the 1980s onwards agricultural improvements have decreased, particularly when the replacement rate of fossil fuels dipped. This results in lower crop yields unless other fertilisers are used.

[2] Every agricultural economy has experienced rising price trends since the millennium. For example, between 2004 and 2008 alone, world rice prices increased by 255%, whilst wheat and maize prices increased by 90% (Heady and Fan, 2008).

Therefore the Trans National Corporations (TNC) practices of buying then shelving patents for new forms of fertilisers, described in the later sections on TNC practices, also reduce crop yields. The growth of biofuel cultivation by the West also needs taken into account in considering future food production forecasts.

Food insecurity can be identified in geographic patterns with over 60% of the world's undernourished living in Asia and 25% in Africa (two-thirds of the projected increase by 2050 may occur in Africa) (Parry et al, 2009) and the proportion of people who are hungry is already greater in Africa (33%) than Asia (16%). There are 22 countries (16 in Africa) where over 35% of the population are undernourished (Ayalew, 2012). Some forecasts predict more dramatic food insecurity trends with Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia hit more severely by climate change, with Africa possibly losing 47% of its agricultural income by 2100 as a result of climate change (Toulmin, 2009:64; also see FAO Report, 2012). Food insecurity is also prevalent in the globalised north.[3]

Measuring hunger is, however, more complex than agricultural, demographic, and economic forecasts can accurately predict because food access and entitlement to food are often politically determined, sometimes with the threat of hunger used instrumentally as a political weapon. There is general agreement in the food security discourses though, that food crises, those sudden, volatile price-spiking manifestations of food insecurity, will proliferate as the boundaries of the Earth's capacity in the 21st Century are reached.

To arrive at a stable, effective food security governance regime, it is important to identify the many contributing factors of food insecurity. There are factors at each level of analysis. Sub-national factors include regional land-law and gender inequality, national level factors are numerous and include *per capita* income, health and nutrition, population size, urban agglomerations, civil society and political

[3] Rates of food security vary significantly by race, class and education. For example, in the USA one in six people are food insecure (USAID, 2012). In both kindergarten and third grade, 8% of the children were classified as food insecure, but only 5% of white children were food insecure, while 12% and 15% of black and Hispanic children were food insecure, respectively (Kimbro, Denney and Panchang, 2012).

culture, religion and secularity, geopolitics, state fragility and post-conflict status (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). Global-level pressures include commoditisation of food, environmental factors, financial crisis and population explosion, oil and water crises, violent conflict and more (Smith, K., 2008 '2008: The Year of Global Food Crisis' *Sunday Herald* 8 March p1). These are outlined in detail in Chapter Two.

Motivation for this Research and Biographical Position

The motivation for this research arises from my time as an investigative journalist, when I wrote a front-page story on the 2008 food crisis for the UK's Sunday Herald newspaper. This was subsequently nominated for a British Press Award (see Appendix 1 for the article). The article become one of the definitive explanations of the food crisis. Drawing on detailed journalistic research my article set out multiple reasons for food crises and unpacked the complexity of the issue and contributing factors, explaining that these contributing factors are worsening, ratcheting up food insecurity. I had also witnessed food crises first-hand whilst working in Yaroslavl, Russia in the early 1990's when entire towns and villages endured prolonged starvation during the transition from Communism to Capitalism. At that time, the formal food distribution of the Soviet regime had collapsed and the Rouble was in free-fall and the post-Soviet version of commercial food distribution was not yet established. A well-judged political solution could have averted the food insecurity I witnessed. This regime vacuum of 1991 chimes with the apparent anomie of global food governance, uncovered by the 2008 global food crisis.

I continued to write articles on food security and the food crises in 2008 and 2009 but one question recurred. With such apparently apocalyptic consequences for humanity, why were there no solutions in sight? Which begged the question 'why is there no effective food security regime?'

As well as this professional engagement with the topic my personal biography also influences my position in relation to food security. Attending high school in one of the most notorious poverty zones in Scotland in the late 1970s and early 1980s gave me a number of vantage points from which to witness food poverty. Public health screening identified those of my classmates who were already stunted from malnutrition. The mass public health approach to services was not an ineffective top down solution for food poverty. I came to understand that food poverty was symptomatic of deeper, often intergenerational poverty and accompanied by health issues, fuel poverty and impaired childhood experiences since all in the family were affected and entirely focussed on finding contingent measures to resolve the food insecurity. Crime and violence often, but not always, resulted. Yet it was often also transient, caused by vulnerability and lack of resilience to food and fuel price volatility. Amongst my classmates' families there was no attribution of their vulnerability to the structural unemployment nor socio-economic causes and contexts, such as the collapse in manufacturing, coal mining and shipping on which so many of the families, including my own, depended. Instead food poverty fuelled a sense of individual failure and familial shame.

I also witnessed the welfare state intervene although it was then rule-bound, unbending and seemingly compassionless in its application and so interventions were rarely successful. A more individual-centred welfare service which engaged and responded rather than dictating solutions would have had more success but Thatcherism was rolling back the welfare state and, like many Scots, this had a politicising experience on me as I watched crime levels and social discord increase directly as a result of Thatcherite policies. Taking this understanding of food insecurity and poverty as vulnerability to the systemic and political, I became active in student journalism and politics and then active in public governance spaces such as the Civil Society Forum in Scotland which, in the 1990s, advocated discursive democracy and constitutional change. The civil society contribution to public forums resulted in political change and, ultimately, differentiated policies such as free care for the elderly. Poverty and food insecurity may be systemic but are far from inevitable. Solutions that mitigate food insecurity and poverty could be designed from civic engagement and bottom-up deliberative democratic discussion about prevention rather

than boilerplate solutions or interventions. For this reason I value interviews as a method, to avoid solipsism and understand other world views and positions.

As an investigative approach, journalism can only go so far. As well as being subject to sometimes capricious news agendas, it is *sans* theory and Critical Analysis. Academic research, however, offers the opportunity to critically analyse, to interrogate the food governance structures and address what can be done to avert the apparently inevitable catastrophe. This thesis is my attempt to address that question.

With the research question set out, the first step is to review the literature.

Original Contributions

To define the research puzzle the main bodies of literature reviewed include food security, global governance, human security, globalisation and some International Political Economy literature on advanced capitalism. Similarly, the research design and methodology draws on literature from Field Theory, Bourdieusian Field Analysis and qualitative research methods and discusses Bourdieu in International Relations.

This research argues that ineffective global food governance is one of the causes of worsening global hunger, in addition to issues such as the commoditisation of food, climate change effects, the financialisation of agriculture and land degradation. The global food governance literature suggests that global governance is vital to establishing a stable and effective food security regime and yet no overall description of the global food governance field exists and so the dynamics of the field have remained largely unexamined. Bourdieu's Field Analysis is modified and used as a method to map out the current food governance field and identify key actors and their positions, according to measures of economic capital, political capital and 'democratic legitimacy' capital. Four sectors in the field are delineated; the 'agrifood' Trans National Corporation sector, the International Organisation sector, the Aid and

Charitable Organisation sector and, marginalised at the outer limits of the field, Civil Society Organisations. The dominance of private actors in the global food governance space is revealed, and the Field Analysis also presents the Gates Foundation as a dominant governor in the field.

Food security is also part of a much larger intellectual map, located in a nexus between Anthropology, Agricultural and Welfare Economics, Development Studies (for Human Security theories plus the understanding of asymmetrical development). Human Geography, International Political Economy, Sociology (for the literature on globalisation and the discourse of domination), and finally, and the most relevant for this thesis, International Relations, for analysis of the dynamics of global governance.

Although not the primary disciplinary locus of this research, the intersection between economics and sociology is useful for food security because analysis of the social structures of the economy is key for the study of global food governance. This underscores Bourdieu's perspective that economics and sociology are part of a single discipline, rather than two different disciplines with economic transactions being just one aspect (Bourdieu 2005:17).

International Relations is the disciplinary locus because the central question and focus is global governance, the international actors in food security governance . This responds to a gap described as the 'silence' of International Relations discipline in face of the growing inequality and widespread poverty that characterises the neoliberal era, the result of the uneven benefits of globalisation process (Thomas, 2009). Addressing the issue of the effectiveness of global food governance also speaks to this silence. International Relations is the most relevant discipline to answer this research question, offer a review of the current global and regional governance of food and also address the overarching question of how global governance responds to food security causes. Therefore, International Relations is the discipline of best fit. The 'practice turn' in International Relations has seen an increasing use of Bourdieu's work by International Relations scholars in the last few years. Bourdieu's work correlates to the structure agency debate in International Relations and there is increasing recognition of the applicability of Bourdieu's terms of field and habitus to the structure/agency debate in International Relations. For example and of most relevance to this research is the concept of *field*, where

structures and architecture of hierarchy are objectively mapped out and strategies for positioning within the field represents structure and the ongoing 'structuring' dynamics of the field can be seen to be an agent in change, or in perpetuating the status quo.

Over his lifetime's work Bourdieu frequently analysed the transmission of power, conflict and sovereignty:

> "Bourdieu's sociology provides us with an opportunity to rethink international politics in ways not offered by these other thinkers. Bourdieu helps us rediscover the everyday practices, symbolic structures and arenas of conflict that bring many other actors into perspective, rather than just focusing on nation states that produce (what we call) international politics. An engagement with his work redirects our discipline from being influenced by overly abstracted and simplified reifications of world politics…" (Adler Nissen, 2013:6).

This study builds on existing research on food security, specifically Clapp and Fuchs, McKeon, Margulis, Bne Saad, and Sen. Clapp and Fuchs outlined the effect of corporate power in the Food System; McKeon set out the importance of democratisation for the food security field; Margulis's work covers the global governance of food security; Bne Saad's research attributes the causes of food insecurity to the political and economic system and Sen's work on the structural and political origins of hunger and famine is the fountainhead of this work. Each of these are outlined further in the pages following immediately and discussed in detail in Chapter Two. In addition a number of practitioner reports are included, specifically from the FAO, GRAIN and Oxfam. These sources offer some key factors for the analysis of the research questions. For example, the impact on governance of the neoliberal turn and neoliberal approach of international actors such as IOs and TNCs, the financialisation of agricultural trade and the increasing commoditisation of food's effect on food security governance. Other causes of food insecurity mentioned in the

food security literature include the decrease in food trade and exchanges, biofuels cropping and the impact of the peak oil crisis (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). Climate change in particular is a very significant multi-dimensional cause of food insecurity.

It is widely identified across the global food governance literature overall, both academic and practitioner literature, that there is no overall description of the global food governance field (see McKeon, 2015) so this research addresses that omission by providing an overall view of the food governance field. Mapping out the food governance field is a key rationale for the research design to enable investigation into the ineffectiveness of the global food governance field. In doing so it provides an original empirical contribution to the study of food security governance. The approach through which this is done, i.e. by modifying and empirically applying Bourdieu's Field Analysis in analysing power distribution and effects in global governance, makes a methodological contribution to the study of food security.

Three Main Discourses in Food Security

These factors and causes are presented in a variegated way across the key discourses in food security, which can be grouped into three main approaches. The first is productivism, which essentially links agriculture, food supply and hunger: McKeon succinctly describes this as: "a judicious mix of state support + capital + science" pitted against the Malthusian scenario of population growth exceeding growth of agricultural output" (McKeon, 2015: 72). To date the main Western view of food security has been a *neoliberal* productivist discourse: that maximising farmers' profits means maximizing agricultural production. By enabling farmers with resources and tools, for example, accurate weather forecasts, improved production techniques, improved seeds, secure land tenure etc., then the individual farmer will decide which tools to use, and how to use them, as farmers have intimate knowledge of their own land and local conditions. What is grown is sold to markets or food distributors such as supermarkets.

The limitations of the productionist approach is that it overlooks a number of factors such as the role of TNCs and the socio-political dimensions of food security. There is also a dissonance evident in that the wine lakes and butter mountains of the Common

Markets in the 1970's and 1980's proved that good agriculture is more than simply increasing production, which in turn can lead to oversupply and gluts. As the hitherto dominant approach to food security, however, understanding the productionist discourse is important. This is one of the main approaches of food security (McKeon, 2015).

The productivist discourse has been heavily critiqued on environmental, energetic and nutritional grounds (Lang, 2011:272) so in response the current productivist description is "sustainable intensification" which uses GMO and chemical fertiliser (McKeon, 2015) and focuses on productivity per unit of water, focusing on providing smallholders with the 'right' seeds or information. Sustainable intensification is discussed in more depth in the section on agroecology in Chapter Four. The Productivist discourse is promoted by all TNCs, International Institutions such as the World Bank and IMF and some but not all International Organisations and Aid Organisations and also, increasingly, private organisations such as the Gates Foundation.

The second approach is the food sovereignty discourse which argues that this productionist view of yield per acre/person/crop is neoliberal, technologist and views peasant-based production as inefficient and basic. It counters with four 'pillars' of food security. These are the Right to Food and food sovereignty; mainstreaming family farming; the defence of access to and control over natural resources and food trade sovereignty (McKeon, 2015). Food sovereignty aims to change the existing "inequitable social political and economic structures and politics that peasant movements believe are the very cause of the social and environmental destruction in the countryside" (Wittman, Desmarais and Wiebe, 2010: 3). As part of promoting people, households and communities rights over food production, La Via Campesina, who developed the concept of food sovereignty, mainstream gender in

their policies and campaigns. The nutritional and cultural appropriateness of food is a growing part of the food sovereignty discourse.

The food justice approach views food security as a basic human right and advocates farmer-led distribution of food, grain crops in particular, as well as pointing to the political will as the key to ensuring the fair distribution of food. The core of the food justice movement is the belief that what is lacking is not food, but the political will to fairly distribute food regardless of the recipient's ability to pay. The limitation of the food justice approach is that whilst there are many stakeholders who fight for food justice, the model for achieving change is neither clearly defined nor well organised. Citing the examples of 'food deserts' in the US, (where there is little access to nutritious affordable food in some communities) it was noted that some food justice organisations,

> "…identify policy leaders as primary targets for their efforts and activities. In doing so, many of the stakeholder organizations who work in this way approach community change from a top-down perspective, believing that a policy focus will shift health outcomes. Further, collaboration between stakeholder organizations is inhibited by the inability to branch out beyond each organization's operational silos. Most often, these organizations are not focused on changing community outcomes per se, but instead, are focused on meeting their funding or political priorities" (Alkon and Agyeman, 2011:46).

This top-down model of food justice prevents efficacy due to the 'operational silos' of NGOs.

The food sovereignty approach overlaps with the food justice perspective and also asserts that food is a basic human right. The 'food sovereignty' position advocates banning the production of many cash crops in developing nations, leaving local farmers to focus on subsistence agriculture. Farmers, the movement proposes, should have sovereignty over their own produce. They also oppose 'import dumping' when low-cost subsidised food is imported from industrialised nations into developing countries. Import dumping also occurs in food aid distribution through programs like the USA's 'Food for Peace' initiative. One of the limitations of the food sovereignty approach is that, as with all rights-based movements, whilst the justice can be established as a right, it also needs to be established as fact. Some commentators have pointed to the 2008 global food crisis, climate change and the Global Financial

Crisis as having 'jolted' existing paradigms and the food governance system (DFAIT policy document, 2011) such as the food justice or climate change approaches. That there is no single international institution responsible for the management of food security was revealed by the 2008 food and financial crises. As a result there is a small but growing trend away from the free market/neoliberal discourse towards a civil society approach. The food sovereignty and food justice discourse is promoted by some Aid Organisations, such as Oxfam, and Civil Society Organisations.

Over its fifteen year existence the food sovereignty discourse is increasingly seen as "fighting against…corporate controlled globalised food system" which is "defended by some intergovernmental institutions – with the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO on the frontline – and by an array of governments whose line-up has expanded from the G8 core to include a number of emerging economies" (McKeon, 2015:80). The contested discourses are between "proponents and opponents of a global system that impact negatively on small-scale producers and consumers in all parts of the world." (McKeon, 2015:80). Critiques of the food sovereignty discourse centre around the need to solve issues such as how markets would work to meet the needs of small farmers and food consumers in a food sovereignty regime (Bernstein, 2013). Also, whose realm is sovereign and 'who is the sovereign in food sovereignty?' is a current trend in discussion. The Food Sovereignty discourse places the community and smallholder at the centre with the Right to Food and choice over the food trade but there is some recognition that it also needs to be "supported by policies adopted at higher governance levels" (McKeon, 2015:84).

The third main discourse in the food security literature is the civil society discourse. With its genesis in the freedom from want school of thought this approach draws on the food justice and food sovereignty approaches promoting a civil society approach to governance, to encourage deliberative democracy. McKeon (2009) details the UN Commission on Global Governance which started in 1992 and reported in 1995

urging that Cold War politics be replaced by core values which unite people of all backgrounds, which was aimed at bringing civil society into UN discussions and governance processes, rather than only sovereign states. Since then some UN programs and agencies developed more interactions with the NGOs and some civil society but "many central bodies were more resistant and policy dialogue forums remain dominated by governments" (McKeon, 2015: 90-92). An example of this are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which many civil society actors believe were formulated behind closed doors (green-rooming) and since then there is a growing criticism from civil society actors that the neoliberal approach of institutions increasingly dominates and that the World Bank, WTO, and IMF contest and compete with the civil society discourse, rather than dialogue with it (McKeon, 2009: 10-11). Civil Society Organisations such as La Via Campesina and FIAN and farming coalitions such as Navdanya and support this discourse, with varying degrees of Food Sovereignty or Food Justice perspectives.

These discourses are championed by different groups of actors who compete for dominance via the food governance field. The discourses also vie against each other, interrelating and reacting against each other and also in response to the wider agri-economic, political and international community contexts and so settling on definitions is key to obtaining clarity on the competing discourses.

Definitions from the Food Security Literature

Setting out key definitions also helps clarify the research. More than 30 definitions of food security have been identified (Maxwell and Frankenberger, 1992). At the most general level, food security definitions denote the availability of food and access to it from an individual perspective. The original foundational definition had a supply only focussed view (UN, 1975) which later evolved to include physical and economic access. The World Food Programme then conceptualised food security as an "assurance of supplies and a balanced supply-demand situation of stable foods in the international market" (WFP report, 1979:22; see also FAO, 1983; WFP Report, 1979; Rome Declaration, 1996). It then migrated in the 1990's to include 'social access', as in the contemporary definition: "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious

food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO, 2009:8). National definitions are mostly constellated around this definition: "the assured ability to acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways" (LSRO 1990:1560; see also Sen, 1982, MacDonald, 2012). The World Food Summit of 1996 defined food security as existing when "all people at all times have access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life."
The USDA defines food security from a household perspective; "a household-level economic and social condition of limited or uncertain access to adequate food" (United States Agriculture Department, 2012).

Three main pillars of food security are identified in the food justice literature as; food access, food availability and food use. Generally, food access is taken to mean having sufficient resources to appropriate foods. Food availability means availability of sufficient quantities of food on a consistent basis and food use is the appropriate use, (based on basic knowledge of nutrition with adequate water and sanitation). An added dimension to this is the stability of these three dimensions over time (FAO, 2009). Price volatility disrupts food access in both the short and medium term.

Stages of food insecurity vary from transient food insecurity to full-scale famines although all are degrees of food insecurity:

> "Famine and hunger are both rooted in food insecurity. Food insecurity can be categorised as either chronic or transitory. Chronic food insecurity translates into a high degree of vulnerability to famine and hunger; ensuring food security presupposes elimination of that vulnerability. [Chronic] hunger is not famine. It is similar to undernourishment and is related to poverty, existing mainly in poor countries" (Ayalew, 2012:3).

Defining food crises is also important to understanding food security. A food crisis occurs when,

> "…rates of hunger and malnutrition rise sharply at local, national, or global levels. This definition distinguishes a food crisis from chronic hunger,

> although food crises are far more likely among populations already suffering from prolonged hunger and malnutrition. A food crisis is usually set off by a shock to either supply or demand for food and often involves a sudden spike in food prices" (Timmer, 2010: 224).

Therefore food crises can be understood as a sudden spike in rates of hunger and malnutrition correlated to supply or demand shocks whereas food security is the assured access to safe, nutritious food in sufficient quantities over time.

Definitions of Famine and Hunger

Definitions of famine and hunger also differ from the definition of food security. Whilst food security refers to the availability of food, famine and hunger refer to the physical effect of the non-availability of food, a product of food insecurity. As with the definition of food security, the definition of famine has also migrated. One frequently used definition of famine is a "sudden, sharp reduction in food supply resulting in widespread hunger" (Brown and Eckholm, 1974:25). Unlike definitions of food security, there are also mortality-based definitions: "Unusually high mortality with unusually severe threat to food intake of some segments of a population" (Ravallion, 1997:1). Definitions of famine which are food consumption-based include: "sudden collapse in level of food consumption of large numbers of people" (Scrimshaw, 1987:2). Food safety, an important element in food access, is outwith the scope of this research project although it should be highlighted that each year, "over two million children die… from diarrhoeal illness caused by contaminated food and water. These preventable deaths are rarely discussed in terms of food and water security but perhaps they should be" (Death, 2011: 35).

Amartya Sen, who witnessed the Bengali famine of 1943, defines famine as "Starvation is a matter of not having enough food to eat, not a matter of there being enough food to eat" (Sen, 1981:10). Sen's famine definition follows the concept of 'entitlement failure' which Sen defines as the failure of food entitlement when one's entitlement set does not contain enough food to avoid starvation, if non-entitlement options such as charity or food aid are not present (Sen, 1981). Famine results when a significant number of people suffer from such entitlement failures at the same time. This dovetails with another assumption of this thesis that all food insecurity (and hunger) is political, using the Senyan conceptualisation of famine where the

entitlement set is engendered politically. Sen's conceptual approach to both famine and economic development plus his own belief in the political genesis of hunger are outlined further in Chapter Two. Famine is on a continuum with food insecurity but food insecurity is not just a chain of causation where food shortage causes starvation that then leads to famine. A contemporary concept of causation is that food shortages lead to initiating/ intervening factors which may themselves result in pre-famine or famine (Sen, 2013). Remembering the definition of hunger and famine as referring to the physical effects of non-availability, then hunger and famine can now be understood as 'products' of food insecurity.

The assumption is also held in this thesis that chronic and transitory forms of food insecurity differ, with chronic food insecurity being long-term and persistent and transitory food insecurity being short-term and temporary. When analysing food insecurity, the duration of the problem, which groups it effects plus the intensity or severity impact on the overall food security and nutrition status are important. Different 'scales' or 'phases' to 'grade' or 'classify' food security have been developed by food security analysts using various indicators and 'benchmarks' such as the severity of undernourishment (Stamoulis and Zezza, 2003). The most well-known scale is the Integrated Food Secure Phase Classification scale (IPC) (see Table 1 below). Food insecurity that is severe but transient can be remedied by harvest yields, adroit policies or effective governance. Severe chronic food insecurity can also be mitigated by these remedies but they have to be enduring and sustained.

The Integrated Food Security Classification scale and Famine Scales

The IPC scale, or Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), is a standardised scale that integrates food security, nutrition and livelihood information to gauge the severity of a crisis (http://www.ipcinfo.org/). Using international standards

of human welfare and livelihoods, situations can be geographically or temporally compared (ibid). The sliding scale is as follows (taken from the IPC).

Generally Food Secure: More than 80% of households can meet basic food needs without atypical coping strategies.
Borderline Food Insecure: For at least 20% of households, food consumption is reduced but minimally adequate without having to engage in irreversible coping strategies. These households cannot fully meet livelihoods protection needs.
Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis: At least 20% of households have significant food consumption gaps or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs only with irreversible coping strategies such as liquidating livelihood assets. Levels of acute malnutrition are high and above normal.
Humanitarian Emergency: At least 20% of households face extreme food consumption gaps, resulting in very high levels of acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or households face an extreme loss of livelihood assets that will likely lead to food consumption gaps. extreme loss of livelihood assets that will likely lead to food consumption gaps.
Famine/Humanitarian Catastrophe: At least 20% of households face a complete lack of food and/or other basic needs and starvation, death, and destitution are evident; and acute malnutrition prevalence exceeds 30% and mortality rates exceed 2/10000/day.

Table 1: The Food Security classification scale. Source: www.ipcinfo.org.

Famine Scales

Famine is measured here by the Howe-Devereux intensity and magnitude scales (Howe and Devereux, 2004). The Intensity Scale is 0 (Food Secure) to 5 (extreme famine).

0 has a crude mortality rate of less than 0.2 per 10k of population per day with stable food prices.
1 is Food insecure with 0.5 per 10k per day and reversible coping strategies with unstable food prices.
2 is Food Crisis with 1 fatality per 10k per day, prevalence of oedema and irreversible coping strategies.
Famine is level 3 with Crude mortality rate of 5 per day per 10k, wasting at less than 40% of the population with coping strategies exhausted and survival strategies (e.g. migration) adopted.
Severe Famine is level 4 with a CMR of 15 per 10k per day, wasting greater than 40% and widespread social breakdown.
The final stage, 5, is extreme famine with a CMR of greater than 15 per 10k per day and widespread mortality.
Intensity scales are used for specific areas. Magnitude scales give a designation of how widespread famine is:
Category A famine is called a minor famine with fatalities in the range of 0-999.
Category B (moderate famine) has fatalities at 1000-9999.
Category C is a major famine (10,000-99,999).
A great famine is category D (100,000-999,999).
A catastrophic famine (E) is measured as 1,000,000 and over.
For example, the Southern Sudan famine of 1998 was a category C, Major Famine with an intensity of 5.

Table 2: Famine Scales. (Source: Howe and Devereux , 2004: 370)

Defining 'the Field'

It is also useful to define the other key terms in the principal question. The concept of 'regime' is key to investigating a stable and secure food security regime. The definition of regime used here is " …the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area (Krasner 1982: 185). In the context of this thesis it means a food security regime. In this research the global food governance *field* is also used, aligning with Bourdieu's use of

the term to mean a structuring, contested 'space', a setting which locates actors/agents and their social position (Bourdieu, 1984). The position of each particular agent in the field is a result of interactions between the specific rules of the field plus the actor's habitus and social, economic and political capital and fields interact are hierarchical, interacting with each other (ibid).

Using *field* allows examination of the convergence of actors and power dynamics on a given issue-area and enables some analysis of the principles, rules and decision-making procedures along with other issues such as membership. Positioning the actors, those involved in the food security regime, in a food governance field in this way allows for the research method of Field Analysis to outline how the food security governance space is constituted and, by looking further into some of that membership, some of the dynamics across the field can be identified. For example, the Field Analyses in this research show that private actors are significant in the field. The interviews with actors from the food governance field undertaken for this research indicate that many are unaware of the extent of private actors in the food governance field. To facilitate the Field Analysis the term *field* is mostly used from here to discuss food security governance, although it should be noted it is not transposable with the term *regime*.

Another key term, Global Governance here

"…implies a change in the fundamental political units that rule our word, incorporating new forms of authority that recognise the technical complexity of a world characterised by economic integration" (Rosenau, 1992:66). Others comment that the new emphasis on global governance offers the opportunity to undermine "established elites and traditions of inequality", by expanding democracy (Sinclair, 2013:6; see also Sinclair, 2012:6; Dryzek, 2010 and Higgott and Erman, 2010).

Defining Food Governance

Food governance, defined as, "the institutionalised economic processes that organise and coordinate food activity among a wide variety of economic actors" (Campbell & Lindberg, 1990:636)[4] is narrower than Cooke's definition of global governance given

[4] The main institutions for food security and governance are (in chronological order); the Food and

earlier which included the governmental and intergovernmental efforts to organise and co-ordinate food activity including consumption (Cooke in Currant et al, 2010).

The large range of actions within global food governance includes more than just economic processes. It encompasses policy-making, emergency food aid responses and adjustments to agro-ecological and technological changes:

> "As the division of agricultural labour expands, food commerce intensifies, and traditional norms and customs fail by the wayside, public officials with a variety of often contradictory motives step in and attempt to fill the regulatory gap. Agencies and institutions like the World Bank, the United Nations, the General Treaty on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) loom large here but so do local policymakers who are forced to confront the changing global food regime head on-and thus find themselves in a juggling act with the fates of their communities, their careers, and their ecosystems in their hands" (Cooke in Curran et al, 2010:2).

Defining Effectiveness

It is also useful here to define 'effectiveness'. When applied to governance outputs, 'effectiveness' or 'ineffectiveness' are general, euphemistic, falsely dualistic terms with 'ineffectiveness' typically associated with 'benign failure'. How efficacious governance is in resolving food insecurity is perhaps better categorised as being one of four measures drawn from legal definitions (here the terms are borrowed from Tort law where nonfeasance means a failure to act which causes injury to another (Kionka,

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Agricultural Organisation (founded 1944), the World Food Programme (1961), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (1961), the UN Centre on Transnational Corporations (1974, abolished 1992), the Consultative Group International Agricultural Research (CGIAR, est. 1971) , World Food Council (1974, abolished 1993), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 1974) and, in reaction to the 2008 Global Food Crisis, the UN High Level Task Force on the food security crisis (HLTF, 2008), The Global Partnership of Agriculture and Food security (GPAFS, 2008) was created by the G8 in 2008. HLTF is a technical initiative with a membership of secretariat heads, technical staff of specialised agencies, Bretton Woods institutions and parts of the OECD. GPAFS has no real existence to date. The extent and overlapping remits of these institutions does seem to suggest a diffuse institutional architecture.

1988)).[5] Misfeasance is defined as neglect of duty which is 'injurious' to another (so it is 'legal'[6] but improperly informed), in which, through mistake or carelessness, there are errors or an unfortunate result. Misfeasance is without evil intent and/or violation of law (Kionka, 1988). Unlike misfeasance, 'malfeasance' is conduct in violation of the law and dishonesty, illegality, or knowingly exceeding authority for improper reasons are always factors of malfeasance (ibid). These terms and definitions are useful as a shorthand, a typology of global governance effectiveness although the illegality does not yet transfer from the domestic to international juridical realms. For the purposes of this typology, if it is the case that some GFG actors *intentionally* (i.e. knowingly) disrupt the establishment of an effective food security system then the ineffectiveness is 'malfeasance' since it involves intentionality - doing something either legally or 'morally' wrong (ibid). [7] [8]

Malfeasance, as an output or effect of global governance, arises from intentionality of one or more actors in the global governance field to disrupt the authority of the field. Malfeasance can also vary in magnitude depending on the dominance of those actors in the field. Of course when a governance issue-area is based on an issue as critical to life as climate change, food or water then any type of ineffectiveness; nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance can cause fatalities.[9] Which is an argument for further scrutiny of global governance to create a legal framework to outlaw malfeasant actions of international actors. Unfortunately the international law aspect of global

[5] Since Tort is civil law then these terms are designed for civil cases, in domestic courts against tortious actions and is applied here only to inform a typology of 'effectiveness', against which to evaluate a range of possible global food governance outcomes.

[6] Here 'legal' is defined in relation to the relevant jurisdiction.

[7] A definition of moral is, of course, culturally relative and is a much fought over definition in its own right in international ethics, where Cosmopolitanism, Realism, Liberalism and Marxism offering competing definitions. In Tort, morality is understood as an alternative normative domain than law, where there is no underwriting by coercive power of the state. Law and morality are not necessarily separate domains since they both relate to responsibility (Cane, 2002)

[8] The jurisdiction for regulation of any malfeasance in/by global governance regimes is not straightforward. Possible options include international law, regional law (such as the EU Court of Justice), or national jurisdiction, that of either the host nation-state of the injured parties or the home nation-state or the organisation. The applicability of international, rather than civil domestic law is in the international norms, rules, standards, and practices that affect corporate responsibilities. These issues are discussed in further detail in the section on corporate and organisational accountability of Trans National Corporations.

governance is outwith the scope of this research but would offer a good opportunity for future research.

With this in mind the next step in setting out the research question is to review the global governance literature with the aim of identifying the food governance space, followed by the setting out of the research design.

Global Governance

Since the mid-1990s, global governance has increasingly taken a more central in International Relations (IR) and the key theorists in the literature, such as Rosenau, aims to account for the sources, nature and effects of governance efforts organized by networks of state and non-state actors operating beyond state borders (Rosenau, 2002). Focussing on a wider range of non-state actors as well as a state-level of analysis, it examines the diffusion of power from state to non-state actors at the transnational level and the resultant increase of power and role-taking of those transnational actors. States are now only one type of actor (Katzenstein et al, 1998).

Some scholars, such as Held and Hale (2001) countenance the discussion that global governance is not working with the argument that global governance is constantly adapting and readjusting. Biermann and Pattberg (2008) develop this argument further by pointing out the dynamic features of contemporary governance; the emergence of new types of actors, the emergence of new mechanisms and non-state led institutions, and increasing fragmentation and segmentation across all levels and functional spheres.

Transnational governance states that territorial and national sovereignty can no longer be assumed (Djelic and Sahlin –Andersson, 2006) and the phrase 'governance without government' (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992) represents the view in the International Relations literature that there are many other actors in contemporary governance processes in addition to national-level actors. Networks of actors are formed as new

issues arise (Hancher and Moran, 1989) and how these actors emerge, interrelate and enter the governance 'field' is of current research interest. Capturing which actors are present in the global food governance field is of prime interest for this thesis. In addition to network of actors discursive networks exist (Marcussen, 2000; Kogut and Macpherson, 2004) where expertise and knowledge claims legitimise actors so networks and governance processes are institutionally embedded.

The two systems, government and governance also represent different democratic models with the authority system of government based on coercive rules – hard law – whereas the authority system of governance is based on non-legally binding rules, agreed with multiple authorities who can be public or private, and the various private actors can take part in authoritative regulatory processes (Cutler et al, 1999) which result in soft law and soft regulation. The common themes of governance are that of a process rather than a system of rule with measures of control, measures and managing made up of inter-subjective norms, principles and rules (Jessop, 1998; Rosenau, 1999 and 2002). Specific focus on international law in global governance is provided in the work of Reus-Smit (2004) and issues of patenting and intellectual property law and environmental treaties, so key to global food governance, are soft laws and norms (Karns and Mingst, 2009). As with the private actors in global food governance; TNCs, private voluntary organisations, civil society organisations and private foundations, the private actors in global governance more generally "regulate both states and much of transnational economic and social life" (Murphy, 2000:793) via the soft laws and norms. Dahlberg pointed out two purposes in global governance, purpose (directing and guiding) and regulating (managing, restraining and controlling) whilst pursuing the "deeper purposes that groups and societies pursue" (Dahlberg, 2001:136). Duncan situates the global governance of food within a context of embedded neoliberalism to examine the legitimacy, accountability and categorisation questions of global governance (Duncan, 2015). It is useful then, at this point to identify the portion of the global governance 'space' that governs food insecurity.

The Global Food Governance 'Space'

To examine the effectiveness of global food governance, the next step is to set out the

GFG 'space'. The provenance of GFG can be traced to the creation of the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1944 and its aim had to 'ensure freedom from hunger'. The FAO's entry was into a post war world where the food situation was in crisis. In 1946 it produced a World Food Survey, the findings of which caused its director-general, Sir John Boyd- Orr to propose "a new global mechanism to provide a means of acting together, as well as consulting together" (Staples, 2006:86). Boyd-Orr proposed a World Food Board with strong executive power to deal with production, distribution and consumption with aims of stabilising prices, establishing a world food reserve, providing "funds for the disposal of surplus agricultural products on special terms" and, lastly, to co-operate with industrial and agricultural organisations regarding trade and commodity policies (Staples, 2006:86; see FAO 1946). The proposal was seen as being 'inimical' to trade interests of the hegemonic nations (Staples, 2006:88) and so failed. Although the FAO was not invested with the powers of a food board it was given a mandate for 'global food and agriculture' (although the Soviet Union did not ratify its membership) (Clapp and Cohen, 2009).

The FAO and the UN set up the World Food Program (WFP), established in 1963 to be a multilateral food aid initiative channelling food surpluses but since the efforts in their early years arose out of donor country surpluses, the redistribution of these surpluses, even based on humanitarian motives, brought criticisms that the disposal of these surpluses relieved downward pressure on prices in the donor's own country and created food import dependency in developing countries, opening up new export markets (Clapp, 2012:30). In addition to economic benefits for donors, food aid has also been criticised for serving political objectives, particularly of the US although this critique has also been applied to Food aid from Canada and the EU (Clapp, 2012).

Following the food crisis of the 1970s the 1974 World Food Conference led to the establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in

1977, as a lender and implementer of agri-development projects. The World Food Council was established by the General Assembly of the UN in 1974 to be a coordinating body for national ministries of agriculture but it was officially suspended in 1993. Its function (which included global policy) returned to FAO in all matters except for agriculture and food trade, which were taken over by WFP. Following the Uruguay round in 2000, the WTO took over responsibility for global agreements on agricultural trade. Along with the World Bank and United Nations Development programme (UNDP), FAO co-sponsored the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in 1971 to develop agricultural research although this became dominated by the World Bank and eventually the role of FAO in technical agricultural research diminished. In the 1980's WFP became an 'autonomous programme' and resources available to the FAO decreased by 31% from 1994-2005, (not including crisis interventions) (Gustafson and Meikle in Clapp and Cohen (eds), 2009:184).

In independent external evaluations, FAO was critiqued as making 'fragmented efforts' and it has been ' conservative and slow to adapt' with a 'heavy and costly bureaucracy' (FAO, 2007). The 2007 evaluation did conclude that the role of the FAO is crucial to the global governance space, particularly for global policy coherence and also for ensuring that the interests of the rural agricultural sector and the 'hungry' are not overlooked in global governance discussions. Over 100 changes were recommended in FAO's 2007 evaluation which were incorporated into a Plan of Action which is currently being implemented. The involvement of the OECD-G77 members was a sign of a positive step yet others point out that reform is not a goal in itself, that the reduction of the hunger across the world is the aim:

> "most of the key players have now had comprehensive evaluations, including in addition to FAO, IFAD and the CGIAR system of international agricultural research centres…Most of the architecture is in place…But, despite the best efforts of all, the recent evaluations demonstrated that the international system, your international system is not working as a coherent whole. The number of the world's poor and hungry continues to grow instead of decreasing in line with the World Food Summit and Millennium Development Goals" (Mohammad S. Noori-Naeini, Chair of the FAO Council, FAO, 2008).

These eight decades have seen the proliferation of international institutions all charged with addressing the complex causes of hunger. There are, at present, over a dozen international institutions active in the field of food security. Numerous regional, non-governmental and private organisations work alongside these institutions: "This decentralized patchwork of institutions constitutes what may be best described as global food security governance" (Margulis, 2012: 231). This over proliferation of actors can contribute to weak governance:

> "Along with the general intensified globalization of social relations in contemporary history has come an unprecedented expansion of regulatory apparatuses that cover planetary jurisdictions and constituencies. On the whole, however, this global governance remains weak relative to pressing current needs for global public policy. Shortfalls in moral standing, legal foundations, material delivery, democratic credentials and charismatic leadership have together generated large legitimacy deficits in existing global regimes" (Scholte, 2007).

Although the UN system has traditionally been charged with addressing global hunger, principally through its three food agencies, the FAO, IFAD and the WFP, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) also effects GFG and since the UN and WTO have dramatically competing organisational rationales there are:

> "Major tensions between these two regimes, with WTO trade rules making agriculture and food increasingly subject to market forces, while, in sharp contrast, the UN advances a human rights approach to food and a greater role for states and deeper constraints on the market. The WTO's expanding authority over food security has prompted this counter-movement by the UN system, with UN institutions actively seeking to shape WTO trade rules in an attempt to limit the negative impacts of trade liberalisation on world food security" (Margulis, 2012:1).

This demonstrates the countervailing pulls of free trade neoliberalism and pro-rights international institutions across the food governance space. Margulis sets out an image of international organisations as 'semi-autonomous actors' who "influence outcomes at competing institutional sites of global governance" (Margulis, 2012:1).

This also includes the World Bank and the IMF, and illustrates a point developed later in Chapter Two, that there is a lack of accountability and little oversight or democratic input of these institutions, "no matter how well intentioned" (Harvey, 2006:68). With this patchwork of democratically weak institutions, the counter-pull of neoliberalism trade rules on the food system is more significant, meaning that the governance is contradictory and conflicted.

At each of the 'competing institutional sites' that Margulis defines, varying configurations of state and non-state actors pursue competing objectives and regulatory outcomes. From examining new efforts to govern land grabbing at the global level, Margulis asserts that a better understanding of the intrinsics of global governance can be gleaned from how different actors such as civil society organisations (CSO), IOs and private sector actors and Nation-States (N-S) exercise power in transnational negotiations and how they shape an emergent global governance regime (Margulis, 2013).

Therefore, changes to the food governance space are possible. Another comparable governance area of interest is the institutional negotiations around Climate Change, which illustrates the potential of a dynamic governance regime. In this parallel Human Security issue, the scientific intergovernmental body, the International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), was set up in 1988 at the request of member governments and by two UN organisations; the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) (more than 120 governments are currently involved in the IPCC). The IPCC was subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly. Thousands of experts including scientists and environmentalists contribute on a voluntary basis, writing a 'Summary for Policymakers' which is subject to detailed approval by the governments.

At the regional level and also of interest to GFG is the European Court of Justice's legal judgment on the applicability of criminal sanctions for bodies who breach EU legislation on Climate Change [9] and also a second legal judgement on the issue of

[9] Norman notes that the 'environmental crimes case' was against the explicitly stated preferences of a vast majority of member state governments. The Community gained the competence to impose on member states the enforcement of Community law via the use of criminal sanctions. The political significance of the decision at the time was considerable since national systems of criminal law are generally regarded as sovereign. (Norman, 2014).

light arms control [10] (Norman, 2014). The Commission effectively brought these two policy issues from the area of intergovernmental cooperation into the supranational framework of the European Community. Can these recent developments in the governance of land grabs, climate change and gun control be reproduced for food security? At the European level some political will amongst member states for addressing food security is evident from recent developments such as the land grabs ruling which outlaws grabs by the EU in 2013. Also the recent discussion about the non-commoditisation of food in the EU is directly relevant. It is interesting to note another countervailing pull on global governance, this time by the EU.

Mapping out the food governance field is the first step for the research design to enable investigation into the ineffectiveness of the global food governance field.

Theoretical Perspectives and Research Design

With the assumptions, definitions and theoretical context to this research question outlined, the next point is to briefly set out the theoretical perspectives and research design drawn from the bodies of literature. It will first outline the theoretical perspectives, then the research design, and then discuss the constraints on designing such a research project, mindful that certain theoretical approaches demand specific methodologies and different theories may explain the same events differently "all theories include varying levels of structural understanding" (Wight, 2006:288).

A Marxist perspective is drawn upon to understand the current food insecurity situation in that structural factors drive the current food system, factors which have arisen due to the anarchical international society. There is enough food produced

[10] In this second case, the 'small arms case', the Commission gained the right to enact measures in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the Community's development policy framework (Norman, 2014). In both examples the Commission, which is an international administrative body, successfully challenged the Council and the member states in the European Court of Justice (Norman, 2014).

annually to feed the world so one of the key questions is why is there an apparent lack of political will to fairly distribute food (Battisti, 2014). Dependency theory, the differentiation between core, peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, and the global economy, specifically the global organisation of production and global finance (see Cox in Gill, 1993) and the smallholder/peasant's commuted role due to the international division of labour are all key influences in this thesis. Marxism and global governance studies examine the challenges of globalisation through examination of the means of production and power (see Callinicos, 2002). Some elements from the food sovereignty perspective, that the business practices of the TNCs are a form of neo-colonialism, are also taken into account, specifically in contextualising the current food security situation and enabling Critical Analysis. Field Theory is also drawn upon as a theoretical perspective and is used as the methodological approach to understand the organisation of the food governance field, and this is covered in more depth in Chapter Three.

The Research Design and Methods

This investigation uses the following research methods. Firstly, a Bourdieusian Field Analysis of the global food governance field, to set out the main actors in the field and to define, their 'governance criteria' such as their economic capital. The second research method is qualitative research, consisting of semi-structured interviews with senior executives in the global food governance field. The third method is case studies with one organisation from each of the four sectors of the global governance field. These four case studies will illustrate the findings from the Field Analysis and qualitative research.

The selection of these methods is justified on the basis that the global governance of food security is a multi-factored problem with many levels of 'structural understanding', and many variables, too many independent variables to run a positivist quasi-experiment or establish a causative link between any one factor and food security. If we perceive that there are two ways to test theories - either experimentation or observation - then with experimentation not being viable, observation is the required approach (Van Evera, 1997).

Alternative research designs were also considered. A comparative case-study approach was considered as the major methodology for the research design but this would have investigated a variable of commonalities and differences between, say food crises and insecurity, rather than addressing the variable of effective governance of food insecurity. The scale and imperative in the problem of global governance itself needs a more direct attempt at addressing the issue of ineffective food security governance. So rather than a comparative case study, the use of methods in this thesis involves Field Analysis, interviews and brief case studies which together will inform a map of the structure and practices of the international institutional system. This combination of research methods will allow both explanation and analysis. It will yield the data needed to answer the research question with specificity, for example, what are the obstacles to attaining a stable food system? What is the architecture of the global food governance field? This research design will allow for a description of the current global food governance space and, using a Critical Approach in interpreting the data, an interpretative analysis of the remedies needed to establish a stable and effective food security governance system. This will be done in sequence over the middle chapters with a view to identifying and then analysing the field. This is a standard approach in research because "There are always two stories to tell, one explanatory and the other interpretive, and that they cannot finally be combined" (Hollis and Smith, 1994, cited in Wight, 2006:255). Robert Cox articulates a distinction between critical and problem-solving theories with the former "raising questions about the historical location of both the theorist and his or her theory" (Fierke, 2007:1) and the latter reckoning the world as it is and attempting to find solutions (Cox, 1981)

As has been set out so far, the overall research objective is to investigate the global food governance field with a research design that identifies the main actors and architecture, analyses global food governance issues through the viewpoint of interviews with actors involved in the global governance field and depicts one

organisation from each sector of global food governance by case study. The research is constructed this way in an attempt to answer the research questions. Combining methods can be a powerful approach, "as each method can, to some degree, offset the limitations of other methods" (Bennett, 2007:171). The original conceptualisation of the research design did not include the Field Analysis but when the search for a 'map' of the global food governance field to enable the selection of respondents for the interviews proved fruitless, then its necessity became apparent. A modification of Bourdieusian Field Analysis was chosen as the method due to the disparate architecture of the field, (which ranges from NGOs through TNCs to peasant networks as each have some role in the global food governance).

Therefore, the research is looking for 'structural understanding', by examining the actors, processes and issues in global food governance. It outlines any causal mechanism in food security and crises or the governance of them but is not setting out to establish causation *per se*. So the research design aims to support the research puzzle drawn from the literature review to explain, understand and interpret the global governance of food insecurity, based on the question of how food insecurity is governed. Individual introduction to each of the three components and methods now follows.

Field Analysis: Mapping The Global Food Governance Field

A map of the global food governance space and the relevant institutions and actors is essential. Field Analysis enables a scoping of the main remit and main actors involved in the GFG. Bourdieu's Field Theory allows the examination of the field as a contested space, the rules of the 'game' (*doxa*) and the habitus of those who occupy the field. Effectiveness of the International Organisations overall will also be evaluated in the elite interviews. Other organisations evaluated include Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), Trans National Corporations (TNC), who fulfil a political role in food security as well as Civil Society Organisations (CSO), who are largely marginal Chapter Three contains the results and findings from the Field Analysis.

Qualitative Interviews

Chapter Four contains the interview results and case studies. The ten interviews evaluate the global food governance field and are also used for corroborative and additive purposes, to provide new information on the real-world experience of food insecurity. As semi-structured interviews they allow for deeper qualitative insights and have many benefits, allowing for flexibility, such as being centred around a cluster of themes and issues. Semi-structured interviews can also test official statistics and by not restricting respondents to a set list of questions and can allow for respondent questions, comments, further qualitative points and even counter narratives to the hegemonic narrative to be expressed (Cresswell, 2007). The interviews are looking for a critical analysis of the global food governance field itself.

Case Studies

The four case studies are each drawn from a sector in global food governance and are the World Food Programme (IO/NGO), Monsanto (TNC), the Gates Foundation (Charity) and La Via Campesina (Civil Society Organisation). In addition to corroboration, an aim of the case study can also be illustrative: "Case study methods, especially the combination of process tracing and typological theorizing, have considerable advantages in studying complex phenomena" (Bennett & Elman, 2007:171). The case study can also provide an opportunity for a close focus on the issue of food security and to also usefully intensively illustrate the theories. David Collier points to the special contributions of "researchers who are experts at 'extracting new ideas at close range'…these scholars are deeply engaged both with theory and with the close analysis of cases, giving them an unusual capacity to see the general in the particular… [and develop] differentiated and more closely focused concepts" (Collier, 1999: 4). The fifth and final chapter offers a synthesized analysis and recommendations to achieve effective global governance of food security.

In summary, this chapter has introduced the topic, set out the research questions, key definitions and assumptions, established the disciplinary locus, scoped the food security problem and food governance space, and described the research approach, objectives and design. It also reviews the most relevant bodies of literature. It then sets out the theoretical perspective and sets out the research design, outlining each of the three methods.

Chapter Two continues the discussion on food security discourses by reviewing bodies of literature which are more contextual to the topic, namely the globalisation, human security, development and international political economy literatures. The wider point that all hunger is political is established as a core understanding. The politics of hunger and famine are also discussed.

In conclusion, with one in seven currently going hungry and this possibly worsening to one in three in the next 40 years, food security is of paramount importance to the future of human security and the globe. Biofuel cropping, climate change, globalisation, peak oil and the commoditisation of food have all contributed to the degrading food security situation as has the ineffective governance of food insecurity at national, international and global levels. Since the 2008 food crisis it has become apparent that the effectiveness of the global governance of food, along with climate change governance, is now at the very centre of humanity's fate.

Chapter Two The Lie of the Land: The Politics of Food security.

"There is no such thing as an apolitical food problem" Amartya Sen (1982).

As established in the last chapter, food insecurity is a key element of Human Security and is one of the dominant threats of the 21st Century. Interrogating the global governance of food security in this context needs to first identify the political contexts. Understanding food security as food access rather than just supply of food *per se* alters both the conceptualisation of food security and the questions about the governance of food. If, as Sen proposes in the opening quote of this chapter, no food problem is apolitical, then to what extent is food insecurity driven by political factors? And to what degree can these political drivers and contexts be improved to mitigate food insecurity? How is entitlement to access of food decided and by whom? Additionally, how important is the political dimension of food security to evaluating the global governance of food?

Political Contexts of Food Security

To answer these questions, this chapter continues the literature review on globalisation to set out the political contexts to food insecurity and delineate obstacles to establishing an effective food security regime. The second section in this chapter has a further discussion on the main relevant discourses in global governance, such as the role and scope of International Organisations and asks what could effective global governance of food security achieve? This description further defines the research puzzle, forms the platform into the research results and analysis in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

McDonald suggests that solutions to food insecurity can be classified as two-fold: either addressing the causes (cause-focussed) or addressing the manifestations of food insecurity (effects-focussed) (McDonald, 2012). Yet challenges to achieving food

security arise from not addressing not only the causes and effects of food crises and food insecurity but also the political dimension of food insecurity. Many commentators frequently point out that there is enough food to feed the world's population but "it is increasingly evident that the problem is not so much a technical one of producing more food as a political one of ensuring that food is available to those who need it" (McKeon, 2011:1). The levels of global governance responses to these factors vary from none/ad-hoc/some/full response and, it is argued here, are themselves often shaped by political agendas and motivations. Therefore the effectiveness of global governance policy solutions vary across causes, effects and political dimensions of food insecurity and as such, are often neither as urgent nor as effective as the degrading food security situation demands. [11] This 'cause-or-effects' solution categorisation is an important distinction, which is useful as a ready reckoner for quickly identifying the type of solution. Food aid, for example is effects-focussed whilst food trade stimulation measures are cause-focussed. Initiatives which empower women are examples of a solution which addresses the 'political' dimension of food insecurity.

[11] Over-nutrition, or excessive net energy intake, is often taken as being the other side of the coin from under-nutrition and both often classed as malnutrition (McDonald, 2012). Malnutrition is a form of structural violence, as defined by Galtung's definition of an impairment of fundamental human needs and Gilligan's of "the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them" (Gilligan, 1997: 89; see also Galtung, 1969). .

Food Insecurity Factors and causes	**Food insecurity Cause?**	**Food insecurity Challenge**	**Current Global Governance policy response?**	**Whose remit? (i.e. which Sector)**
Biofuels	Yes	Yes	Exacerbated by GG policy	GG + N-S
Commoditisation of food	Yes	Yes	Exacerbated by GG policy	GG + NS, TNC
Decrease in food trade and exchanges	Yes	Yes	None	GG + TNC
Effects of Global Credit Crisis	No	Yes	None	GG + TNC
Effects of Peak Oil & oil crisis	Yes	Yes	Biofuels	GG+N-S +TNC
Effects of the Water crisis	Yes	Yes	None	GG + TNC
Environmental factor: crop failure	Yes	Yes	Ad hoc/reactive	GG + N-S
Environmental factor: land degradation (deforestation/desertification)	Yes	Yes	Yes –some mitigating policies	GG+ NS+CS
Environmental factor: droughts	Yes	Yes	Ad hoc/reactive	GG, N-S CS
Financialisation of agricultural trade	Yes	Yes	Exacerbated by GG policy	GG +TNC
Financialisation of poverty	No	Yes	Exacerbated by GG policy	GG+ N-S +TNC
Fossil fuel dependent agriculture	Yes	Yes	None	GG + N-S +TNC
Interest of corporate actors	No	Yes	Exacerbated by GG policy	TNC
Lack of plurality of International actors	No	Yes	Exacerbated by GG policy or practice	GG+CS
Land deals/land grabs	Yes	Yes	Exacerbated by GG policy or practice	GG +NS+ TNC
Neoliberal policies	Yes	Yes	Exacerbated by GG policy	GG + N-S +TNC
Population Explosion	Yes	Yes	None	N-S
Climate Change	Yes	Yes	Some/piecemeal	GG +N-S
Corruption/kleptocracy/dictatorship	Yes	Yes	No	N-S

Table 3 Food Insecurity Factors and Causes (compiled from multiple sources). Key: GG=Global Governance level. N-S =Nation-State. TNC-Trans National Corp. CS=Civil Society.

Compiled in Table 3 above are 19 causes and factors which are challenges to establishing a stable food security governance system. These are drawn from food security literature. Each factor is also a food insecurity challenge but not necessarily a cause of food insecurity in itself for example the effects of the global financial crisis are not directly a cause of food insecurity (but are a challenge). Neither is the lack of plurality of actors in global governance a cause but it is a challenge (although this later thesis argues that it is also a cause). The level of global governance response is estimated from the literatures and indicated. Seven of these factors and causes have no current global governance response, four have some sort of global governance policy response (of which three have an ad hoc or piecemeal policy response). As for the balance, the remaining eight causes/factor are exacerbated by global governance policy response. For example biofuels cropping, which uses arable land to grow biofuels rather than food is exacerbated by the global governance policy which saw this as a route to replacing fossil fuel dependence. The column on the extreme right of Table 3 displays the remit (not in a self-conferred meaning of remit but in a statutory sense (for IOs), or 'who has responsibility' sense) and it can be seen that most of these have IOs, TNCs (as commercial actors) or Nation-States down as the global governance sector holding responsibility. This is not equal to taking responsibility but more of a mechanism to start to appraise and equate the multiple causes of food insecurity with a sector. As new policies initiate and develop, this table will change but it is a snapshot of the food security causes and factors discussed offered in the literatures.

To aid analysis of the effectiveness of global food governance policies, a 'performance gap' in global governance is identified, arising from a number of questions on how effective global food governance has been to date.[12] To fully address these questions, the next step is to outline the politics of food insecurity and famine. Then the political contexts of the causes and obstacles are critically analysed

[12] Principally, what is currently being done by the global food governance actors and how effective are these measures? What needs to be done to establish a stable and effective food security regime? How can global governance effectively address these causal factors and impediments to establishing food security? How can the causes and drivers of food insecurity be overcome and should global governance first develop cause-focussed solutions or effects-focussed solutions (or both, given their sometime overlap) and what are the constraints to them doing so? Given the forecasted exponential rise of the human cost of this problem, what should the targets of effective governance be? Lastly, which political agenda and political culture changes need to be made to enable International Organisations to fully face and address the devastating food security crisis?

before moving on to reviewing the current global governance food security field asking, who are the actors and 'in whose interest do they act'?

In line with the Food Justice approach to food security, the view that food insecurity is caused by inequity in food access, food use and distribution of food makes a case that hunger is political. To analyse what this means for establishing an effective and stable food security governance regime, it is useful to first deepen the understanding of the political dimension of food insecurity, that is the politics of hunger and famine.

The Politics of Hunger

As introduced earlier, Sen's main argument is that famine is not only a lack of food but also arises from inequalities in the mechanisms for distribution of food (Sen, 1981) and that food insecurity (and the hungry) are manifestations of these legal and economic inequalities (Sen, 1982). Examining the Bengal Famine of 1943, Sen argues that it was caused by an economic boom predominantly in urban areas which resulted in food prices increasing. Earning wages which could not purchase the amount or quality of food required, millions of rural workers in Bengal died of starvation. Famines do not always necessarily mean that food supplies are significantly reduced. Instead, Sen argues, famine was lack of monetary means to buy food as prices increased due to buying behaviours and factors caused by the war. These behaviours included hoarding, panic buying and acquisition by the British military (Sen, 1981). This entitlement approach argued against the Malthusian tradition of undersupply of food instead emphasising the restricted access to food, through lack of entitlements which consist of endowments and entitlements. Endowment equates to the control of assets and some resources such as labour power. Entitlement refers to "the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of right and opportunities that he or she faces" (Sen, 1984, p. 497, cited in Devereux, 2001, p. 246).

Initiating Factors Of Famine	Common Policy Responses For Famine
Food Availability Decline	Tax Relief
Market Dynamics	Pastoral Protection
Government Response	Early Warning System
International Response	Food Support Mechanisms
Conflict Or War	Good National Governance
Crop Failure	Freedom Of Speech/Press
Market Failure	Microfinance
Failed Economy	

Table 4: Factors of Famine and Responses.

Source: Compiled from: West, 2005; Sen, 1981.

As can be seen from Table 4 above initiating factors of famine include measures of ineffective government and governance therefore ineffective governmental and international responses can cause famine and food insecurity. Signals of famine include drops in food availability, crop failure and a failing economy. The ratio of these factors may vary from case to case but they are each factors which initiate famine. However, the conventionally proscribed common policy solutions for famine (right hand column, Table 4) include measures of democratisation, such as freedom of speech but no social protection policy to shore up ineffective governments, nor redress of the failure of international response (or any other governance performance gap). There is a mismatch between the initiating factors of famine and the common policy solution for famine (and therefore extreme food insecurity) as mentioned in the literatures. The initiating factors are cause-focussed and the solutions are effects-focussed and this is a pairing typical of food insecurity resolution. There are economic measures in the policy solutions but no governance measures. This mismatch may represent a lack of cognisance or political will to reform global governance, a rejection of the food justice approach and its assertion that hunger is political or perhaps even devolution of the responsibility for addressing famine to the nation-state.

Critics of Sen's entitlement approach point to its food perspective, which ignores other contextual factors to famine such as social disruption (deWaal, 1990; Osmani, 1993). Critics of Sen have also commented that a significant decline in food availability may have contributed significantly to the Bengal Famine after all. In response, Sen states that food production had been higher that year than the

production in previous years and a number of socio-economic factors, namely declining wages, poor food-distribution systems, rising food prices and unemployment were also at play (Sen, 2009). These factors led to starvation and, Sen comments, it is important to note that it was only certain groups in society who were affected, namely those who did not have the capability to pay for the high food prices. This analysis of famine is also relevant to food insecurity and food crises. It is the cost of food and inequalities in the distribution of food that are the drivers for food insecurity. The price spikes in food crises impacts on those low-paid groups without the capability to endure even a short-term rise in prices. It is not the freedom to buy food that is affected but the freedom to have the capability to buy food.

In his later work Sen further evolved this 'capability' approach to understanding famine and Table 5 below sets out the definitions of the main terms. Having the *capability* to obtain food or vote is what matters since having the 'right' is only hypothetical if the capability does not exist alongside (Sen, 2009). In short, rights like food access or equality may be legal rights but also need to be physically attainable. 'Functionings' are the constituent elements of capability and can vary from, in the instance of voting, education and literacy down to transportation to the polls. When functionings enable the capability to access rights, then personal choice is present. In this way, development is about obtaining freedom (Sen, 2012). Freedom without the capability to exert personal choice in the deployment of freedom is, Sen proposes, an empty right.

Term	Definition
Entitlement	Having the legal means to secure enough food plus other commodities to survive. Entitlement is based on endowment and exchange.
Endowment	Having resources to exchange (internal). This includes labour, cash, access to credit and assets. Endowment loss means depleting resources.
Exchange	Dependent on the cost of living (external) - the opportunities in the market to exchange other commodities.
Capability	This is a measure of functional capabilities and has five components in assessing a person's capability. • The importance of real freedoms. • Differences across individuals in the capability to transform resources into valuable activities. • The range of nature of activities giving rise to happiness. • Both materialistic and non-materialistic factors used to evaluate human welfare. • Concern about the distribution of opportunities within society.

Table 5: Sen's Food-related Welfare Economics terms and definitions. (Compiled from Anand P, Santos C and Smith R, 2009 and Sen, 1981).

Applying this 'development as freedom' approach to food insecurity further, if a livelihood is not enough, in food security terms, to have on-going access to quality, nutritionally appropriate food, then securing the right to food access, although an important statement of equality, remains an empty concept if the functionings and capability exist for all to obtain food on an on-going basis without resorting to coping strategies such as selling land or debt loading, which jeopardise future food security (Sen, 1981, Sen, 2009). Under this approach it is inequality and lack of justice and freedom which inhibit food security. Issues which, in light of the effects of globalisation and the crisis of advanced capitalism outlined next in this chapter, may be best remedied with well-developed policy solutions at the global governance level, perhaps implemented at a national level. Although Sen states that famines do not occur in functioning democracies due to public opinion and representative governance, extreme food insecurity and food crises, (stages two and three of the five-level famine intensity scale) now do (see Table 2 for the famine scales). The current exigencies of the sovereign debt crisis in European countries like Greece or Spain or the over one million users of food banks in the U.K. (BBC, 2014) show that whilst the intensity and magnitude of famine may not be present in advanced democracies (a minor famine is measured by WFP and USAID as level four on the intensity scale)

democratic governance is no bulwark against food insecurity or early stage famine. In advanced industrial societies the problem of food insecurity is often represented as an individual rather than systemic problem. If stages two or three of the famine scale are consistently evident in the food deserts of the US or across UK housing schemes where many depend on food banks, then these are systemic problems which show chronic food insecurity.[13]

If Sen's conceptualisation of 'democratic food capability' is no longer entirely applicable in the face of the phenomenon of global food insecurity, then is it possible that food insecurity and famine are by-products of globalisation and advanced capitalism? The Human Security view of food insecurity as one of the most relevant approaches of threat and risk to the individual is also important to Sen's entitlement and capabilities concepts. Continuing the distinction between cause-focussed and effects-focussed solutions for achieving food security, the next section goes onto analyse with more specificity the global economic and political contexts of food insecurity. This builds towards the argument that effective global governance and not necessarily just democratic national-level government is key to addressing food insecurity.

Locating Food Security in Human Security

Food security is most frequently positioned as part of Human Security studies. Human Security itself is most times located in the International Relations discipline rather than Development Studies or Human Geography *per se* because, as soft security, it sits within Security Studies (Cottey, 2011:192). The main focus in Human

[13] Of course it is morally inequivalent to discuss the threat of famine in so-called 'first world' nations whilst famines do sap developing economies across the globe. The point made here is to use recent events to counter Sen's assertion regarding democracy as an indicator of food security and instead highlight that food insecurity is now truly a global phenomenon and it can no longer be presumed that functioning democracies are immune. This underscores the point made earlier that political freedom is not the default solution to food insecurity or even the solution itself (Sen, 2009).

Security is from the individual, rather than the state or collective perspective but placing it in International Relations underscores the point that International Relations has not always addressed the individual level perspective. A brief overview of Human Security follows next and a more detailed setting out of the causes of food insecurity follows in Chapter Two.

As one of the main subject focus in the larger intellectual map, Human Security describes 'a condition of existence' which includes basic material needs, human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, and an active participation in democracy from the local to the global (Fierke, 2007).

Globalisation plus the failure of liberal state building due to the Washington Consensus,[14] the reducing threat of nuclear war between the superpowers, the end of the Cold War and the spread of democratisation and international human rights norms are all contributory factors in moving the focus from the state onto the individual. The proliferation and increase of new security threats at the end of the Cold War gave rise to a new security agenda which included the environment, migration, poverty and human rights (Fierke, 2007). To adapt to these new security threats, the referent object expanded to include other objects rather than just nation-states e.g. communities, individuals and the world itself. This avoids limiting the study of security to a one-way causal relationship and instead looks at the issue which poses the greatest threat and which should therefore be the target.

This decreasing relevance of traditional definitions of security to the contemporary world was foregrounded with two developments in the mid-1990s (Fierke, 2007). The UN Human Development Reports of 1990 and 1994, with their development of security and development discourses, established the point that without justice there could be no peace – underdevelopment is a threat in itself in that it has a correlation with violent conflict (Fierke, 2007). Human Security emphasises meeting basic material needs as well as preserving human dignity. Out of this came the assumption that the Liberal Democratic model would help to establish peace. As we have seen above, there is no guaranteeing peace through liberal institutions alone.

[14] The Washington Consensus, in its more commonly used broader definition of 'stabilise, liberalise and privatise' peaked in the 1990s and ended with the 2008-09 financial crisis which saw a Keynesian resurgence of fiscal stimuli and expansionist monetary policy. These 'first generation' macroeconomic and trade reforms have been augmented with non-Washington consensus reforms such as programmes to support the poor, educational improvements and institutional reforms.

A new Human Security agenda arose from both the recognition of this new global reality of failed and collapsed states and the 1990 and 1994 UNDP reports, themselves precipitated by the growing human rights, sustainable development and human development discourses which called for an approach to addressing human insecurity. [15]

The UNDP 1994 report argued that human security needs both 'Freedom from Fear' and 'Freedom from Want' and these two schools of thought emerged over the scope of the threats and the mechanisms for protection. The Freedom from Fear approach seeks to prioritise protecting individuals from violent conflicts whilst recognising that these violent threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and other inequalities. Emergency assistance, conflict prevention and resolution and peace-building are the main concerns of this approach. The Freedom from Want school advocates a wider approach to human security, incorporating security and development goals, arguing that the scope of threats should include threats to security like hunger, disease and natural disasters because they are so often at the root of human insecurity and more devastating in scale than genocide, terrorism and wars combined. The concept of food insecurity partly arises from the Freedom from Want school (UNDP, 1994).

Human insecurity is widely recognised as an issue which, due to the scale of those affected, supersedes state insecurity. Recent developments which include the increase in the number of failed states, the rising number of civilians killed in conflict versus military, and environmental degradation (which affects more livelihoods) have meant the need to include a focus on the individual-as-referent is clearly understood. Fierke argues that against the 'backdrop' of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina and the lack of

[15] Despite the declaration at the World Food Summits of 1996 and 2002, the 'eradication of hunger' was downplayed as an actual development objective although lobbying by the FAO resulted in the "eradication of hunger" being included in the Millennium Development Goals. The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) range from halving extreme poverty to halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the target date of 2015. The blueprint set in 2000 in the United Nations Millennium Declaration aimed to form a Global Partnership to reduce extreme

protection for citizens of failed states, "…[they have] exposed the vulnerability of the world's military and economic hyperpower" and a new meaning of security as 'protection from harm' has emerged (Fierke, 2007:10).

The desire for security, Fierke argues, arises from the shared experience of the individual's and community's vulnerability. The juxtaposition of the traditional focus of security studies, that of individuated "states preparing for military defence against enemies" throws the challenge of defining security for the contemporary world into the spotlight (Fierke 2007:10). Whom one chooses to protect, though, is political. The traditional viewpoint of the protection of those bounded by the state has been challenged since the state can also be a source of threat to its inhabitants. Two examples frequently put forward are the erosion of civil liberties in the Homeland Act in the US and the rise of covert surveillance by the UK following the so-called 'War on Terror' (Fierke, 2007). The trade-off between liberty and security is renegotiated by the ongoing consensus and dissensus within the state. 'Fear of poverty and achieve a set of time-bound goals.

The 2010 Review Summit adopted a Global Action Plan to achieve the eight anti-poverty goals by their 2015 target date with major new commitments on women's and children's health, and major new initiatives in the worldwide battle against poverty, hunger and disease (UN MDG website, accessed 12 September 2013).

Food Loss' is often used as a political gambit and is a recurrent driver in conflict. The political manipulation of fear commonly use entitlement to food as a political reward and fear of its loss can garner popular support and shape the boundaries of a group, defined by those who are and are not entitled to food access. [16] Even humanitarian intervention such as food aid could be seen as ongoing exploitation by foreign powers (Fierke, 2007), a form of 'recycled imperialism' (Chomsky 1999). This legacy of imperialism is perpetuated by globalisation, which is discussed in detail in the review of the literature on advanced capitalism.

[16] One recent example of this is Greece's extreme right-wing group Golden Dawn, who provide food to those who prove they are Greek but not to immigrants (Alderman, L., 2012 Right-Wing extremists popularity rising rapidly in Greece, New York Times, 30/9/2012).

The Critical approach to security proposes that, since the present is 'hardwired' to the past then the present situation cannot be assessed without reference to the historical context and legacies which shape the current structures. This also explains why international responses to violence or suffering, such as food insecurity, arise from an intention and assumed responsibility to 'fix' a problem. This explains criticisms of 'sticking plaster' solutions that respond to moments of crisis rather than addressing the underlying structural reasons for the perpetuation of crises. Which is not to condemn any humanitarian response to a crisis, which should be as quick and as comprehensive as the situation demands. Instead it is make a point against only transient remedies. Any imperative of the moral agency of the international actors is met when they respond to the crisis of powerless victims. Yet there is surely also an unmet moral imperative to overhaul or reform the international structures, to address any unjust post-colonial overhang which might perpetuate the situation of these powerless victims and crises. Indeed contemporary practices can "reproduce hierarchies of power" and "contribute to the reproduction of war and insecurity" (Fierke 2007:9). This reproduction of war and insecurity is accompanied by the reproduction of these transient remedies. This creates a cycle of issue-response (or sometimes non-response) which, it can be argued, address the symptoms but not the pathology. When it comes to food security, is it the case that international actors, such as the FAO and WFP by reproducing the structures of power and knowledge, cause the problems that they are also trying to solve? If so, this would mean that food insecurity can be placed into the category of a super-wicked problem [17] which adds focus onto the agencies tasked with remedying the situation. This also raises a further question about intentionality of international actors, which is also discussed further in Chapter Two and in the qualitative research in Chapter Four.

[17] Under the Levin (2012) definition of super-wicked problems the other criteria are 1. Time is running out. 2. No central authority. 3. Those seeking to solve the problem are also causing it. 4. Policies discount the future irrationally. While the items that define a wicked problem relate to the problem itself, the items that define a super wicked problem relate to the agent trying to solve it. Global warming is also a super wicked problem. Conklin (2005) expanded Churchman's (1967) term.

Critique of Human Security

Critics of the concept of Human Security point to the problem of making the individual the key referent of security - it removes agency from the state which is the conventional agent through which human security can be obtained. The state is "a necessary condition for individual security because without the state it is not clear what other agency is to act on behalf of individuals" (Buzan 2000:6). It should be recognised, however, that human insecurity proliferates in all societies. NGOs and IOs point to the erosion of Human Security despite structural adjustment programmes and other liberal model actions and instead call for the transformation of global structures and economy (Fierke, 2007). For issues like food security, Human Security creates the necessary paradigm for a human-centred approach, around which actions and policies can be actioned. It establishes the forces of globalisation as being multiple threats to the individual, manifested in the socio-economic inequalities of the globalised world. Food Security sits in this thematic locus of Human Security.

If not the individual nor always the state, this then passes the agency for Human Security onto other structures and agents. Thomas points to the global level:

> "the shift to human security…highlights the importance of scrutinising global processes that may impact on, even jeopardise security and the global governance structures which drive these processes" (Thomas, 2009:9).

Food Insecurity, manifest in each nation-state, also requires the scrutiny of global governance structures. The traditional viewpoint of development assumes the transition from a subsistence to a modern industrial economy to be a process understood as reliant on modern science, technology and driven by elites.
It assumes that non-Western states are, due to unlimited economic growth, in transition to achieving living standards akin to Europeans or North Americans. Yet food insecurity is endemic in Europe and North America too. As evidenced by the rise and proliferation of food banks since the financial crash of 2008, new specific food insecure phenomena such as 'hidden hunger' or 'food deserts' are developing. Are Nation-States now developed only in pockets with other parts of the state underdeveloped or in stasis? Do these zones and communities suffer from chronic rather than transient food insecurity?

In contrast to the Liberal Development model, Worlds Systems Theory proposes a core periphery structure of development with the industrial core overdeveloped and the periphery underdeveloped (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008; Wallerstein, 1974). This resonates with the wider Marxist analysis of the capitalist world economy consisting of those who control the means of production developing the North or exploiting the underdeveloped South. Whichever *weltshaaung*, or world view, is drawn upon, the existence of food insecurity in the core/North/West/former colonial powers as well as the periphery/South/Third World/former colonies points to the need for a less Manichean, more nuanced understanding of food insecurity, if the future challenges are to be addressed. Food insecurity is a human security threat no longer zonable, like environmental degradation, it faces the whole of humanity.

For some, though, the question of responsibility for food insecurity also remains unattributable. Some argue that since global governance is not an agent, then agency cannot be attributed to it (Sinclair, 2012). Governance is not government, but it can guide, shape, collaborate and lead. It has already been proposed that the agency of food security could lie with global food governance since there are supra-national issues to be addressed. Indeed, the question is asked if ineffective global food governance, in failing to remedy the food insecurity, could even be a contributing factor? For example if the practices of TNCs, the institutional silos of the IOs or the dearth of international regulation of the financial/commodities markets have created the conditions in which food insecurity proliferates? This further indicates that food insecurity is a super-wicked problem. This research investigates if global governance is part of the problem and is the level at which the solutions need to be formulated. To detail the global food governance space, a Field Analysis is set out in Chapter Three.

Food Insecurity: Crisis of Advanced Capitalism?

For many, recent food crises and food insecurity can be mostly contextualised into a wider context of Western dominance associated with globalisation, postmodernism and neoliberalism with agency attributed to the West. The neoliberalist paradox of extreme unaddressed inequality resonates with Bourdieu's 'double meaning' of globalization, as in: "…both the unification of the global economic field but also the expansion of that field to the entire world" (Bourdieu 2005:224) and also an,

> "economic policy aimed at unifying the economic field by a whole set of juridical political measures, designed to remove all the limits to that unification, all the obstacles to that extension, most of which are linked to the nation-state " (Bourdieu 2005:224).

This, Bourdieu points out, defines neoliberal policy and also explicates the distinction between neoliberalism and globalisation, where the latter is about the market regulation and the administration of markets. It renders the global market a political creation (Bourdieu, 2005:225). Formal equality, in a situation of real inequality favours the dominant. Bourdieu points to the fate of local producers in Brazil, Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand where the deletion of all barriers to foreign investment leads to the collapse of local enterprises which are then bought up for very low prices by the TNCs (Bourdieu, 2005:225). This is what Harvey described as 'accumulation by dispossession' of the 'new imperialism' (Harvey, 2004). 'Accumulation by dispossession' involves privatisation (of public assets), financialisation (the financial system becomes the centre of redistribution of assets), state redistributions (the neoliberal state redistributes the assets away towards the bourgeoisie) and the management and manipulation of crises themselves (Harvey,2004, 2005, 2006, 2010). Globalisation and the neoliberal turn are also evident in local as well as global examples. [18]

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is conceptualised by neo-Marxists as the latest stage of capitalist global structural and hegemonic domination, an 'epoch-marking order' that relies on the quasi-legal restructuring of relationships between nation-states and transnational

[18] As does Bourdieu, Tsing also demonstrates this with local producers in Indonesia, "…even seemingly isolated cultures, such as rainforest dwellers in Indonesia, are shaped in national and transnational dialogues" (Tsing, 2005:3).

agencies (Ong, 2007). These relationships create instability in the name of stability with crises a continuous condition. Harvey proposed that "Capitalism never solves its crises. It simply moves them from one place to another. From Brazil to Russia to Argentina to America to Britain to Greece" (Taylor, 2010). The site of the food crisis may revolve or proliferate but as an extension of the logic of this argument, eruptions of food crises, which under the Senyan analysis are caused by a dearth of legal and economic endowments, will continue.

Governance of food insecurity, if it is to be addressed at this structural global level needs full participation of the stakeholders in the international processes. This proposed involvement of global governance actors contradicts the predominant ideology of late capitalism, neoliberalism, best defined here as "a political philosophy with a claim that the market is better than the state at distributing public resources" with a return to " a primitive form of individualism: an individualism which is 'competitive', possessive and construed often in terms of the doctrine of 'consumer sovereignty" (Harvey, 2006:11). Neoliberal reasoning is both economic (efficiency) and ethical (self-responsibility) (Harvey, 2006) but it should be noted that economic neoliberalism differs from political/ideological neoliberalism.

Synthesizing this with Sen's view of hunger as a lack of legal and economic entitlements, the default position of the structural and hegemonic domination of capitalism means that food crises and food insecurity will perpetuate unresolved since it is systemic to advanced capitalism. Crises such as food crises and financial crises are endemic in capitalism because neoliberal capitalist policies centralise the power in the hands of few. The centralisation of wealth, restoration and consolidation of class power by the neoliberalised global political economy creates a system that benefits few at the expense of many.

Crises, as a fundamental part of Historical Materialism, are part of the logic of capitalism and, as Harvey indicates, can be created and manipulated by developed countries. Harvey gives the example of suddenly raising interest rates which often results in developing nations agreeing deals such as structural adjustment programs which go against the needs of their populations (Harvey, 2010). Furthermore, national and international institutions, specifically the U.S. Treasury, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are often actors in the manipulation of these crises and are, Harvey argues, unregulated or unchecked in these actions (Taylor, 2010). [19]

> "Internationally the situation is even worse since there is no accountability let alone democratic control over institutions such as the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank, while NGOs can also operate without democratic input or oversight no matter how well-intentioned their actions" (Harvey, 2006:68).

Neoliberalisation has evolved from neoliberalism and creates a power imbalance within these supra-national financial institutions. Some commentators point to the enforcement of neoliberal trade rules by the United Nations 'twin intergovernmental pillars', the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as well as the IMF, who Harvey argues act in the interests of US investment banks (Harvey, 2005). Their formal remits are development (WB) whilst the IMF is constituted to oversee the world economy. An example which demonstrates this global imbalance of power is the IMF instigating macro-economic reforms which often subject markets in developing countries to conditional investment. Likewise the World Bank makes loans conditional, which are often contingent on the proper implementation of neoliberal reform (Harvey, 2005). Yet some believe that the remits of the WB and IMF need revised to adjust to a 'good global citizen' remit due to the globalised nature of national economies (Bossone and Marra, 2013).

There is also not complete consensus on the idea of a manipulative global North/West. Aihwa Ong contests the view of "a neoliberal North and a South under

[19] A recent example here is the government-debt crisis in Greece when, in May 2010 the European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund, to avert sovereign default, launched a 110 billion Euro bailout loan in return for privatisation of state assets, austerity measures and structural reforms. The EU sovereign debt crisis was triggered by the 'Great Recession' caused by the global sale of US mortgage-backed securities, offering higher yields than U.S. government bonds. Mostly packages of subprime mortgages they collapsed when the U.S. housing bubble burst and US homeowners defaulted on their mortgage payments in large numbers from 2006.

siege", arguing against the framing of the neoliberal state as a singular ideal-type of predatory capitalism which adversely effects the South. China, for example, challenges the typologies on geographical North-South and neoliberalism as a 'tidal wave' sweeping from dominant countries to smaller ones (Ong, 2006:12). Instead, Ong proposes that neoliberalism can be viewed as a governing technology which includes particular individuals and populations and exclude others (Ong 2006, Ong 2007); "Techniques of economic globalisation are invested with an oral calculus about more or less worthy subjects, practices, lifestyles, and visions of the good" (Ong, 2006:21). With the neoliberalisation of the International System, the state is also part of the governing technology and so the state facilitates globalisation. Ong's perspective provides a critical understanding of the world economy, arguing that neoliberalism is unexceptional and despite the perspective of predatory institutions, trans nationality is not necessarily detrimental to the nation-state, neither is it the end of the nation-state (Ong, 1999). If it is a post-national world, it does not necessarily mean the end of the nation-state (Ong, 1999). Applying this to food insecurity introduces the idea that neoliberalisation, as the governing technology, dictates who is included/who is not and therefore how food capability is set. In short, who has access to food and who does not.

Amongst the discourse of the death of the nation-state there is some consensus on the role of states in the new globalised world 'disorder' and that the nation-state is withering away from the forces of the transnational. Zygmunt Bauman describes Trans National actors as having an almost spectral-like presence:

> "Since nation-states remain the sole frame for book-balancing and the sole sources of effective political initiative, the 'trans nationality' of eroding forces puts them outside the realm of deliberate, purposeful and potentially rational action. As everything that elides such sanction, such forces, their shapes and actions are blurred in the mist of mystery; they are objects of guesses rather than reliable analysis" (Bauman, 1998:5657).

This view of 'transnational forces' which escape reliable analysis bears out when considering where the power lies in the International System. This theme is repeatedly communicated in the interviews in Chapter Four where interviewees across the sectors discussed the executive power in the system. The interviewee from a TNC commented that nation states hold the power as voting members of the UN forum on food security, the Committee of World Food Security (CFS). This chimes with Bauman's point on nation-states being the 'book balancing' frame, as the corporeal rather than spectral eroding forces in the International System. The International Organisation interviewee, however, pointed out that there is little executive power in the International System and that was part of the problem in establishing a stable and effective food security regime. A third respondent, this time from an NGO believed TNCs to be extremely powerful despite their avoidance of sanctions, perhaps these are the eroding transnational forces in the globalised world 'disorder' that Bauman describes?

The Context of Globalisation

Despite this dynamic of transnationalising forces outwith the realm of the nation-state, the international process is still being shaped by institutions and frameworks developed for nations (Sassen, 2006). Globalisation also leads to transformations within the state, which reshape power and legitimacy within states, with the power shifting away from the legislature and the judiciary to the executive. This decrease in the democratic process across the organs of the state means less potential for strong nation-level governance to address not only food insecurity but to counter the forces of globalisation. For Western Liberal democracies particularly, this diminution of the (public) nation-state results in the augmentation of the (private) globalising forces within the state. With the result that these private forces increasingly determine food access, food use and food distribution and the public forces are increasingly hampered in any attempts to mitigate the effects of these by good governance and policymaking, where there is the political will to do so.[20] This results in ineffective food governance

[20] With the International System nation-states are keen to exert influence over the UN Executive which decides agenda-setting. TNCs seek to influence the UN through nation-states. Power is also brought to bear at the Committee level where non-members, such as TNCs, under the auspices of technical neutral 'stakeholders' in the process, influence agenda-setting, decisions and policy-making which feed into legislation. By these two routes, TNCs such as Monsanto and Cargill have power in GFG.

at the national-level, partly due to a failure in the ability to address the forces of globalisation within the Nation-state as well as across the International System.[21]

The authority shifts within states to the executive from the judiciary or the legislative is due to globalising forces and so globalisation is "partly endogenous to the national rather than external" (Sassen, 2006:23). The state, although transformed by globalisation, remains potentially powerful but due to "the increased complexity and technicality of the economy" oversight is needed by "specialised government agencies and the private sector" rather than by more general legislatures (Sassen, 2006:171). This technical expertise is one justification why commercial organisations have been admitted as members to the global governance field and awarded a concomitant political role.

Comparing and synthesizing both Sassen's and Harvey's descriptions of globalisation gives a sense that Sassen describes the provenance, scale, velocity and reach of monetisation in particular, whereas Harvey describes the motive and intent of neoliberalism. Global food crises and food insecurity are products both of monetisation and neoliberalism, manifestations of the human cost of these forces and practices. They are also products of the paradox at the heart of capitalism and neoliberalism, inequality, which driven by the dynamics of globalisation propagating the ideology of neoliberalism, creates great perpetual schisms of food security and poverty across the earth and iniquitous food access. Applying the motives and intents of neoliberal states (as Harvey and Bourdieu both identified) renders Sassen's call for oversight of the state by the private sector unwise.

[21] Yet effective food governance at the nation-state level is still possible. Two examples of effective national-level food governance are the Food Stamp system in the USA and the recent pricing policy of staple foods in India.

One of the major neoliberal factors in food crises is the process of monetisation (Harvey's term is financialisation) where derivatives in the global market and the consequent commoditisation of food have a significant impact on the volatility of food prices. Producer markets are increasingly articulated with capital markets directly or indirectly (via the financialising of their operations, for example the use of complex derivatives packages to hedge a firm's risk) (Sassen, 2006). This also happens with rice, wheat and other staples. The hedging itself becomes an important source of profit and slow capitalism (mining/agriculture etc.) is subordinated by fast capitalism (finance) (Sassen 2006; Agger, 1989). With the price not related to the value of the crop but instead to derivatives and trading, by the time the crop is harvested, the price is a logarithm of transactions in the world's stock markets. There is a total disconnect from all aspects of the crop.

There can be local resistance to globalisation and financialisation, explained by a metaphor of 'friction' which illustrates the 'conflicting social interactions' which make up the world (Tsing, 2005). For example, since the 1980s capital interests have reshaped the landscape of the Indonesian rainforests through chains of legal and illegal entrepreneurs, who dispossessed the previous claimants from their land. The aim was to create resources for global markets. In a response to this, local, national and global environmental movements mobilised to defend the rainforests. This 'friction' demonstrates the cultural processes between so-called 'predatory' business practices and local empowerment struggles. North American investment practices, the stock market, UN environmental funding, adventure sports and the overthrow of the Suharto regime all contributes to Tsing's ethnography of "global context" (Tsing, 2005:ix). Friction itself is global, it is not only local vs. global capital but local/global environment versus local/global capital. The forest landscape, Tsing asserts, is social (Tsing, 2005:xi): "Indonesian forests were not destroyed for local needs; their products were taken for the world." (Tsing, 2005:2) In this example of 'friction', a new economy was based on what Indonesians call KKN; corruption, collusion and nepotism. Extraction licenses were bought by corrupt practices, "faked or fixed locally" (Tsing, 2005:17) with the links between illegal and legal enterprise so close, local residents were overwhelmed and generally unable to defend their "lands and resources against this combination of legal and illegal, big and small" (Tsing,

2005:17). There are "new projects of connection and hegemony…emerging here" (Tsing, 2005:12).

Similar examples of friction and KKN from local food production abound. Action Aid's report 'Power Hungry' gives the example of the Adivasi tribal community near the Davershola tea plantation in Tamil Nadu, southern India. Five Adivasi tribes are fighting for their land's ancestral rights which conflicts with Unilever's desire to control tea production. Adivasi villagers reported harassment and intimidation and with their houses being pulled down and their tea plants uprooted in a lengthy dispute with the plantation's managers, which is owned by HLL (Unilever's Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever). Their livelihoods were threatened although many grew only a quarter of an acre of tea. One villager commented that: "The new [HLL] manager came with forest department officials when I was working in the fields and destroyed my coffee and tapioca plants. They slashed and uprooted our silver oak, pepper, tapioca, banana and coffee bushes. I begged them not to destroy our plants, but they ignored me" (Action Aid, 2011: 253-255). The 'powerless' like the Adivasi people are often subject to the force of law but may not be capable of using the law for redress of their grievances. The 'powerful' break or ignore the law as it suits them, especially in weak states where the rule of law in not robust. Even where a TNC like Unilever has Corporate Social Responsibility policies (Action Aid, 2011). Despite local or even global resistance, the devastating effect of 'fast capitalism', powerful TNCs and other private non-accountable interests on communities and individuals can be seen in the food system. Domination and hegemony, where the international and nation-state reproduce and maintain consent for class hierarchies of capitalist society, is a useful framework through which to examine food insecurity. "The central logic of domination in Western civilisation hierarchises the productive and valuable over the re- or un-productive and valueless" (Agger, 1992:8). This 'fast capitalism' reproduces domination not only over class and race but gender, reproduction and nature (Agger, 1992). Yet what is productive and unproductive is

not always self-evident. They can be rendered so socially, as in the example of the Adivasi tea planters. Indigenous productive tea production is threatening precisely because it is productive and therefore must be rendered valueless by claiming it is uncommercial or illegal. Critical social theory, which goes beyond 'what is there' to 'what ought to be there', is, Agger proposes, the best theoretical lens through which to examine 'fast capitalism'. This is useful here as part of the response on how GFG should respond to food crises/insecurity. The importance of a Critical theoretical approach to food insecurity is outlined further in the section on research design but first prevailing ideologies of the global system are examined to understand how they shape GFG.

The Effect of the Washington Consensus

The role of ideology as a determinant of a strong or weak food security regime is key to understanding the perpetuation of food insecurity. This section considers further the prevailing ideologies of the global system and examine the ideology of the hegemonic global actors and countries. To this end the Washington Consensus is identified and discourses on ideology as an obstacle to global development are also outlined.

The Washington Consensus (WC) in its original definition had ten specific economic policy prescriptions which the IMF, WB and US Treasury promoted to developing countries. These economic policy prescriptions included policies such as macroeconomic stabilisation, expansion of market forces within the domestic economy and opening up of trade and external investment which all countries should adopt to increase economic growth. Since the late 1970's many developing countries implemented reform packages since they were conditions for receiving loans.

A new orthodoxy, the Post-Washington Consensus (PWC) approach was taken forward with the Obama administration's Foreign Policy objectives, which are changing the PWC significantly;

> "It is possible to discern a noticeable shift in the policy focus of the key Bretton Woods institutions in recent years away from a hard-core neoliberalism to a new kind of synthesis which could be described as the emerging Post-Washington Consensus. Arguably, the process started in the World Bank at an earlier stage than in the IMF: [where] there has been a

> renewed interest in poverty and governance issues at the Bank, which began in the early 1990s" (Onis and Sense, 2005: 273).

The new role of the World Bank has included the launch of a global food security program in 2010. The World Bank has also launched a global Food Crisis Response Program and awarded grants to more than 40 nations for agricultural improvements (World Bank, 2014).

This 'new' understanding by these key institutions is essentially that, in light of the failure of the WC in the Asian crisis and the global credit crisis, support by state and social arrangements are essential for markets to function and so institutional reform is key. Yet despite the PWC, central questions such as the institutional change needed to effect good governance are still unanswered:

> "The question remains as to whether the PWC - together with the flourishing alternative globalization movement and against the background of increasing distributional imbalances at all levels - will bring about such a change, and how quickly (Onis and Sense, 2005: 287).

Other economic models such as the Beijing consensus and Vienna Consensus have been putatively tendered as alternatives. Since 2004 the Chinese model has been put forward as such an alternative to the Washington Consensus. The Beijing Consensus allows infrastructure development abroad to support its own economic wellbeing without imposing political or economic structural conditions on AID recipient countries, particularly in Africa.

> "The Beijing Consensus is as much about social change as economic change. It is about using economics and governance to improve society, an original goal of development economics that somehow got lost in the Washington-consensus driven 1990s." (Ramo, 2004:4).

Following the financial crisis of 2008, many Western and Chinese analysts pronounced the death of free markets and the rise of the Beijing Consensus. Yet ten years after the birth of the Beijing Consensus, critics are increasingly pointing out that

according to the living standards of the average Chinese, liberalising, modest political reform, and migrating away from statist policies saw the best economic performance (Huang, 2011). Latin America, which politically swung to the left following years of neoliberalism, also offers an alternative political economic model (Tausch, 2007).

In contrast to the WC or PWC, a larger role for state intervention is enabled in the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth, coming out of the 2010 Seoul Summit of the G20 nations which proposes tailored reforms and policies for each developing nation. This is very much in contrast to the one-size fits all Washington Consensus. The Seoul Consensus' principles and guidelines sought to achieve the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (G20, 2014). Despite this the MDGs missed their 2015 targets.

It should be noted, however, that although there are also new orthodoxies evolving out of the WC and PWC from the 'Bretton Woods Institutions', the prevailing ideology remains neoliberal which means that market-orientated solutions are largely still pursued for food insecurity. Solutions which include situations such as the ongoing membership of TNCs in GFG, the perpetuation of revolving elites in IOs and TNCs and the ongoing rack-renting of the developing world's resources by many financial institutions. The ideological and political context which gave rise to both global food insecurity and ineffective global food governance flourishes yet across the world.

The Global Economic Field

With this understanding of the political context in hand, the Global Economic Field is now analysed for its impact on GFG. It is important to identify the main players in the field, including private bodies such as Trans National Corporations (TNCs) and Financial Organisations (FO). TNCs take position as stakeholders in global governance but it is clear yet surprising that corporate and business actors also demand a *political* role "in the 'establishment and implementation of norms, rules and institutions governing international political and economic interactions" (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009: 2). This reveals a picture where TNCs lobby governments and quasi-private bodies such as NGOs frame international laws and shape the agrifood business to such an extent that their involvement is no longer questioned. The

increasing level of corporate involvement is actually *governing* the global food system (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). The span and global integration of their operations being such that national food systems are no longer players. Instead there is a higher concentration of ownership by a few companies of each part of the food governance chain in the countries of the OECD (FAO, 2003). This rise in power of private companies can be understood from the preceding sections on globalisation, neoliberalism and the dominance of the Washington Consensus but the extent and consequences of unchecked power also raises questions about corporate accountability and responsibility, which is detailed in Chapter Three.

In addition to Trans National Corporations, huge influence on the GFG is also exerted by the practices of Financial Organisations. One example of this is the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index, created in 1991 by Goldman Sachs Bank. This derivative tracked 24 raw materials such as coffee, corn, pork bellies, soy and wheat. The weighted investment value of each commodity was synthesized by a logarithm into a single value. In 1999, when the Commodities Trading Commission in the US deregulated the futures market, banks could take an unlimited position in commodities such as cereals rather than the traditional *bona fide* hedgers of the futures market such as those with a physical stake in wheat; farmers, millers and warehousemen on one side with supermarkets, Kraft, Nestle etc. on the other. Speculators who make money by arbitrage had also traditionally been welcome since their capital from the arbitrage kept the market liquid (Kaufman, 2011).

The grain market system with its forward contracts had kept the real price of wheat decreased for most of the 20th century and the American agribusiness flourished as a result of the decreased prices (Kaufman, 2011). Since the end of World War Two, the USA had produced a grain surplus, the selling of which, some propose, contributed significantly to the end of the Cold War (Clapp, 2012). The new investment vehicle

of the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index deviated from the old buy-sell/sell-buy patterns by constructing a long-only single derivative product which turned the commodities and investment into a stock. Like any company share, this commodity became an asset class to which investors looked to invest and rest their money long-term. This brought in investors and investment for the banks and traders but without a 'short' or sell in the GSCI, the prices of the commodities continued to rise. When the due-date arrived, the buy orders were rolled forward into the next futures contract, itself due a few months later, by the bankers. Without the deflationary effect of selling and only the predictable market fluctuation of the 'rolls', commodity traders profited from the ever-increasing prices (Kaufman, 2011). This was compounded by the increasing price of another part of the GSCI, energy, which rose steeply from 2003 as the expanding economies of India and China bought oil to, literally, fuel their internal growth.

These issues are, of course, wider than just the Goldman Sachs indices but this example illustrates the mechanism by which corporations exert financial effects on the global food system. With 'fast' capitalism is more profitable than the 'slow' capitalism of crop growing, the slow capitalism becomes secondary and is manipulated for financial objectives. The effect of derivatives like these was devastatingly inflationary. Food prices are driven up by the trading price rather than due to scarcity, and, without the deflationary 'sell' price, the pattern of increasing prices causes not only those behaviours that Sen witnessed in the Bengal famine: hoarding, panic buying and contingency measures but, on a more obvious level, the penury and starvation of millions.

If their entitlement is indeed "the set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she faces" (Sen, 1984: 497), then the abrogation and neglect of effective governance of the International System, where unchecked private organisations (such as banks and self-interested food conglomerates) jointly drives the price of commodities in that bundle out of the affordability of the majority of the world's population, (causing their starvation) is apparent. The frequency of repeated food crises and worsening food security is attributable at least in part to these practices. The governance failure to regulate these practices plays a large role too: "The law stands between food availability and food entitlement. Starvation deaths can reflect legality with a

vengeance" (Sen, 1981:166). It is sobering at this point to recall the figure of one in three of the global population likely going chronically hungry by 2050. And to acknowledge that one of the main drivers of this ratio could be an unregulated and obdurate autonomous commercial/financial sector of the global governance field.

The Autonomous Financial Field

As 'subfields' of the global economic field, global corporations such as banks and food companies are almost always oligopolistic. Competitiveness within the field means each of these sub-fields are structurally subordinated to the completely unregulated and autonomous financial field (Bourdieu, 2005: 229). Controlled by bankers, this has created the "international speculation economy which is freed from the control of national institutions" (Bourdieu, 2005:230).

This integration into the global economic field weakens all national or regional powers and leaves citizens powerless in the face of great transnational economic and financial forces. All other models of development, including national models, are condemned at the outset (Bourdieu, 2005:230). Bourdieu proposes social protectionism, such as the welfare state, as the only body capable of opposing the power of TNCs and the international financial institutions of the "so-called free-market" (Bourdieu, 2005:230), which has deployed a series of "convergent measures of deregulation and privatisation, such as abolishing all protection for the domestic market and relaxing controls on foreign investment" (Bourdieu, 2005:230). This domination by the forces of neoliberal capitalism and eroding forces of globalisation have reduced the poorest nations to economies based on the "exploitation of natural resources … also manifested in the asymmetrical treatment meted out to the various nations by the global institutions, depending on the position they occupy within the structure of the distribution of capital" (Bourdieu 2005:230). One example which Bourdieu cites is the IMF's requests in the 2000's to the USA to reduce its deficit

(which went unheeded) whereas the IMF forced many African economies to reduce their deficits, which has increased poverty and unemployment (Bourdieu, 2005:231).

The state is able to exert a determining influence on the way the national and international economic field functions. Which means that the economic field is also inhabited by the state, which "contributes at every moment to its existence and persistence, and also to the structure of the relations of force that characterises it" (Bourdieu, 2005: 9). States also admit the international public and private actors to its domestic economic field:

> "This unification of the economic field tends, particularly through monetary unification and the extension of monetary exchanges that ensues, to pitch all social agents into an economic game for which they are not equally prepared and equipped, culturally and economically; by the same token it tends to subject them to the norm objectively imposed by competition from more efficient productive forces and modes of production as can clearly be seen with small rural producers, who are increasingly wrenched from a state of autarky. In short, unification benefits the dominant, with the difference between the two being turned into capital by mere fact of their being brought into relation" (Bourdieu 2005: 223-224).

This means that all social agents at all levels in the food system, including subsistence farmers, food distributors and consumers, compete with commercial/financial Goliaths. Due to the prior acquisition of capital by nation-states, the global economic field is not a level playing-field. Without regulation, autonomous companies are free to deploy any practices which self-benefit. The national economic field then becomes dominated by international private actors. Therefore, the state contributes to the formation of a global economic field (Bourdieu, 2005). As with the national economic field, the global economic field reproduces these relations of dominance, and with it the economic, cultural and legal iniquities at the heart of food insecurity.

As well as its utility as a thinking tool, Bourdieusian Field Theory is also useful for determining the scope, scale, architecture of the GFG field, since mapping it out, auditing the position of existing international institutions and evaluating the effectiveness of this governance field overall is essential in determining the reality of the governance behind any rhetoric or beyond any pledges of action. Field Analysis as a key method for this research investigation and its methodological application is defined later in the methodology section. It is interesting to note, however, that in both the grey and white literatures there is no current mapping of the GFG field.

There is, however, consensus across the Human Security literature that although the remit of global institutions such as the UN Security Council have widened to include non-traditional issues such as poverty, HIV, health and the environment, a wider inclusion of actors is still needed. This goes beyond the involvement of nation-states but to include civil society groups and other stakeholders. Since global actors set, apply and monitor the global rules then there is need for regional, and sub-state actors to be included. There is also broad agreement in the Human Security field that there is enough food produced across the globe but the issue is access and affordability. By dint of severe and inter-generational poverty, a lack of a share in the capital gains of globalisation, structural food insecurity is perpetuated. Since the neoliberal model of development pursued by many global governance institutions depends on equality coming from the market, from trading rather than redistributive mechanisms, it presumes that the rewards and benefits of globalisation will reach the poor.
The food crises prove that this is not the case.

It can now be seen that the neoliberal model negatively effects the world's supply of food. With the 'fast capital' of trading food replacing the 'slow capital' of growing it, international agricultural trade has expanded more rapidly than world agricultural output (FAO, 2005:12). Over the past decade there has been a trend where dependence on the international food system is also increasing. Many emerging nations are no longer agriculturally self-sufficient but dependent on imports. In the early 2000s growth in food imports was most marked in developing countries (115% increase) compared to developed countries rise of 45% (FAO, 2004:14).

The Individual and Food Insecurity

An individual-level analysis of food insecurity is perhaps the most complex to set out. At its core is not only the key question, '*who* are the hungry?' but since food insecurity also affects households in the North as well as those in the South, '*where*

are the hungry' and '*how* are people hungry' leading to the overarching question of 'how can global food governance mitigate against food insecurity in a way that is most effective for the individual'? With these questions in mind it is easier to examine how food security impacts on individuals and consider the required policy responses. The scale and recent trends of food insecurity have already been set out in Chapter One but discussing the nuances of this is useful in determining how effective global food governance should be constructed.

Poor rural food producers make up the majority of the world's hungry (IFAD, 2010). Those ill-equipped for the economy are often those without citizenship, so although entitled to farm by custom or common law they may not be formalised as such. They occupy a different *habitus* than those with citizenship. Zones of 'bare life' are typical for those without citizenship protection (Agamben, 2005). Many female subsistence farmers have neither formal land rights nor citizenship. Increasingly they are often dispossessed of access to the land they use by land purchases by TNCs and other nation-states/ organisations such as the EU (Oxfam, 2012). Those without territorialised citizenship might make claims, whether through local communities or NGOs (Ong, 1999:24). These claims include political claims such as land rights or food security. Human Security for those in zones of bare life is not just about material sufficiency but " a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be met" (Thomas, 2000, xi)

One of the questions raised about food insecurity is that of instrumentalism or intentionality. 'Land grabs' are an example of intentionality and are one of the contributing factors for food insecurity.[22] The controversial rise in land deals creates a form of "neo-colonialism" where the dispossessed subsistence farmers then work for the new land owners rather than for themselves to feed their own hungry people (Borger, 2008). This 'bitter harvest' means that by 2025 only one quarter of the African population will be fed by Africa with the other 75% dependent on some sort

[22] Large-scale land acquisitions in developing countries with the purchase or leasing, typically by TNCs or foreign governments to secure their own long-term food supplies. Millions of hectares have already been purchased (Oxfam, 2012).

of aid, according to Karl Harmsen Director of UN's Ghana-based Institute for Natural Resources in Africa (Harmsen, 2006).

Individual food producers are mostly absent from food governance measures. There has been some small signs of change: civil society groups representing smallholders and social movements who advocate on behalf of other individuals in the food production chain have started to take a limited role in some recent international negotiations but without multilingual communication, regional outreach, or sensitisation or other inclusion resourcing, their contribution is extremely constrained (McKeon, 2011). Electronic consultations are increasingly useful but again these are subject to constraints (manifest in the digital divide) of a truly equitable incorporative approach that could fully include smallholder agendas. Without addressing this, without including the individual food producer in global food governance, uneven agricultural trade rules and blind profit-seeking will be able to continue unabated. A ground-up rather than top-down model of membership of GFG is required, specifically including the individual-level. Furthermore it should be noted that, even the small amount of progress made in representation does not specifically include positive gender discrimination initiatives, needed to address the more severe effect of food insecurity on females.

Community-Level Food Security

Civic Agriculture also known as Community-Supported Agriculture (CSA) is an local alternative civic model of agriculture where a network of consumers support local growers by buying shares of the future harvest thereby sharing the risk and reward (Lyson, 2004). The producers can be farms or local growers. CSAs can exist in rural or urban environments such as New York City's 'Coalition Against Hunger' (Organic Farming Research Foundation, 2013). The size of the CSA networks vary, some have 13,000 families involved. In Central and Eastern Europe the CSO Urgenci has created many small scale CSAs some of which evolve into social enterprises that practice 'ecologically responsible' farming (Urgenci, 2013). In developing countries, there are

growing numbers of hybrid social enterprise/CSA ventures, often using micro-farming of subsistence plots and community gardens in the scheme so that rather than growers trying to sell any excess produce from subsistence plots, the CSA means that these plots are worked on behalf of the CSA with community members working as shareholders and the food plus any profits redistributed (ibid, 2013). This can offset land and legal rights problems for women. Gender equality, as well as food security and employment are achieved through schemes such as the Harvest of Hope scheme in Cape-Town (Spinks, 2012). A more typical picture of gender equality across the globe however, is that women face both micro and macroeconomic barriers to personal and household food security. Steps can be taken to increase agricultural productivity and policy solutions at the global governance and national levels are also possible (Urgenci, 2013) .

Well-framed global governance policy solutions could also establish gender-equal food security, perhaps implementing national governments' programmes, such as cash transfers and land titling, specifically targeting women (Delang, 2006). Some of the possible policies need an international level of regulation as well as national or regional to be effective. Regulation of TNCs or commodities regulations are two cases in point. With Community Supported Agriculture, many women-centred, agricultural cooperatives are emerging which use collective bargaining for land rights and market access. For example, in the Self-Employed Women's Association (SWEA) in India more than half of the 1.2 million members are now agricultural co-operative workers. Similarly the Argan oil women's co-operative in Rajasthan, India and similar co-operatives in Morocco also bring vulnerable untitled women into the workforce (Larocca, 2007). The last 20 years have increasingly seen international movements such as La Via Campesina lobby and promote rural women's issues.
To improve the status of women in agriculture, improve nutrition, and decrease poverty, USAID created the "Women's Empowerment in Agriculture Index", to study gender inclusion levels in agriculture (World Rural Forum, 2011). The five factors in the Index promotes women's empowerment in the agricultural sector and includes decision-making over agricultural production, (over income and over time use), leadership in the community and power over productive resources such as land and livestock (IFPRI, 2010) (see Appendix 2).

Such gender aware policy-making can invigorate women's individual or co-operatives, reform land laws, improve access to domestic and international markets. Gender-blind policy-making by political elites (at the international, national or local level) will not only prevent the empowerment of women in agriculture but also reduce the possibility of an effective and stable food security regime which could directly improve nutrition and reduce mortality. The next section directly considers GFG as the predominant field through which to reform the current conditions that create food insecurity.

Governing the Global Food Economy

In a 2008 UN World Food Day speech, former US President Bill Clinton commented that the food and financial crises shows "we all blew it, including me…food is not a commodity like others…it is crazy for us to think we can develop a lot of these countries where I work without increasing their capacity to feed themselves and treating food like it was a color television set" (Clinton, W, 2008). Clinton criticised US Government's policy-making which had encouraged the Bretton Woods institutions, for example, to levy conditions on developing countries for receiving food aid, which as a result, saw the decline of Africa's food self-sufficiency and the rise of food imports (Clinton, 2008). This influential formal and informal leadership role in GFG by the world's hegemonic superpower, ascendant since the end of the Cold War, evidences the political will at the heart of the Washington and Post Washington Consensus. From a food security perspective it could be summarised as enabling and facilitating the commercialisation and financialisation of food and although food aid, it was often supplied conditionally. Rather than viewing food security from a developmental viewpoint, it viewed it from a commercial trade perspective aligned with US Foreign Policy objectives.

Since the waning of the Washington Consensus and particularly since the 2008

Financial Crisis, a growing understanding of the interdependence of developmental dimensions of food security can be seen. For example, the Obama administration committed to a policy of investment in sustainable local agriculture. The roles of the then G8, G20 and G78 in GFG as well as the roles of TNCs, NGOs and other IOs are crucial to resolving food security and the leadership role of the US, as the world's hyper power is key in creating the changes necessary Many argue that policymaking leadership by the US government extends not only to IOs but also to TNCs (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).

For the food security field, leaders in governance or 'global governors' who "constitute governing authority in a changing world" include IOs , TNCS, professional associations and set the terms of the governance field. They are,

> " the active authorities who exercise power across borders for purposes of affecting policy. Governors thus create issues, set agenda, establish and implement rules or programmes, and evaluate and/or adjudicate outcomes." (Avant et al, 2010:2).

In addition to introducing agency back into global governance, Avant et al set out a theoretical framework for investigation of the global governors in world politics. Governors are the 'active agents' who want "new structures and rules (or different rules) to solve problems, change outcomes, and transform international life" (Avant et al, 2010:1). With many International Relations theories tending to focus on the role of state and functionalist theories "downplaying the contentious politics of global governance" (Avant et al. 2010:2), a governance-centred approach can use 'conceptual equipment' to analyse the dynamics and change of these global governors (Avant et al, 2010). In global politics Avant et al note, nearly all governing in global politics seem to be the product of governor interactions, the social and political relationships in the governing authority and it is the "character of these relationships" amongst the governors as well as between the governors and the governed, rather than only the types of non-state actors, that is key to understanding global politics (Avant et al, 2010;18). Exogenous shocks can change governors and governance but Avant et al's conceptual framework examines endogenous mechanisms for change to governors and 'governing' including multiple authority sources within a single governor, relations between governors and also performance (Avant et al, 2010:18). Such tensions can create reluctant governors who accept governing responsibilities

because they are necessary to fulfil their primary mission (ibid). This tension can mean that governors become paralysed performing only symbolic or hollow actions, or preferring to serve one mission over another contradictory one for the sake of coherence even if it incurs loss of authority of constituents not served (ibid).

Governors draw five bases of authority; delegated, expert, institutional, principled and capacity based authority (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004) and these can be seen to at play both within each governor and also across the food security governance sectors, for example with the FAO assuming institutional authority, the WFP assuming delegated authority, TNCs position themselves as neutral experts, Aid Organisations are capacity based authority and CSOs are principled authority.

In addition to the traditional intergovernmental organisations (such as the UN and its agencies; IMF, WB & WTO), four further distinctive institutional mechanisms exist: trans governmental (for example the EU, International Court of Justice etc.), inter-regional, trans local and private and public-private hybrids (Scholte, 2011:11). Private voluntary organisations include global social movements such as Oxfam but since "global social movements are self-appointed, substantial questions about their democratic legitimacy inevitably arise" (Scholte, 2011 cited in Sinclair, 2012:23). This means that Aid Organisations and social movements such as La Via Campesina or Urgenci may be considered less legitimate in the GFG field because they have neither an institutional mechanism nor a base of authority to be 'global governors' in World Politics, according to Barnett and Finnemore and Scholte's definitions. This is despite their democratic legitimacy to be fully involved in governance.

There has also been a resurgence in interest in the study of IOs because states establish IOs and,

> "delegate critical tasks to international institutions because they can provide essential functions such as providing public goods, collecting information, establishing credible commitments, monitoring agreements, and generally

> helping states overcome problems associated with collective action and enhancing collective welfare" (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008:70-71).

Traditionally IOs or Intergovernmental Organisations, have been perceived as passive structures with states acting as the agents who exercise executive power (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008). Yet newer studies argue that IOs have authority, autonomy and agency with political roles similar to that of states: "IOs also construct the social world in which cooperation and choice take place" (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008: 71). They govern by defining the issues which need to be addressed and proposing the solutions (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004), with more power and autonomy than ever before. This research will examine if this is the case with the IOs in the global governance of food.

This 'new institutionalism' approach also points to non-state actors taking a role in global food governance which, in relation to TNCs taking a political role in GFG, is one potential areas of malgovernance. Again this raises the issue of their regulation. This *de facto "*governance through networks that link the public and private realms" (Chimni, 2004; Ruggie 2004) results in a multi-layered structure of global governance (Conca, 2005; Khagram, 2005) where 'rule-making' is increasingly instigated by "private authorities such as global corporations and bond-rating agencies, transnational actors such as citizens' movements and indigenous groups, IOs such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and non-governmental organisations such as Doctors without Borders" (Barnett and Sikkink, 2008 :79).

From a food security perspective this 'multi-layered' structure of shared decision-making in global governance means that leadership is difficult, governance is opaque and fragmented and there is no regulation of the TNCs who,

> "…in the absence of global regulations and accountable national governance, private sector corporations have almost untrammelled capacity to attain their objectives at country level to the detriment of citizens' rights and interests, as the current land grab phenomenon illustrates" (Gustafson and Markie, 2009: 179).

The power of these private authorities is significant: "the annual turnover of the largest food companies exceeds the GDP of many developing countries, giving them considerable influence in international regulatory processes" (Macmillan, 2005:11).

The profits are rising to such an extent that if these TNCs were countries and their annual profits (not turnover) were GDP, then according to IMF estimates of nominal GDP for 2008 in 2008 Potash would be the 145th richest country in the world (above Rwanda with a 2008 GDP of USD 4799 million p.a.), Cargill would be the 150th richest country, above Malawi which with a 2008 GDP of USD 4277 million p.a. and Monsanto would be just below Fiji but above Togo as the 154th richest country (IMF, 2014). In 2008, the profits of these agrifood TNCs are some 3 or 4 times the GDP of countries like the Central African Republic, the Sudan or Eritrea (ibid).

Under the neoliberal ideological framing of international regimes, the presumption that businesses and markets assume a neutral technocratic position is prevalent. For example, global governance is defined by the commission on global governance as the role of private, non-state institutions in creating and enforcing governance. The commission suggests that governance could rely on markets and market institutions with some institutional oversight. The view was that private agents are not political but technical (Sinclair, 2012:20) and this would help to dissipate political division (Hewson, 2008:1). This flies in the face of the experiences of agribusinesses and Food Governance generally which, as outlined, have resulted in unprecedented inequality and food insecurity. In fact the level, penetration and power of private sector interests with unaccountable and inadequate and counterproductive policies is a specific area of misgovernance (McKeon, 2011). The question of reforming the International System requires the 'reimagining' of the architecture of institutions and careful consideration of the role and legitimacy accorded to TNCs.

The next step is to introduce the theory and methodology literature from which the research design is drawn, namely Field theory and Field Analysis. There are a number of methods which can partly achieve this analysis. Regime Analysis does offer the opportunity to analyse the food security field in the international order and it is relevant to this study in tackling the "puzzles of international co-operation and of

international institution-building in a world of sovereign states, a world which is anarchical in the sense that there is no central government capable of making and enforcing international rules of conduct" (Rittberger, 1993: xii). Regime Analysis, however, has been criticised though for being static, state-centred, and 'woolly' (Strange, 1982). Whilst it can be used to study problems of regime change and to consider how and why order fails to be achieved in some problem areas, it does begin with a bias towards ordered arrangements, although it is important to also take note that it is relevant to multilevel governance, for example in the distinction between institutions and organisations (Vogler, 2003; see also Tompkins, E. L., 2008).

Bourdieu's Field Theory

Field Analysis, representing the 'sociological turn' in International Relations is adopted as the first method here to examine the food governance field. The Field Analysis method arises from Bourdieu's Field Theory which itself builds on Durkheim and Weber's perspectives on "portraying modernity as a process of differentiation into semiautonomous and increasingly specialised spheres of action" (Benson and Neveu, 2005:3). Fields of economics, finance, media, politics and religion exist that structure human action: "…in analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 96-7). Di Maggio and Powell define fields as 'realms of organisations' which aggregated, 'constitute institutional life' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Analytically and empirically Field Theory conceptually bears some similarity to Habermas' model of the public sphere although Field Theory can offer detailed specification of structures. It is also similar to Gramsci's hegemony theory which pointed to the role of intellectuals [elites] in shaping a society's "common sense" by a world-view. Field Theory also offers the opportunity to consider who and how the organisational routines and practices reproduce that power and by whom: essentially how is hegemony perpetuated (or not). Building on the Marxist concept of dominant ideas being the ideas of the dominant class, Bourdieu, through Field Theory, examines the social worlds in which such ideas are produced and reproduced, examining closely the specific capital, institutions, practices and relations, as well as considering how counter-elite ideas and emerging counter-hegemonic organisations contribute to patterns of dominance.

Bourdieu proposed properties as part of a "rigid family of conditions, that apply to social fields" (Rawolle, 2007:707). Fields are, Bourdieu argued, "structured spaces of positions" that have general laws and logics around which actors act according to their position and stakes (ibid.; see Bourdieu, 1993b). Fields are spaces for the 'social struggles' for power as represented by capital. The stakes include control over which capital is valued most and the 'conversion rates' of different forms of capital. Fields are structured by power relations with 'distinctive patterns of strategies' produced by actors representative of their own position, trajectory and function (Rawolle, 2005: 708). Although Bourdieu also applied these conditions mostly to cultural fields amongst others, as a method for examining global governance, Field Analysis offers much. Mindful that global governance is not government and has a less tangible network within the space it occupies, Field Analysis can still enable the conflicting competing goals and resources of the actors to be identified. Understanding the structure as itself structuring for the actors and field - so the governance map is a dynamic one - is also useful in understanding how the architecture of global governance is dynamic and renews itself. Since global governance contributes to the international order then the legitimacy of IOs, TNCs, and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are key to the stability of the international system (Hurd, 2007).

Any governance field can influence the international field of power. Yet is the conferred legitimacy of these private commercial and financial organisations warranted? Are perceptions of legitimacy enough to achieve *de facto* legitimacy? Field Analysis enables data to be used to construct the positions of the actors relative to each other and also within the field. Political roles awarded to private actors could play out across not only the field of GFG but also across the realm of the International System. Crisis or catastrophe in one field due to, for example, politically powerful but non-legitimate actors could, according to Bourdieu's Field Theory, structure and impact on the international system as a whole. Inequity or misfeasance in the global governance of food could then, in theory, change the International System.

Field Analysis has been applied to areas other than governance, for example, colonial literature, educational management, equity, fashion, policies and research practice and even the academic field within universities (Grenfell, 2008:80). Multiple social fields such as the arts field, bureaucratic field, economic field, education field, political field etc. add up to the overall 'field of power'. All the fields may bear *homologies,* or likenesses of practices. For example, position in the field of education may also bear a relationship upon an individual's position in the economic field but the overall field of power does not determine what happens in each of the sub-fields. Instead, Bourdieu proposes, there is reciprocity of structuring between the field of power and the sub-fields. Figure 6 shows this dynamic structure applied to GFG.

As far as can be ascertained, this is the first Field Analysis of the GFG field. Other research using Field Analysis specifically for International Relations includes applying Bourdieu's concept of fields to IR theory (see Williams, 2006), European defence policy (see Merand, 2008), the field of the EU internal security agencies (Bigo, 2007) and the European foreign policy field as transgovernmental arena, (Merand, 2010). A recent study on the transnational field of international population policy also used Field Theory to examine:

> "…global governance networks as social spaces rather than merely horizontal networks – as meso-level orders that constrain and enable different actors in different ways according to the positions they occupy and the resources they have access to. Thus understood, expert groups can be analyzed in relation to other groups both in the formation, institutionalization and transformation of such fields" (Sending, 2009:3).

There is also some discussion of the methodology which underpin Bourdieu's sociology and its application to International Relations (see Pouliot, 2007) and to globalised policy-making (Dubois, 2012). [23]

The extent of the qualitative and depth of the multivariate analysis which Bourdieu conducted might no longer be viable by singular researchers but the investigative value of juxtaposing economic capital with its nearest transposed alternative in that

[23] Although Grenfell notes that none of these studies such as these "are as exacting and comprehensive in their methods as Bourdieu's own studies…It may be that contemporary social scientists are no longer blessed with the skholé – the time and funding for this kind of exacting research activity" (Grenfell, 2009:81).

field is still possible. Without using statistical components in this Field Analysis, it cannot be claimed (and is not claimed) that this study uses 'pure' Field Analysis as a method, since it is uses only part of the method. It is an application of Field Theory and Field Analysis to the same chiastic structures and concept of capital, but without Prosopography, Correspondence Analysis and Multiple Correspondence Analysis, the method is very altered. But this pared-down version of the method is still very useful in 'discovering' and showing the field. There is precedence for this type and degree of modifications. Other studies using Field Analysis sometimes go much further and use no quantitative data at all (e.g. Merand, 2008) or limited quantitative data (see Rawolle & Lingard, 2013).

This reduced application may not be so incompatible with Bourdieu's own tenets as first appears. When commenting on his work generally, Bourdieu expressed the wish that his theories were to be considered 'thinking tools' to be deployed on concrete real-world issues, aiding empirical investigation into these issues (Bourdieu, 1976). Grenfell also observes that he intended these thinking tools to be developed and evolved 'in the field' itself (Grenfell, 2009). Field Analysis then is perhaps best understood as an approach which draws on Field Theory, as well as being a methodology.



Figure 1. Fields within a Field. Applying Field Theory to the GFG Field.

1 = The International Field of Power, 2 = The Global Governance Field, 3 = The Global Food Governance Field. The size of the fields are not indicated here and also not shown here are other fields within the International Field of Power and Global Governance fields.

In Bourdieu's execution of Field Analysis, he combined the historical trajectory by which agents arrived at a position within the field (habitus) with the structural position of individuals taken within the field. Then he considered that field's position in relation to other fields, to analyse attitudes, behaviour, discourse and practice.

Global Governance fields can be understood as social spaces where horizontal or vertical power relationships actualise and are realised. Field Theory and Field Analysis, then, are useful to global governance and International Relations as both a concept and a method which can identify convertibility between political and legitimacy species of capital as well as economic capital. This develops understanding of the levying of soft and hard power by the actors in the social space of a specific governance field.

This Field Analysis approach to viewing individuals and organisations within a field assumes that the field it examines is part of this larger field of power and as such, there are fields within fields. Food governance lies within the global governance field which itself sits within the international political field. Each field has varying degrees of autonomy and heteronomy. This field-within-a-field is represented in

Figure 1. These nested fields or realms are matryoshka-like but this approach shows the microcosm within a macrocosm with each field obeying "its own laws, its own *nomos*" (Bourdieu, 1993:33). These are 'structuring structures' which actors internalise and reproduce as habitus. Despite the dynamism and competition from within fields, most of the activity Bourdieu suggests, will tend to reproduce the structure of the field, until it is subject to pressures from neighbouring fields. So the status quo is maintained as if by default. Exogenous shocks from other fields include new political orders brought about by democratic processes, changes in the overall legal and economic policy environment, economic crises or social and cultural movements (Bourdieu, 1993:43). New entrants (agents) to the field may be forces of transformation but equally they could also be forces of conservation. Such transformations of the field matter because they depict changes in power, with power represented by symbolic and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1993).

It is known that Bourdieu interrogated and established the habitus of each participant by qualitative research such as life biography interviews, participant observation etc. This prosopographic data was then quantitatively analysed using Correspondence Analysis and subsequently Multiple Correspondence Analysis (Robson and Sanders, 2010). Bourdieu's notion of capital is built on "accumulated labour' since capital is relational to labour time. The differing volumes of capital held by actors indicates power relations but Bourdieu, however, did not differentiate between material and non-material labour and this is one criticism of Bourdieu's capitalisation literature (Swartz, 1997).

Bourdieu put his thinking into mathematical terms to produce 'geometric modelling of data' (Lebaron, 2009). This approach was,

> "the logical consequence of a critical experience and reflection about the shortcomings of dominant quantitative approaches in social sciences, which led [Bourdieu] to a conscious and systematic move toward a geometric frame

> model more adapted to his conception of the social world" (Lebaron, 2009:11).

This central aspect to Bourdieu's work has been subsequently overlooked by some writing on Bourdieu (Lebaron, 2009) and also by some who use Field Analysis as a method.

Critique of Bourdieu's Field Analysis Method

Whilst it is important to acknowledge the application of Bourdieu's "anthropological perspective to the sociological interpretation of survey data" (Lebaron, 2009), applying this approach to the global scale and the parameters of this research, whilst it could be useful, is not viable here for a number of reasons. Whilst the social class of personnel in organisations is important and GFG has certainly been criticised for its 'revolving door' of personnel moving between IOs, NGOs and TNCs and state-level governmental organisations (GOs) such as the FDA (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009), such a micro level of analysis would allow for conclusions about the *personnel* of actors in global governance and not allow for analysis of the politics and practices of the actors, as well as the architecture of the global governance field itself.

To examine global governance from an International Relations perspective means that modifying Field Analysis in this way allows for a better fit between method and discipline. Additionally, the trajectory of the major institutions involved in GFG (including a brief explanation of the rise of Corporate and Financial Organisations) has been covered in the literature review (page 64) so the habitus of some organisations is already established. The case studies in Chapter Four examines one organisation from each of the four sectors in GFG in more depth. Also, the dramatic vertical integration of all TNCs in 2012 and 2013 means that individual organisations' habitus are now opaque, hidden behind a 'corporate veil' of monopolistic conglomerate mergers but these are not so relevant to the scope of this study. On this point, it is interesting to note the increasing use of the 'corporate veil' [24] in corporatism in global governance (also in the trend identified as 'corporatocracy').

[24] Features of the corporate veil include foreign liability (so difficult to use domestic rule of law), no international standards to regulate competition from one continent to another. Market practices. The 'hidden hand' are also obscured from view.

Furthermore, one of the reasons that Bourdieu included habitus was to establish actors' class but this may not be as relevant to an analysis at organisational or system level. Class is, of course, an important variable in Bourdieu's sociological analysis, since it is the vehicle of perpetuation for domination and elite hegemony. The aim of this study though is not a sociological inquiry into class nor how Bourdieu converted class into other symbolic capitals, such as literary renown. Instead the aim is a descriptive analysis of a global governance field, weighted by economic, political and legitimacy capitals. So there is no need to measure and make manifest the habitus of the organisations *per se*. Another reason Bourdieu included habitus was to inform the practice of the actors. It is acknowledged that without habitus as a variable then the practices of organisations cannot be determined solely by Field Analysis (since habitus + doxa = practice) but instead the practices of the actors are available in the reviews of the white and grey literatures plus the case studies in Chapter Four illustrates examples of said practices.

Lastly, there are also practical considerations for not including prosopography, quantification and formalisation in the Field Analysis. A full quantitative analysis along the lines of Bourdieu's was considered for this research but Bourdieu used a statistical team (often from the *Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Economiques*) alongside his research team to conduct his research so the multidimensionality and scale of this method is outwith the financial and practical scope of this research project. Instead, elements of Bourdieu's Field Analysis and the overall conceptualisation of Field Theory inspire the 'Field Analysis-esque' approach here. Even with these alterations the method is still consistent with Bourdieu's aim to establish a 'synthetic vision of social space as a global structure', here the GFG field (Lebaron, 2009:14; Bourdieu & de Saint-Martin, 1976). For example, in his study of culture, *'Anatomie du Goût'* (1976) Bourdieu examined in more detail two sectors within a social space; the spaces occupied by the dominant class and the middle class respectively. The choice of variables allowed for subjectivity. The results gave

'volume of capital', the 'composition of capital' and the seniority in the class' (Bourdieu & de Saint-Martin, 1976). Bourdieu also studied economic elites such as CEOs and heads of enterprises in his 1989 work *La Noblesse d'état* (republished as State Nobility). In this he analysed positions occupied in the field as indicated by economic capital positions and also indicators of social capital such as memberships of councils and committees plus indicators of symbolic power such as positions in boards etc. (Lebaron, 2009; Bourdieu, 1989). Although Bourdieu also included biographical details, the main aim of *La noblesse d'état* is consistent with this study – the dynamic relational aspect between fractions in a field as an indicator of power and domination.

It is interesting to note that Bourdieu himself critiqued parts of the quantitative elements of his methods, commenting that regression analysis was too limited (Lebaron, 2009). Towards the end of his career Bourdieu developed the understanding that:

> "…if quantification is to take place in sociological research, it has to be multidimensional and aim as a first step at operationalizing each of the basic dimensions of social space, namely the various types of capitals (e.g. economic, cultural, social and symbolic)." (Lebaron, 2009:13).

This approach continues to be deployed in Bourdieu's 'school' within sociology but is also extremely useful for International Relations because where there is opaqueness, such as with the 'corporate veil', it offers a way to map out the governance space and place relationally the governance actors within that field. If the same approach is deployed in repeated field analyses then it allows for not only a better interrogation of the field but comparison across governance fields too. Bourdieu also set out various 'research strategies' along these lines, so not only discovering and representing the field but showing structural similarities across fields, for example, position by in-depth studies of individuals, types of modalities and also, similarities in dynamics of fields (Lebaron, 2009:26). From an International Relations perspective these dynamics could be hegemonic, conflictual etc.

Bourdieu and International Relations

Possibly due at least in part to the flaws and challenges already outlined, the approach and ideas propounded by Bourdieu "have made relatively little impact on international relations as a whole" (Edkins and Vaughan Williams, 2009:112). One explanation could be that IR is structured around debates incorporating varying metatheoretical positions with less emphasis placed on empirical investigation. Although Guzzini argues that Bourdieu's framework of power analysis offers an opportunity for "more coherent social theoretical setting for many power phenomena and concepts" and to "embed a performative analysis of power in International Relations", discussing "power concepts" inherent in International Relations (Guzzini, 2006:21):

> "Yet, at the same time, the transfer of this approach to an international power elite, is marred with a series of difficulties, not the least of which the question whether such an elite can ever be circumscribed in the first place" (Guzzini, 2006:21).

Formal modelling and other quantitative methods were considered for this research question but assessed to be not as appropriate for setting out a 'performative analysis' of the GFG Field. As mentioned, Regime Analysis was considered too but critics point to its weakness with Non-Governmental Organisations and Transnational corporations (see Buzan and Little, 2000) and organisational types, which are central to the study of global governance.

Notwithstanding, of all the approaches of International Relations, Social Constructivism is possible the most compatible with Bourdieu's Field Analysis but Social Constructivism has, until recently, not interrogated the issues of power that Bourdieu's work focussed on (Williams, 2007; Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Yet Bourdieu's social theory has a strong political bearing and the relational consideration

of economic capital and political capital offers a useful 'thinking tool' for the study of global governance and the subsidiary questions such as the power of private TNCs in the International System. These constants are already deployed in analyses of the domestic and international 'fields' (Bigo, 1996 and 2006; Guzzini, 2000; Leander, 2005 and 2007; Williams, 2007; Pouliot, 2007). The international field with its competition, co-operation, hegemony, struggle and 'transversal relations' all display *doxa*, that is a 'common-sense of the field' which Bourdieusian Field Analysis can also offer.

Research Design

Method 1: Field Analysis

A large part of Field Analysis' applicability stems from its ability to demonstrate the economic power and other 'symbolic' powers of the field by drawing on Field Theory, thereby setting out a dynamic map of the structure of the governance field. [25] By mapping out the field in this way it aids understanding of food security, going further than simply providing a list or organogram. This approach, whilst not intended to be definitive or exhaustive, provides one measure, an estimate, of the economic and political positions of the top organisations in each of the four sectors which might be useful not only to this study but hopefully to other studies of food security governance or global governance. As mentioned, substantial modifications have been made to the method to the extent that it is perhaps more accurate to call the approach a quasi-Bourdieusian Field Analysis or even an inquiry device inspired by Bourdieusian Field Analysis. A 'thinking tool' which enables some audit of the constitution of the governance field, rather than thinking of the GFG field as a monolith. To limit the amount of mis-specification (which arises from the conceptual ambiguity) and contribute to future comparative research with other governance fields, measures for each capital species' criteria have been developed and these are contained in the notes for Tables 6 and 7 in Appendix 4.

[25] The need for dynamic map of the structure of the GFG became apparent when approaches were made to development and agency elites to request a map of the GFG Field. In addition the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) of the Committee for Food Security (CFS) have identified the need for one (Duncan, 2013)

Fields are perhaps best understood as a match or game (*Le Jeu*). Competitive contested arenas with two forms of power, or capital species, which Bourdieu identified in his Field Theory of cultural production as cultural (i.e. symbolic) capital and economic capital (Bourdieu, 1993). Cultural capital includes educational credentials, technical expertise and can manifest itself in many ways: embodied (such as the manners of an aristocratic art dealer), objectified (owning art) or institutionalised (cultural capital as certified by an authority: e.g. the Pulitzer or Nobel prize) (Bourdieu, 1979). Economic capital here includes money or assets and it is, on the whole, the more powerful of the two (ibid). This juxtaposition can be represented as intersection between two axes shown in The Social Field (see Figure 2, below). Cultural capital relates to symbolic capital. Other forms of symbolic capital are used for other fields such as political capital and 'political legitimacy' capital.

Figure 2: Bourdieu's Social Field.



Figure 2: Bourdieu's Social Field. The X-axis is -/+ Cultural Capital and the Y-axis is -/+ Economic Capital. The diamonds are organisations/actors. Source: Bourdieu, 1993.

Method 2: Interview.

The second method used here are the interviews with personnel from within the field. In-depth interviews can "let us see that which is not ordinarily on view and examine that which is often looked at but seldom seen" (Rubin & Rubin, 1995: 15) Interviewing can be seen as "a series of steps in a procedure" of identifying interviewees, determining which type of interview is both practical and effective in obtaining data, design and use an interview protocol including deciding on the questions, use adequate recording procedures, refine the questions through pilot testing and transcribe the answers soon after the interview (Cresswell, 2007: 132-134). As with other qualitative methods field issues' can arise such as access to the organisation but mostly focus on conducting the interview. The relationship between interviewer and interviewee is key yet complex, sometimes reflecting the interviewer's (witting or unwitting) dominance through hierarchy, hidden agendas, asymmetrical power balance and the interviewer's monopoly over interpretation (Kvale, 2006), perhaps projecting the interviewer's own culture, gender, race and status (Nunkoosing, 2005). To counterbalance these projections, it is also important to be responsive as an interviewer, to listen and hear the data, so as to not treat the participant as a research object (Rubin and Rubin, 1995:15).

Method 3: Case Study

The third method used here is case study and this is to supplement the description of the field obtained by the field analysis by focusing in on four organisations and they supplement the interviews since the organisations selected for case study declined to be interviewed. As a qualitative method, case study research involves drawing on "multiple sources of information" such as documents and reports, offering a case description and case-based themes (Cresswell, 2007:73). The four small case studies selected here make up a collective (multiple) case study rather than a single instrumental case study (where one bounded case study is selected to illustrate an issue) (Cresswell, 2007). As multiple case studies of organisations within the global food governance field they are bounded together within the field yet are distinguished by each being a different type of actor/organisation (International Organisation, Trans

National Corporation, charitable organisation and civil society organisation). For multiple case studies the format should be consistent - using the "logic of replication" where the procedure is replicated for each case (Yin, 2003) and to enable generalisation, representative cases need to be selected, with 'purposeful sampling' to select cases that show different perspectives (Cresswell, 2007:75). The 'cross-case analysis' is possible when this multiple case studies' format is a detailed description of each case and themes from the within-case analysis followed by a thematic analysis across the cases, the cross-case analysis. This enables the interpretation phase (Bennett & Elman, 2006).

Using case studies within IR means that here are many possible combinations of case study; experimental, formal, statistical, survey, and the characteristic strengths, weaknesses, and challenges of alternative combinations and sequences of multimethod work deserve more examination. (Bennett, Elman, 2006: 187). Approaches for combining case studies with other methods within IR need more consideration too. Lieberman (2005) pointed out that the compatibility of statistical and qualitative analysis such as case studies offer a lot of promise to IR and Social Science and he proposed the idea of 'nested analysis'. The combination of each mode of analysis can be successfully used to achieve similar social scientific ends, while using somewhat different tools (see King, Keohane, and Verba's (1994); Brady and Collier, 2004).

Conclusion

As well as introducing the three methods used and reviewing some of the literature for each method, this chapter continued the literature review introduced in Chapter One, to further define the research puzzle. A number of the challenges to establishing a global food governance field have now started to emerge from the literature review. Such issues urgently need addressing, for example, the role of financial speculation in

price volatility. There are a number of possible 'building blocks' of GFG proposed in the grey literature and a few of these are listed below. This research project's objective is to delineate, investigate and interrogate these challenges, issues and possible remedies. The research also aims to discover and identify any such possible foundations for better food governance.

Neoliberalism, the Washington Consensus, the Vienna and Beijing Consensi, the G20 Seoul Summit and other factors identified in this chapter are political contexts surrounding global and National/Regional political situations where global hunger and food insecurity continue to rise. Despite strategies to reduce food insecurity, the rate of global hunger accelerates. These 'ideological' factors have begotten and continue to beget economic factors such as the financialisation, commoditisation and commercialisation of food. All of which unremittingly drive up food prices without reference to the cost of food production and distribution. This created entitlement failures, making food unaffordable for an increasing number across the world. If hunger and famine, the physical effects of food insecurity, are caused by political factors then so too is food insecurity.

Changing the political conditions and structures of food governance through institutional reform is essential to establishing a new food security regime yet with the track record of overall ineffectiveness by the current international order, then perhaps a new global governance regime is also needed to circumvent this political situation and establish a stable and effective food security situation? All the more so since the private agribusiness companies who reap benefit and profit have a political bearing and role in the global governance of food. The questions now are, what shape should the architecture of the global food governance take? What should the membership be and what form of governance should it take? In the next chapter, Chapter Three, a Bourdieusian Field Analysis of the global food governance field maps out the existing organisations and policies to establish whom and what is currently present and it also discuss these results and findings from the Field Analysis. Chapter Four sets out the interviews with those involved in food security at international and national levels and case studies. Chapter Five concludes with the remedies and recommendations arising from the literature review and research.

Chapter Three: Setting out the Global Food Governance Field

"The eradication of hunger and malnutrition is an achievable goal. Reaching it requires, however, that we move away from business as usual and improve coordination across sectors, across time and across levels of governance…Local-level and national-level policies should benefit from an enabling international environment, in which policies that affect the ability of countries to guarantee the right to food."

(Olivier de Schutter, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 2014)

The Politics of Food Security Governance

The political dimension to food insecurity and hunger is now established with the understanding of food insecurity as a dispossession of both food and the Right to Food. The next step is to investigate the political dimensions of food security governance. This chapter sets out and analyses the current global food governance (GFG) field. It identifies the current membership, mapping out four sectors of the GFG field and estimating the degrees of economic capital, political capital and political legitimacy of 16 key actors. This exogenous view of the field provides a descriptive context from which to identify then analyse the balance of power in the GFG field. This global governance 'power map' is a springboard to the subsequent chapters. This chapter contains the Field Analysis results and Chapter Four the endogenous views of the field established from interviews with workers from the GFG field. Chapter Four also examines by brief case study one organisation from each sector, looking at their profile and practices. These chapters build up an arc of description and analysis that identifies changes that could be made to the GFG field to mitigate food insecurity. The thesis concludes with recommendations for changes in GFG to alleviate food insecurity, presented in Chapter Five.

A Field Analysis of the Global Food Governance Field.

Specifically, the aim of this chapter is to identify, classify and delineate the GFG field by Field Analysis and to set out some main features. 'Mapping out' the top players in

each sector of the field builds an informed picture of the power in the field. [26] This chapter's research method is a modified Bourdieusian Field Analysis of the GFG field that maps out the top organisations to establish who is dominant within the field and how effective this format is for addressing food insecurity.

So the GFG space is here treated as a 'field' and in this space are the members of the field, the IOs, NGOs, TNCs and CSOs. These can be positioned on sets of axes with economic capital and political capital poles and, secondly, for this research, economic capital and political legitimacy capital poles. Here capital of 'political (democratic) legitimacy' and 'political capital' have been transposed onto Bourdieu's concept of 'symbolic capital'. So political capital and 'democratic' legitimacy capital are new additions to the repertoire of Bourdieu's symbolic capital. This is on the basis that the field of global governance is being examined and this drives the form that the symbolic capital takes. For example, Bourdieu's investigation into the field of cultural production used cultural capital and the field of literary production used literary renown.

The symbolic capital forms of political capital and political legitimacy are constituted by criteria such as the GFG actors' mode of self-governance (e.g. public/private), degrees of transparency, their representativeness and other 'values' drawn from the global governance literature which more clearly delineate the actors' democratic legitimacy in the GFG field. The criteria and measures for economic capital are also shown in Appendix 5. In the following results section, each of these two variables tables are juxtaposed in turn against economic capital in a set of axes. The first set shows economic capital versus political capital and the second shows economic capital versus legitimacy. This is to demonstrate, firstly, the juxtaposition of the economic and political capital of the top organisations in each sector of the GFG field and, secondly, the economic capital and political legitimacy of the same top organisations. A diagram showing the criteria and measures of all three capital, is provided in Appendix 8.

Bourdieu advised three steps in undertaking Field Analysis, the first being to identify the position of the field in relation to the field of power. This is identified from the earlier literature review. The second is to map out the positions of the

[26] Power is here defined as 'intentionality and effectiveness' (Wrong, 1995:2).

agents/institutions who, "compete for the legitimate forms of specific authority of which this field is a site" (Wacquant, 1992:104-7). Third is the analysis of the habitus of social agents, the different 'dispositions' held and shaped by a "determinate type of social and economic condition" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 104). As discussed, since this is not an investigation of social class *per se*, the habitus (step three) is not examined in this Field Analysis. In its place is a step counterpointing economic capital with firstly, political capital at organisational level and secondly, with legitimacy capital. This approach still allows the researcher to reveal the position taken by the actors (see Grenfell 1996 and 2007). Identifying actual objective positions of organisations and sectors in the field (as opposed to only position-taking) in polar categories of economic capital versus political capital and also versus legitimacy 'capital' are mapping-out exercises to clearly identify the main authorities (and therefore the power) in the GFG field. Measuring the objective structure of the field overall is also important and Fuchs specifically identifies this as important in relation to the power of not only global governance but more specifically the power of agrifood corporations within the field of global governance (Fuchs, 2007). So to operationalise the research, the steps are to firstly, delineate the 'field of power' then, secondly, map out relations by establishing and evaluating the symbolic capital/s of GFG and lastly, analyse the results.

Setting Out The Field of Power

The field of power, the GFG field, was identified as a sub-field of global governance, set in the neoliberal context of the current international system, which corresponds to Bourdieu's 'international field of power' (Figure 1). Following an initial scoping of the players in the field (Appendix 3), the four largest similar institutions in each of four sectors were included to allow for equitable comparison across the sectors. This also gives an indication of the biggest power players not only in each sector but also in the field. The initial scoping garnered results for the largest 12 TNCs, eight NGOs

with only one Civil Society Organisation, La Via Campesina, available and so the need for parity and symmetry across sectors was evident. 'Cutting' the economic data to show the top four of each sector by economic capital enables a better descriptive and comparative tool of the GFG field sectors. One of the challenges of this approach was to find three other Civil Society Organisations, such is their low salience in the field. This was sourced from the attendees list for the Committee for Food Security and the interview participants were also asked for this data (Appendix 9).

The next question to be fixed is identifying the symbolic capital in the food governance field. It can be argued that the consecrating principle in *government* is direct or instrumental power to drive forward one's own agenda, to influence, to achieve objectives (Bäckstrand, & Lövbrand, 2007; also Falkner (2008) uses the term 'relational power'). In democratic government, one consecrating principle is democratic legitimacy and the capability to hold power. To establish the consecrating principle in *governance* it is useful to turn to the GFG literature to define the constituent elements of powerfulness. Fuchs points to transparency, accountability, autonomy, low regulation etc. (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). Margulis uses dimensions like, power, norms, ideology from a critical International Political Economy perspective (Margulis, 2012).

For the governance field, with its close proximity to government, security and power, there are a number of symbolic capital alternatives, or manifestations, of powerfulness and political capital. These could include variations of power such as discursive power, or desirable principles such as transparency, representation or even political roles. For the GFG field alternatives are considered such as political capital or effectiveness in establishing food security (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). Other qualitative measures of good governance such as transparency and accountability could be used but, in keeping with Bourdieu's definition, as the hierarchies' consecrated principle, power to influence - capital in action over time - is taken as the symbolic capital. This is the actualisation of power. To establish this, the *raison d'être* of the organisation is established, by cross-checking with the symbolic capital Bourdieu delineated for the fields he researched, and the consecrated principle becomes clear. The *raison d'être* also represents the mission of the governor/actor. In deciding the symbolic capital there is an element of value judgment and it can be said that even the choice and construction of symbolic capital is a value-based judgement by the

researcher, who selects what they presume to be the consecrated principle of the field. Yet the endogenous view of the consecrating principle may differ from that of the researcher's. Bourdieu himself could also stand charge for this (which he countered by pointing to the importance of the self-reflexivity of the researcher).

To address this, dual field analyses have been done with the 'consecrating principles' of political capital and 'political legitimacy' (which draw on the variables of transparency and accountability mentioned above). The components of the symbolic capital (variables) are attributed to actors in degrees decided by a range of criteria for which data has been gathered from disclosure by participants, organisations or obtained from desk research. The criteria and data are standardised by 'measures' (see Appendix 4 for the measures and criteria).

As can be seen from Bourdieu's Field Analysis (Figure 2), the top of the Y-axis shows a scalar value of high economic capital. The X-axis represents increasing cultural capital left-to-right. Therefore the organisations in the bottom left quadrant have both less economic power and less cultural power. Moving clockwise, those in the top left quadrant however have a bigger ration of economic power to cultural power with some having cultural power only. The top right quadrant has both high cultural power and high economic power and those in the bottom right quadrant have a higher ratio of cultural power to economic power. Bourdieu also identified organisations in the chart as tending towards the autonomous or heteronomous depending on their positions dominating cultural and/or economic capital. The heteronomous pole represents external forces - primarily economic. The symbolic capital specific to the field (e.g. technical skills) are represented by the autonomous pole. A comparison to Bourdieu's Field Analysis on the Literary Field illustrates this binarism well.

The axes are the main opposition or distinction in Bourdieu's Field Analysis. Other fields have economic capital versus other forms of capital or sub-sets of symbolic

capital such as scientific capital, educational capital and these sub-sets of symbolic capital establish the "hierarchies of discrimination which exist in the sub-fields" (Grenfell, 2008:100) For example, the literary field attributes the symbolic capital of temporal capital (form) to the X-axis, with less form (i.e. more creative editorial content) to the right of the X-axis and global capital of renown +/- to the Y-axis). Symbolic capital, the "transubstantiated types of economic capital" (Grenfell, 2008:104) are relevant and appropriate to their field. In fact, the symbolic capital is the 'consecrated principle' of the field. For example, in the cultural production field, cultural capital is the principle which is held in highest esteem by the actors in the field. However, the social worlds Bourdieu investigated, such as art, literary, higher education and property reflect his sociological inquiry into social worlds. So the species of capital he defined - the 'symbolic capital' - are designed for investigations into those worlds. Just as the cultural reproduction of dominance is core for sociology so the political reproduction of dominance is central to global governance.

For International Relations, however, it is more appropriate to deploy 'political capital' and 'political legitimacy' as transubstantiated forms of economic capital as these are two main distinctions in the field of power. For example, for the TNC sector of the GFG field, economic capital admits the actor to the field and then political capital is used as leverage to influence the agenda, maintain or increase position-taking and increase economic capital etc. Political capital is a 'consecrated principle' of GFG Field since it is held in the highest esteem by the actors. Similarly, although a recent development, the CSO are admitted through perceived high political legitimacy. This approach of comparing economic capital to a transubstantiated type of economic capital, political capital or legitimacy, is applicable to global governance research. It allows for analysis of which organisations have the most/least economic capital and which have the most/least political capital most/least legitimacy. This is still true to the aim of a Bourdieusian Field Analysis i.e. to show how economic capital and the symbolic capital are relational in the field for reproducing capital.

This approach also allows for a distinction between those who have the most power and who have the most economic capital. It should demonstrate the difference between position and position-taking by the organisations involved. For the GFG field, possible elements or sub-types of the symbolic capital of political capital could

be derived by cross-referencing with specific aspects of power including discursive, structural, instrumental etc. (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:159 also see Arendt, Weber etc.).

Bourdieu identified these as variables but it is important to assert here the benefits of modifying Field Analysis to global governance. Firstly, it can report the position of different types of actors in the field, not just IOs. Secondly, by attributing values to political and economic capital, it can offer a view of the actors within the field of organisations and also their competitors. Thirdly, it shows one view of the struggle in the field - the dynamics underpinning a static 'snapshot' of the field. This is useful as a baseline for mapping out future events within the field such as competing logics, tipping points or political change. Lastly, it can show new entrants to the field, mergers between the actors and, most crucially, provide an estimate of the true economic and political weighting of each of the major actors. Each of these benefits are useful to establish and advance a more informed understanding of the architecture, membership and dynamics of a global governance field and also the economic and political measures of the main actors and sectors within the field. As with Bourdieu's fields, it offers a visualisation of who dominates. With the rhetoric and disavowals consistent with a field of power, this is a useful thinking tool, a method of description from which to draw observations about the nature of global governance.

As arenas of struggle and competition where organisations struggle to compete to maximise the value of the forms of capital which they possess, these fields show that those who dominate are the ones who have most successfully converted one form of capital into another, acquiring both economic capital and symbolic capital through which their dominance is achieved and perhaps legitimated.

Drawing on the understanding obtained so far from Bourdieu's other fields, and applying them here to the field analyses of the GFG field which follow in Figures 11 and 13 (where the Y-axis is the value of economic capital in increments of USD (millions), and the X-axis is a scalar value of either, political capital (Figure 11) or

political legitimacy (Figure 13), we would expect to see the following.[27] From bottom to top and left to right of the axes the overall amount of both of capital increases with the top half of the axis as the 'field of power' where all actors possess increasing amounts of economic capital. Any actors with high levels of economic capital *only* are on the top-left of the axis. High levels of either political capital *only* or political legitimacy *only* are on the right of the X-axis and actors with relatively high amounts of either a) political and economic capital or b) legitimacy and economic capital sit at the uppermost top-right area of the axes. Therefore those actors in the 'top top-right' of the right quadrant dominate the GFG field either politically and economically or legitimately and economically. Those sitting on the X-axis on the right have either more political capital but less economic capital or, alternatively, more political legitimacy but less economic capital. The results of which actors do dominate the GFG field in this way follow but firstly there are some further caveats on the application of the method are required.

In researching GFG it is essential to understand that political capital may be deployed by different sectors to different objectives. The *raison d'être* of each sector determines its level of self-interest and the application of its political capital. So TNCs seek to maximise economic capital, or profit-seek. NGOs seek to fulfill their political and mission objectives, Aid organisations seek to achieve their humanitarian objectives having stated their political objectives and the CSOs seek to achieve their discursive/representation objectives plus political objectives in some cases. To fulfill these objectives, each actor must seek the optimum return on their economic capital and political capital. The less material resources an actor has, such as economic capital, then the more non-material resources the actor needs to use, to be more effective according to their *raison d'être*, such as non-material assets and attributes such as democratic legitimacy, discursive power, reputation etc. which can be used as resources for other forms of capital, for example symbolic capital.

[27] On the Field Analyses axes (Figures 17 and 19), poles of more/less political capital and more/less democratic legitimacy poles offer an opportunity to depict and analyse the architecture and membership of the field, contextualising it in the political and economic power of its top members/sectors. Then any relationship between political and economic capital can be identified, and allow for analysis of any increased power-sharing position-taking in the GFG field by, for example, networks of community agricultural groups or smallholders.

Problems and Limitation of using Field Analysis

There are a number of other flaws with Field Analysis as a method, which tempers the results and necessitates the use of other methods to triangulate any conclusions drawn from Field Analysis (interviews and case studies are used for this research). Firstly, there is the false opposition of the chiastic structure (Benson and Neveu, 2005). This can be seen between economic capital and cultural capital in the Social Field Analysis and also between renown and symbolic/temporal capital in the Literary Field Analysis. Supplementing this Field Analysis with other methods such as interviews and case studies can offset any distortion from this false juxtaposition of species of capital. Another mitigation is to limit the Field Analysis to a descriptive or illustrative function in the research. It is useful to map out the field of global governance to achieve a clearer understanding of the most significant players in the field with measures of their economic and political power relative to each other but since Field Analysis sets the parameters of analysis along the lines of species of capital, then it limits other factors from being introduced into the analysis.

Secondly there are the problems associated with the double weighting of economic capital, where it is both counted as a form of capital and is also a constituent criteria of the other capital too. In this study this could potentially could bias the measurements in favour of TNCs, although it actually had little impact on this study, making only very little difference to the relative power of each sector and organisation. This double-counting of economic capital favours those actors with the largest economic capital and the potential to bias of this flaw in field analysis should be noted for other studies. An adaptation to the Field Analysis method, where double counting of economic capital is avoided by removing it as a criteria in both political capital and political legitimacy would be possible and this forms a recommendation in the final chapter of this thesis.

The observation in the case studies is that they are very useful supplementary methods to Field Analysis since they lend real-world examples of practices but again they can be subject to researcher bias and as much a construction as the Field Analysis. These mini-versions of case studies suffer for their brevity yet are useful nonetheless in that had they been omitted, the research results would not have had the same real-world focus at organisational level.

Secondly, field Analysis suffers from a rigidity of form which, if it were to be the only method deployed, could lead to deterministic 'skewed' findings. Of course such a non-experimental non-positivist research design is less rigid but remains nonetheless a useful descriptive device for setting out a field of governance. Secondly, there is the question of how subjectively the values for these variables are attributed and this remains a challenge for this research project. Therefore the results should be accepted on a critical basis only with self-reflexivity about the subjectivity of the attribution of the variables' criteria. Thirdly, it is a critique of Bourdieu's approach and style that there was not always clarity about separating sociological and statistical interpretations. Similarly, both Field Theory and the "sociological interpretation of statistical analyses" were not entirely formalised (Lebaron, 2009:27). There is not "the clear understanding of what he did from a statistical point of view" which limits the inferential potential and reproducibility of his method (Lebaron, 2009: 27). Despite these challenges an analysis using Field Theory offers the opportunity to identify and investigate a field, the position-taking by the actors within it and the relational effect of capital/s on the field. It enables comparison of the field temporally across time spans, cuts through the 'fog' of warring propagandas and offers a measure of the power in global governance fields. The applicability to International Relations is interesting and useful, which, with the modifications outlined below, may also improve the method's cross-disciplinary application.

Step One: Conducting The Field Analysis

The first step, identifying the GFG field, can now be undertaken. From the interview results to question three, it is clear that the GFG field can be structured into four main sectors: private commercial sector which consists of TNCs, IOs, [28] the charitable and aid organisation sector (Aid), and, lastly the civil society organisations sector (CSOs) (Figure 3 below). There are actors who hold influence in this field not represented here, for example, National Governments and Financial Organisations as well as the Institutions from the International Field of Power such as the IMF, WTO and World Bank. Their membership (or exclusion from membership) of the Field Analysis sectors is decided on the basis that their *primary* function does not iterate fully with GFG, rather that their involvement in GFG is adjunct to their main functions, albeit that their role may be important and significant for the global governance of food. One way of understanding this is that, referring back to Figure 1 on the Field within the Field, these organisations may inhabit the second level, the global governance field or the first level, the International Field of Power rather than level 3, the GFG field. That is, National Governments and Financial Organisations sit in the field of power. So for example the World Food Programme is included whilst the World Bank and WTO are not, despite their large impact on food security governance. Another factor to remember is the merging of many global actors, for example the recent vertical integration of TNCs towards a more monopolistic architecture means that some Financial Organisations are part of the same corporation. One example of this is Monsanto. This consolidation of corporate power has led to accusations of 'corporatocracy'. Again the private FOs, whilst they may be part of the same corporate 'family' have not been included since their primary function is not food governance-related. This approach enables a more precise probe into the field

[28] Specification on nomenclature of 'organisation' and 'institution' is in Chapter One.

although a Field Analysis into the wider field of power in GFG is also an opportunity for future research.

Identifying the Sectors in the Global Food Governance Field.

Figure 3 represents the four sectors of Global Food Governance. In this graph each sector is represented unweighted by economic or political capital**.** In Figures 11 and 12 the sectors are shown by financial weighting. The number of actors in each sector vary widely but for the Field Analysis the top 4 actors only in each sector are included.

The quarto-sectorial structure of this analysis of the GFG field represented in Figure 3 was corroborated by answers given to Question Four of the interviews. There were a few individual propositions towards a different structure such as five sectors with advocacy as a fifth etc. but there was no consensus on these alternative propositions and in general these reflected an asymmetrical focus on the type of organisation/sub sector in which the interview participant was based. Two of the respondents also stated that national governments should be included, since they provide the national context for food insecurity. Again, these actors are sited in the Field of Power. There was, however, majority agreement amongst interview participants on the GFG field consisting of these four sectors. This enables some differentiation of the field which is helpful in gaining a sense of the structure and capital dynamic of the field. With the four sectors of the GFG field identified, it is useful to look at the features of these

sectors in turn. One example from each of the four sectors are examined in the case studies in Chapter Four.

Trans National Corporation Sector

The TNC sector is key to understanding the GFG field as corporations have been major players in the development of the world food system for the last 150 years. Themes of power, authority and legitimacy arise from the literatures on the central role of TNCs in the agrifood system (see Glover and Newell, 2004; McMichael, 2005; and Saad, 2013). As well as market power, there is recognition that TNCs exercise political power over the global food system, a system which has seen a dramatic increase in the value of agri-trade with over two thirds of that trade now processed food (FAO 2004: 26) and more developing counties have become net agricultural importers since the 1970s (FAO 2004:14). This intense corporate concentration highlights concerns about accountability, regulation and responsibility (see Murphy, 2006; Action Aid International, 2005; MacMillan, 2005) and raises the question if this 'private authority over food globalisation' - the increasing corporate control by TNCs over so many levels of the globalized food system - results in effectively a 'privatisation' of food security?

Most of the TNCs have expanded horizontally and vertically to cover more activities of the food and agricultural process such as commodity trading, distribution, food processing, international trade, production, retailing plus seed and agricultural chemical production (FAO, 2003). Their political activities mean that many of these TNCs are involved in setting the rules of their own regulation which includes "influence over state-based and intergovernmental mechanisms of governance, as well as private forms of governance" (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:1). This raises questions about the exact role the TNCs play in setting norms, rules and influence supplicated over the institutions of global governance and in the GFG field generally (see Fuchs, 2007; Cutler, Haufler and Porter, 1999; Cutler, 2009 and Skalir, 2002). That is, the various 'facets of power' that these TNCs exercise in setting the rules of their own regulation and also over the field (see Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). In addition to instrumental and discursive power, the structural power of this private realm of global governance has increased dramatically in recent years:

> "As globalisation has continued, material structures have increasingly put corporate actors in a position to make governance decisions themselves, either supplementing or in some cases replacing traditional actors such as states and global institutions. Economic and institutional structures, processes and interdependencies have created a setting where corporate actors have control of pivotal networks and resources. This control has given them the capacity to adopt, implement and enforce privately set rules that may take on an obligatory quality and that also have distributional consequences for others" (Fuchs, 2005, 2007:9).

Which raises the question to what extent do the TNCs write 'the rules of the game' in the GFG field?

Privately developed regimes, Clapp and Fuchs point out, are "adopted by states as a form of regulation, [and] given legitimacy" by IOs, enabling corporate actors to "determine the focus and content of rules" (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:9). Some see this corporate concentration and exercising of power over rule-making as leading to these rules reinforcing a corporate-led agrifood system [29] (McMichael, 2005) which fosters further inequality and a more vulnerable food security regime (Norberg-Hodge, Merrifield and Gorelick, 2002). An example of this corporate power is the Codex Alimentarius, where voices of smallholders, peasants and consumers are increasingly marginalised in the governance system (Smythe, 2009). In response to this lack of inclusivity there are calls for increased transparency, accountability and participation in GFG, particularly in the TNC sector. In addition to shaping the main sources of TNC power and influence (the public regulations, norms and institutions under which they operate) other main sources of TNC power and influence over the agrifood field,

[29] Since the 1994 Agreement on Agriculture in the GATT Uruguay Round, which liberalised the agriculture of WTO members, corporate concentration of TNCs accelerated with global food mergers and acquisitions dramatically increasing until it was worth USD 200 billion by 2007 (ETC group, 2008:8). For this Field Analysis the top four TNCs are selected because they are the largest organisation of each agro industrial sub-sector. This selection was ascertained from data collected from a total of 107 organisations involved in food security (Figure 10)).

are their size, buying power, setting private standards for suppliers, price-setting as well as shaping the public debate. This led a former Rapporteur of the Right to Food de Schutter to comment that:

> "Large agribusiness corporations have come to dominate increasingly globalised markets thanks to their ability to achieve economies of scale and because of various network effects…the dominant position of larger agribusiness corporation is such that these actors have acquired, in effect, a veto power in the political system," (Tran, 2014).

Despite the size achieved in vertical mergers, large TNCs can collapse, as was seen in the 2008 financial crisis with the collapse of Lehman Brothers as well as the near collapse of many financial and agricultural titans. Some have commented on the vulnerability of the cartel of the industrial food chain:

> "The argument in favour of "too big to fail" agro-industrial giants rests on a single powerful myth: Unless we intensify food production with the North's genetically-engineered seeds, agrochemicals, synthetic fertilizers and corporate breeding stock, the world's burgeoning population, living in the midst of climate change, will not have food to eat. In reality, the industrial food chain offers a very incomplete (and distorted) picture of global food and agricultural production" (ETC, 2013).

Instead they point to the peasant food web as being more likely to feed the globe:

> "The reality of most of the world's food production: the world's three billion of indigenous and peasant producers – rural and urban, fishers and pastoralists – not only feed a majority of the world's people and most of the world's malnourished, but they also create and conserve most of the world's biodiversity and are perhaps humanity's best defence against climate change" (ETC, 2013)

For the TNC however, economic capital is also an end in itself because profit-making is the rationale of the TNCs. Therefore political capital is subjugated to economic capital. There is an implicit expectation to reconvert or re-exchange political capital into economic capital. As with all the sectors, economic capital is part of political capital but for the TNCs political capital must also be exchangeable into economic capital. The issue for TNCs is that political capital enables their individual and collective political agenda to be established and promoted to achieve economic objectives. Although a mirror image of the IOs and other organisations in each sector in the field, this aim drives TNCs' agendas, differing from the other sectors in that

increasing economic capital rather than reducing food insecurity is the motivating principle. As the sector with the second largest economic capital it is expected that political capital would also be the largest. A list of the economic capital for the TNCs (and the other major actors in the GFG field) is shown in Figure 11 below. This usefulness of political capital is borne out by TNCs' tactics to garner political capital, such as lobbying, when corporations can control not only laws but also policies and standards surrounding their industries. The weakened regulatory context impacts on food prices.



Figure 4: The sectors of Global Food Governance weighted by total sectorial annual income (in USD billions).[30]

[30] Figure 4: the sectors of Global Food Governance weighted by total sectorial annual income (in USD billions). The Civil Society sector is present but not visible. This is calculated as total annual income per year, combined for the top three organisations in that sector but it should be noted for all the graphs here that annual income is a guide to economic capital but omits assets. This is one graphical representation of the economic capital on the Field Analysis. Notes: A sample of the biggest three for each sector was taken and their annual income sourced from audited accounts (if public) or stock exchange data (if private). The numerical data is contained in Table A. For the Trans National Corporations the top company from each sub-sector was taken (Monsanto plus Syngenta (Biotech) -

As well as vertical *integration* there is also horizontal and vertical *co-ordination*. Coordination which enables TNCs to control supply chains without the need for mergers. And as well as horizontal coordination there is inter-corporate elite co-ordination (Khan, 2012). For example, when clusters of TNCs control markets by monopolising patented technologies. (Action Aid, 2005: 13). Recalling the 'revolving door' between IOs, TNCs and National Governments, then this is surely part of the mechanism which enables the elision of elites intra sectors. Political and corporate interests can and do elide, but this intra sector elite co-ordination dynamic can only magnify the concentration of power in the field, to the exclusion of other sectors not included in the inter-sector elite co-ordination.

As some commentators state, a 'hidden hand' of TNC practices exists (Action Aid, 2005), where TNCs use/abuse market power, pay low prices, marginalise poor farmers and rural workers all subject to no accountability, in a regulatory void. Corporate Social Responsibility some believe, is rhetorical, with no mechanism for redress. When TNCs engage in practices that violate both human rights and the environment, the communities affected often first look for redress through laws and regulations through their own government, the 'host' country. They may also seek justice in the TNC's 'home' country, through international frameworks such as the Africa Union or the European Union. Authorities in host and home countries are often either unwilling or unable to ensure that companies are prosecuted. Currently there are little international mechanisms for redress that are legally binding on companies. Also TNCs based in the US have the same legal protection as individuals (i.e. a right to privacy etc.), with the result that TNCs often fall between this gap in national and international legal frameworks. Those communities or individuals with a legitimate grievance have limited opportunities to hold companies accountable for personal or environmental damage. Without penalty, regulation or ultimate accountability there

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$1.76 billion; Cargill (Food Merchant) - $1.28b; and Potash (Fertiliser) -$2.4b. For the international organisations UN Food Agencies were used (WFP ($3.7b), FAO ($2.4b) and CGIAR 0.927b and IFAD. Again, the four biggest of the charitable organisations majorly working in food were selected: (Gates Foundation, Oxfam International $10.6 Million, Action Against Hunger $180million (rated up from 2012 figure of $162million) and World Vision $1.019 billion = combined total of $1.2096 billion . From Civil Society the top four food organisations were selected: La Via Campesina ($3.6 million), FIAN ($2million) and Urgenci ($1.8 million) and GRAIN.

is no censure, no reason for TNCs to cease bad practices, despite any obvious dissonance between their stated Corporate Social Responsibility policies and their practices.

An interesting explanation of the legal rights and protection of Corporations is set out by Clements who describes why in the US, American Corporations have the same legal rights as individuals, i.e. privacy, non-disclosure, non-regulation etc., (Clements, 2011). These 'artificial entities' have the same rights of 'free speech' as humans. Clements describes a historic series of battles between 'Citizens United' and public bodies such as the Federal Election Commission and comments that the latest battle is:

> "…class war waged for thirty years from the top down by the corporate and political right [in the U.S.]. Instead of create a fair and level playing field for all, government would become the agent of the powerful and privileged" (Clements, 2011: xii).

Currently corporations, with the same rights as individual, can attack legislation in courts under their 'constitutional rights' because in US, courts can strike down laws where they conflict Constitutional Rights e.g. Brown vs. Board of Education. For example laws to curb pollution require disclosure which corporations, like individuals can decline to disclose. (Clements, 2011: 27-28). This arose in a case Monsanto v BST and BGH where Monsanto claimed the right to remain silent as an individual (Clements, 2011:39). This "fabrication of corporate rights hollows out American citizenship" claims Clements, and 'corporatizes' American character (Clements, 2011:39).

This is pertinent to understanding the TNC sector of the GFG field because many of the agrifood TNCs are not only based in the US but are incorporated under laws of

the State of Delaware. 300 of the mega-corporations listed in Fortune 500 are registered in Delaware as are half of all publicly traded companies in the US. Delaware allows low corporate standards but as with all States' laws, none of the features of the Delaware Corporation Law are 'required'. Rather, they are policy choices made by elected legislatures, e.g. shareholder limited liability. One example of this is the BP Deep-water Horizon Oil Well explosion in 2012 when the shareholders were not held to account due to BP's limited liability (Clements, 2011:62). Yet 'corporate personhood' only exists in US State and Federal law, not in the US constitution. These attributes of a modern corporation such as limited liability, perpetual life, and legal identification as a unitary actor persist in the US (Clements. 2011:61-62) but have a much wider significance for the International System and global governance fields. Their practices shielded by patterns of 'euphemism and distortion' (Clements, 2011:39).

The agro-industrial TNC sector stands charge for hiding behind such a 'corporate veil' (Action Aid, 2009), specifically on accountability issues especially blocking redress in the host and home states, such as no foreign direct liability (no command and control accountability); no international standards for competition regulation from one continent to another; competition policy which should promote social objectives; competition regulations should address buyer power, market practices, abuse of power, price-fixing and to not marginalise peasants (Action Aid, 2005). Further criticisms are that TNCs are not accountable and CSR is optional and insufficient. Ethical investment and scrutiny which includes examination of both self-governance and practices, however, could be a growing trend if there is political consumer action to demand it. More detail will be supplied in the TNC case study on Monsanto provided in Chapter Four which further discusses 'corporate plutocracy' (Clements, 2011). The next sector of the GFG field to be examined is the International Organisation sector.

The International Organisation Sector

The World's largest hunger relief agency, the World Food Program (WFP) emerged out of the FAO, by dint of being the UN agency with responsibility for food aid. The WFP distributes USD2.9 billion (2012) of direct aid mostly from U.S. contributors,

and USAID coordinating some of its work through the WFP. Through its offices in 80 countries it provides food relief to over 100 million people per year. How well this diffuse network is monitored plus questions about transparency have been raised (American Enterprise Institute, 2010). Accusations of corruption have also been levelled at the WFP. This ties in with questions raised about the complicity of International Organisations – either through the malfeasance of intention or misfeasance (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).

A number of commentators have criticised the UN reform 'One UN' as also being process orientated rather than results orientated. This diffuse institutional architecture, however, does offer opportunity for dramatic improvement. One proposed improvement is to integrate existing agencies especially the three Rome based UN agencies, (FAO, IFAD and WFP) into one 'New Roman Forum' or, at least, develop a common strategy (see McKeon, 2011 and Clapp and Fuchs, 2009, ETC group, 2014).

Shaping an enabling international environment is one of the key recommendations in the 2014 outgoing report by the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, who also confirms that most stakeholders agree on the urgent need for reform since "the food systems we have inherited from the twentieth century have failed" (de Schutter, 2014: 4). De Schutter makes five recommendations for 'shaping an enabling international environment' (ibid). These include: remedying food price volatility, a new framework for trade and investment in agriculture, regulating agribusiness, moving away from agro fuels back to food production and, finally, food aid development co-operation (De Schutter, 2014). The recommendations of particular relevance to the global governance of food are the coordination of food aid, managing grain stocks at a global level to limit speculation and also to explore ways to "combat unhealthy speculation on the futures markets of agricultural commodities through commodity index funds" (de Schutter, 2014:27).

Establishing an emergency food reserve for the WFP plus designing trade rules towards more sustainable agricultural practices are also key remedies for the global governance of food security.

There is a strong focus in de Schutter's recommendations on regulating agribusiness, managing the risks associated with international trade, and protection from price volatility for the "least developed and net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs)" (de Schutter, 2014:27). De Schutter also charges states with responsibility for the establishment of a "multilateral framework regulating the activities of commodity buyers, processors, and retailers in the global food supply chain, including the setting of standards by these actors and their buying policies" (de Schutter, A/HRC/13/33). A call for commercial actors in the agribusiness sector to refrain from "practices that constitute an undue exercise of buyer power" was also proposed (de Schutter, 2014:27). Including smallholders in deciding the norms, guidelines and terms the framework is part of this recommendation. There is a paradox of global governance: that the need for international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO has never been so high, but trust in them has never been so low (Stiglitz, 2006).

Aid and Charitable Organisation Sector

This sector of the GFG field consists mostly of charitable organisations. Three selected for the this Field Analysis are Oxfam International, Action against Hunger and World Vision. A fourth, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (B&MGF), is a private foundation but combined with charities in this sector is called 'the Charitable/Aid sector', or 'Aid-sector' (a term which reflects the nomenclature used by workers within the GFG field). There is little in the literature on the role of NGOs in GFG, possibly because much of the grey literature is written by NGOs themselves. There is comment, however, on the relationship of NGOs to Food Aid, commenting that some NGOs prefer aid-in-kind rather than cash-aid because partly because their income is related to it.

As the new entrant, the B&MGF, has "unprecedented financial power to influence agricultural development agenda" (McKeon, 2011). Whereas the FAO's budget for

2010-2011 was USD 1 billion, the 2012 budget for the Gates Foundation was USD 3.12 billion (Gates Foundation, 2014). Questions have been raised about the lack of democratic oversight of a private foundation (McKeon, 2011) but others indicate 'private global regulation' is already a feature of GFG, given the growing power of TNCs and the "emergence of new food movements presenting alternative visions of the food system" (MacMillan, 2005:2-5).

The Aid Organisations sector also show high levels of economic capital and political capital. Recent agreements have seen donors committing to implementing measures to increase the effectiveness of aid and improve accountability to those intended to benefit from aid (OECD, 2014). These recent developments in improved self-governance and governance of the NGO sector enables transparency and accountability and contrasts with the lack of transparency and accountability of the TNC sector. Public governance of each of the four sectors is one of the recommendations made in the conclusion of this chapter. Further details of the NGO and aid organisations will be investigated in the case study on the Gates Foundation in Chapter Four (but it should be noted here that agencies and aid organisations do not have the same function nor *raison d'être*).

The Civil Society Sector

In the Civil Society sector, one significant issue for CSOs is access to the field especially if economic, political and legitimacy capital are *all* necessary for full 'voting-rights' access to the field. The civil society sector in GFG has also been seen as being a buffer to neoliberalism (Duncan and Barling, 2012). The main CSO is the international network of peasant organisations, La Via Campesina (LVC) who declared in 2008 that:

> "we are men and women of the earth, we are those who produce food for the world. We have the right to continue being peasants and family farmers, and

> to shoulder the responsibility of continuing to feed our peoples. We care for seeds, which are life, and for us the act of producing food is an act of love. Humanity depends on us, and we refuse to disappear" (LVC, 2014).

LVC also aim to defend local markets as a building block of food sovereignty which is based on horizontal dialogue between "peasant, indigenous and "scientific knowledges" (ibid). Commitment to gender inclusion means that women are enabled to a key role which in turn "helps build new relations inside the family against patriarchy" (ibid). The set of values rejected by LVC's policy on agroecology include:

> "technocentrism, academicism, reductionism and top-down verticalism, agrotoxics, transgenics and monoculture. Input substitution and neoliberal organic farming that leave monoculture intact. The external "certification" of seeds and the fruits of our labor Agribusiness and commercialism. The privatization of knowledge intellectual property over life; capitalism and neoliberalism. Payments for environmental services and the commodification of seeds, water, forests, biodiversity, carbon, and nature; land grabbing and large private estates (latifundio)…" (LVC, 2014).

LVC also assert that peasant agriculture is not just an "economic model of production", but is a way of life with many complexities including organisation of production and consumption as characterised by the rural indigenous way of life. The 'Declaration of the Rights of the Peasants (women and men)' was adopted in 2008 by Via Campesina which protects the indigenous way of life (Desmarais, 2007) Another significant civil society grass roots social movement, GRAIN, promotes public governance for public policies which 'Support Sustainable Peasant and Family Farm Agriculture' (GRAIN, 2014). These public policies include demands for

> "respect for farmer knowledge and the importance of farmer organisations and the broad implementation of Food Sovereignty policies such as protection of national markets from dumping, hoarding and speculation by corporations, and systems to guarantee fair prices for peasant food production. Support of peasant seed systems and repeal of anti-peasant seed laws" (GRAIN, 2014).

Public sector food procurement, farm-to-city initiatives such as farmers' markets, rural and urban cooperatives are also promoted by GRAIN as measures to improve food security and food sovereignty. Importantly, GRAIN also calls for the prohibition of national and global corporate agrifood monopolies and which "capture and distort policies to their own profit-taking ends, at the expense of farmers and

consumers alike" (ibid). A large part of GRAIN's claims are targeted at TNC domination of an unjust global food system: "…today almost one billion people live in hunger due to an industrial food system that places corporate interest and global markets ahead of feeding people" (GRAIN, 2012). So the CSO actors can be seen as not only a bulwark against the neoliberalism inherent in the food system but also as being in opposition to the dominance of the TNCs. As the fourth sector, it has dramatically less economic and political capital than each of the other three sectors. This concludes step one of Bourdieu's Field Analysis, the identification of the global food governance field. Step two, establishing the capital and step three, analysing the GFG field can now be undertaken.

Step Two of The Field Analysis: Establishing The Capital

Bourdieu defined economic capital as money, assets and property as well as command over economic resources such as cash and assets (Bourdieu, 1986). The economic capital of the GFG actors can be established through a combination of document research such as accessing public sources including the New York Stock Exchange, tax returns and also requesting the data individually (see Appendix 5). Consistency must be kept across accounting procedures, national financial reporting conventions and categories, and also awareness of distinctions such as the difference between profit and turnover or market capitalisation and yield. Since this Field Analysis examines organisations rather than the individuals of Bourdieu's Literary Field, then establishing the economic capital is comparatively straightforward. It should be remembered that economic power alone is often used as shorthand for political power but empirically this is not a secure enough measure. This was a strong rationale for deploying Field Analysis – so that a relational structure of political capital/ political legitimacy and economic power could provide a more detailed picture.

Establishing Political Capital and Political Legitimacy

Despite its centrality to understanding power, political capital is a more fuzzy concept: "Political capital is ill-defined, little understood yet an important concept for understanding political exchange and relationships in the political arena" (Casey, 2008: 3). Casey establishes a definition based on Bourdieu's intercontravertability theory derived from the understanding that capital types (here Bourdieu meant social, economic and symbolic forms etc.) are not 'pure' since they contain elements of other capital. "Political capital is the sum of combining other types of capital for purposive political action or the return of an investment of which is returned into the system (reinvestment) " (Casey, 2008:6). They are interconvertible with each other. Political capital closely relates to the concept of political resources and a large range of political resource theories point to the empowering role of resources in actors achieving outcomes. An example of political capital as political resources are the emergence, dynamics and tactics of social movement organisations (Casey, 2008; Hicks and Misra, 1993; Leicht and Jenkins, 1998).

Each capital species can be distilled into individual elements/resources (here called criteria) such as these and also converted into other capital species. For example, economic capital mobilised for political purposes includes resources such as influence, control over an agenda or lobbying/persuading institutions - in other words political 'pay-off'. Therefore economic capital converts into political capital. As discussed Bourdieu (1986) set out a range of capital species including economic capital (money, assets and property), cultural capital (cultural goods and services), social capital (for example, acquaintances and networks) or legitimation (symbolic capital). In this thesis, the volume of food governance actor's criteria has been determined by document research of financial reporting, minutes from meetings as well as direct communication with the organisations themselves by phone and email (Appendix 5).

Political capital is also defined as "the resources used by an actor to influence policy formation processes and realize outcomes that serve the actor's perceived interests" (Dolsak, Nives and Ostrom, 2003: 298). In Casey's working example of the 2004 US presidential candidacy, an index of Political Capital is created (which demonstrates its conceptual viability). For the 2004 election, four criteria of Political Capital were

created; democratic norms, voting, campaign activism and contact with public officials (Booth and Richard, 1998:782). These are also relevant to group activism or social mobilisation in civil society (as in Putnam's' original conceptualisation of political capital (Putnam, 1993)).

Bourdieu also refers to political capital in his work, describing it as a variation of social capital: "the source for observable differences in patterns of consumptions and lifestyles" and also that it "guarantees its holder a private appropriation of goods and services, residences, cars, hospitals, schools and so on" (Bourdieu, 2002: 16). Political Capital can be understood as the most 'authoritative form of capital' because of its proximity to power and is highly predictive of political action (Casey, 2008 see also Bourdieu, 2002). Capital and capital criteria such as economic capital, social capital, political participation etc. marshalled for political purpose become political capital. Therefore, economic capital or political capital is exchanged at 'political market' for political outcomes, which, in a governmental market, can be electoral, policy or institutional. Global governance political outcomes could include international support, committee access etc. and since political outcomes are set along self-interested lines (Bourdieu, 2002) then in an ideal-type political market the more political capital an organisation has, the more political gains towards self-interested objectives can be obtained.[31] Political capital exercised to these ends are a case of converting political capital to social capital or, perhaps economic capital, where there is, say, a return in shareholder investment for TNCs or grant-funding for NGOs. This is the cyclical nature of capital.

To ascertain the political capital of the actors, component values or 'criteria' of political capital were extrapolated from the literature on political capital. These

[31] The exception may be where the gain is not self-interested, such as is the case of altruism, as is the case of some charities or advocacy groups. Corporate Social Responsibility is not altruistic in that sense since the improved reputation or esteem of CSR and other ethical objectives are a form of social capital.

include material (objective) and non-material criteria (subjective) and compared to the criteria of Casey's political capital and Bourdieu's capital. In the field of US electoral candidacy (the best defined of the political marketplace) Casey establishes that the candidate with the highest amount of financing, or economic capital does not always achieve electoral success, or most number of votes and does not have the most political capital. The successful candidate may be the one with the best return on their political capital or at least who exchanged it most effectively. Although a caveat for any market-based metaphor is that the assumptions are of rational actor, perfect information etc. Other factors impacting on action such as poor or opaque information, disenfranchisement etc. should also be considered.

As identified in this Field Analysis, the exchange of economic capital compared to political capital in the governance marketplace of the GFG Field should illuminate aspects of the relationship between economic capital and political capital or legitimacy capital. In the electoral field Casey attributes seven capital species to political capital; institutional capital,[32] human capital,[33] social capital, economic capital, cultural capital, symbolic capital and moral capital. [34] These correspond with the aspects of power such as discursive power, symbolic power and instrumental power. All constitute political capital but for this thesis the decision was made to measure mostly only the manifestations or material criteria of political capital, to minimise subjectivity. From the main definitions of a) political capital and b) democratic legitimacy variables of measurement can be derived. These form the criteria for the variables table for political capital with each of the top four organisation from each of the four sectors measured against the criteria to give a scalar value. For details on their construction see Appendix 4.

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[32] Institutional capital is here defined as "capital associated with the identification and association of prevailing ideology and power" (Lin, 2001:105) - the resources that governmental organisations wield.

[33] Human Capital is defined as consisting of ability, behaviour and effort and time and is "the currency people bring to invest in their jobs" (Robinson & Baron, 2007: 257) As a political resource it is defined as political ability, skill and experience (Davenport, 1999:7).

[34] Action, cause, example and rhetoric/symbolism are necessary for the building, maintenance and mobilisation of Moral Capital. Moral Capital influences public opinion which can form part of political capital (Kane, 2001). Here it is defined as "moral prestige- whether of an individual, an organisation or a cause –in useful service" (Kane, 2001:7).

Political Legitimacy

With the Field Analysis' initial steps in hand; step one identifies the field, and step two establishing the economic and symbolic capitals then step three, the Field Analysis and results can be undertaken.

Step Three: A Field Analysis of Global Food Governance

With the global food governance space divided into four sectors and the economic capital, political capital and political or 'democratic' 'legitimacy' capital of the field were identified as the key capitals to measure governance power in the field. Criteria (with measures for these criteria) for each of these capitals were defined (Appendix 4). These criteria were then used to give an estimation of the amount of economic capital (see Figures 4 (on p. 104) and 5, 6, 7 & 8 below) and scores for political capital and legitimacy capital for each of the top four actors in each of the four sectors (see Figures 9 and 10). Analysis of these results was Bourdieu's third step in his research design and so this chapter sets out the results of the Field Analysis, analysing what the results mean for the global governance of food insecurity.

Economic Capital

First of all, the economic capital is analysed. The economic capital of the global governance field is considerable, even when based on 16 actors, as it is here. The asymmetrical nature of annual income of the 16 organisations of the global governance field is shown in Figure 8. The economic capital of TNCs is slightly more than that of the IOs but the field is dominated by the 'Aid organisations' (due to the high income of the B&MGF). Figure 7 shows this data with the Gates Foundation removed (and correspondingly one organisation from each sector also removed). This comparison shows that, without the Gates Foundation, the top three Aid organisations

have economic capital equivalent to about one-third of IOs and less than one third of TNCs.

Breaking down the data further reveals interesting insights into the size of each sector by economic capital. The four sectors by each sector's combined annual income (top four actors only) are shown in Figure 6. Figure 5 shows these values expressed as percentages of the field.



Figure 5: GFG Sectors by percentage of combined annual income of top 4 actors per sector



Figure 6: With average per capita annual income per actor in each sector calculated on top four actors only.

By comparison to Figure 7 below, which shows the total income per sector minus the Gates Foundation, (i.e. just the top three actors in each sector) it shows the effect of the Gates Foundation in that Aid agencies, which dominated the field when the Gates Foundation was included, no longer dominate when it is excluded. TNCs dominate with IOs second whereas Aid organisations are only 14% of the GFG field on this calculation. Figure 5 (also below) expresses this in percentages for easier comparison. So the initial view of the economic capital of the Aid organisations being 72% of the field is misleading since, as seen in Figure 7, once the Gates Foundation is removed as an outlier then Aid organisations are only 14 % of the field. Significantly, the Gates Foundation represents 80% of the aid sector (as can be seen in Figure 6). With an average per organisation income of USD 9.58 billion the Aid sector appears to dominate the GFG field but minus the B&MGF, the next top three actors have combined economic capital of USD 777.66 million. This not only shows the size of the Gates Foundation but also the economic capital differential between organisations in the different sectors. The CSO sector is almost not visible.



Figure 7: Shows the combined annual income of top three actors per sector with the Gates Foundation removed (as an outlier).



Figure 8: Shows the sectors of Global Food Governance weighted by total sectoral annual income (in US $ millions).[35]

[35] Figure 8 shows the sectors of Global Food Governance weighted by total sectorial annual income (in US $ millions). The Civil Society sector is present but not visible (between the green and blue segments). This is calculated as **total** annual income per year, combined for the top three organisations in that sector. This is one graphical representation of the economic capital on the Field Analysis. Notes: A sample of the biggest three for each sector was taken and their annual income sourced from audited accounts (if public) or stock exchange data.



	IO	TNC	Aid	CSO
Political Capital per sector (index of 1)	0.857142857	0.714285714	0.642857143	-0.714285714

Figure 9: Political capital weighting per sector.



	IO	TNC	Aid	CSO
Political Legitimacy per sector (index of 1)	1	-0.642857143	0.892857143	0.535714286

Figure 10: Political legitimacy weighting per sector

This is also significant because once the B&MGF is removed, it reveals that TNCs dominate as the economically largest sector. IOs are the second largest economic group. The Aid sector (minus Gates Foundation) is now less than a third as large as TNCs and a third of IOs.[36] The economic capital of the Civil Society sector is considerably smaller than the other three sectors. In Figure 15 it is seen that, as a percentage, the TNCs and International Organisations hold economic capital domination of the field with a much smaller Aid organisation sector and a civil society sector of negligible size.

In regards to the other two symbolic capitals, political capital weighting per sector (for 3 actors) indicised to 1 is shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 shows a measure of political legitimacy weighting calculated from the total score per sector (3 actors per sector, Gates Foundation removed), also indicised to 1. From the legitimacy capital score, International Organisations are the most legitimate with Aid organisations second, and Civil Society Organisations third. Yet CSOs are the most representative by dint of their rationale but the result is skewed by both the non-disclosure policy of La Via Campesina and also by economic capital being included as a criteria in both

[36] The CSOs are a fraction of the TNCs to a ratio of less than 1:1666. The ratio of the economic capital of the CSOs to IOs is 1:1500. From this figure it can be seen that if the CSOs and Aid organisations were to combine, it would make little difference in term of the configuration of the economic capital of the field.

political capital and legitimacy capital. (The reasons given by LVC for their policy is the cost of financial reporting, to protect identify of donors and for political reasons). Despite CSO's lower legitimacy scoring, its position in the field is significantly much smaller and more marginalised that its validity due to its legitimacy. The TNCs have the least legitimacy capital, being as illegitimate as the CSO sector is legitimate. Yet its position in the field is as second most dominant. International Organisations also dominate yet improved and increased funding and power-sharing with CSOs would improve the relegation of the civil society sector to virtual invisibility.

The Field Analyses

Field Analysis 1

Figure 18: Global Food Governance Field Analysis 1 (Political Capital)



With this data put into the Field Analysis axes, the first Field Analysis is shown in Figures 11 (above) and 12 (below). For the first axis political capital is represented by the X-axis and economic capital (Y-axis). This is compiled from the variables table (Appendix 6) with the political capital criteria and measures outlined in Appendix 4, Table A). The distance between the Gates Foundation and the other players in the field is evident. According to its economic capital and political capital, the Gates Foundation could potentially dominate the field. Even if the Roman Agencies merged (WFP, IFAD and FAO), their total would still be less than the

income value of the Gates Foundation. The political capital of the Gates Foundation, according to this scalar value, is equivalent to the others but since economic capital is also convertible to political capital, the Gates Foundation could, in future, become the hegemon in the field for political capital. The political capital, political legitimacy and economic capital of the Gates Foundation is examined further in a case study in Chapter Four and the effect of the Gates Foundation on the field is also analysed at the end of this chapter. Also visible are the fragmented IOs but since the field is struggle and competition, if all the IOs merged then symmetry of the field would improve. The Civil Society sector achieved low scalar values for political capital and is again at the margins of the field.



Figure 12: Global Food Governance Field Analysis 1 (Political Capital, Gates removed) [38]
Notes: x axis= Political Legitimacy Score (taken from variables table 3.5. See table 3.2 for criteria and attribution notes)

With the Gates Foundation removed, Figure 12 above shows that those in the top right have the highest level of political capital and economic capital namely WFP, Monsanto, FAO, Potash and Syngenta, who all inhabit this space. This demonstrates the weighting that IOs and TNCs have in the field. With lower economic capital but similar political capital is Oxfam International, the largest of the Aid Organisations. There is some symmetry between the IOs and the TNCs but not the Aid Organisations since Action Against Hunger is close to zero political capital and World Vision scores

five. Those sitting on the X-axis have low economic capital, for example IFAD, (which also has high political capital) and Action against Hunger (which has 'middle-sized' political capital). The CSOs have low economic capital, low political capital and are once again on the outer limits of the field.

Field Analysis 2.

(Figure 13: Global Food Governance Field Analysis 2 (Legitimacy capital)



Figures 13 (above) and 14 (below) show the second Field Analysis, that is the political legitimacy capital of the GFG field with legitimacy on the X-axis this time and economic capital on the Y-axis, as before. The political legitimacy scores are taken from the Variables Table (Appendix 7) with Appendix 4 Table B showing the criteria and attribution of measures for legitimacy capital. As the most dominant player in the field, it is interesting to note that the Gates Foundation scored lower on accountability and regulation, although its scoring sits between the CSO sector and Action Against Hunger. The top right of Figure 14 below shows those scoring highest in the legitimacy scoring, namely WFP, FAO, Oxfam, World Vision and CGIAR (in descending order of economic capital). It should be noted that whilst IOs claim inclusivity (they scored a 1 for that), it is not always demonstrated in widening the membership out of the GFG field to others. Which poses the question if any inclusivity performance gaps are perceived by governors in the GFG field. Inclusivity can be rhetorical and the GFG field is not representative (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). The CSO sector score highly on political legitimacy but not as highly as IOs due to lower economic capital being a criteria. LVC's score, despite the organisation's representativeness, is lower due to a lack of transparency and accountability. This infers that legitimacy is not equal nor based on representativeness, only that representativeness is an element which may only be rhetorical. Effective global governance would include meaningful representation, since regimes and issues can only be democratic and effective in their governance with good information and inclusion.



Figure 14: Global Food Governance Field Analysis 2 Legitimacy Capital, Gates Foundation outlier removed

What is learned about the GFG field from these Field Analyses? This section analyses the main results and themes arising out of the Field Analysis results including architecture, dynamics, effectiveness, membership and power. Each of these aspects of governance relate to the principal question of this research, that is how can global

governance best mitigate food insecurity and address the obstacles to establish a stable and effective food security regime? [37]

Of primary importance is that this Field Analysis demonstrates that GFG is indeed a field according to Bourdieu's 'family of conditions' (Bourdieu 1993b). Additionally, the GFG field is traversed by both some very powerful and some very marginalised actors. Also important is the observation that the most powerful in the field are the least legitimate. The Gates Foundation has substantially more economic capital than previously thought and there is less variance between the legitimacy of the TNCs and, surprisingly, the CSOs than might be expected, although this is perhaps due to La Via Campesina's non-disclosure policy, which decreases its legitimacy. The asymmetrical appearance of these 16 actors across four sectors reaffirms the point of the GFG architecture being fragmented and incoherent with many of the international actors who claim a role having overlapping mandates and competing rationales and organisational structures (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). From the Field there is general (but not unanimous) agreement that the food governance framework has "failed to provide a sustainable food supply that is accessible to all" (Gustafson and Markie, in Clapp and Cohen, 2009:179). The key challenge for any reform agenda, however, is to reach consensus on an appropriate framework which would also be effective in eliminating hunger.

One approach could be a 'gradualist' approach, perhaps consisting of evaluation, similar to the evaluation that the FAO experienced. This could perhaps be based on a comprehensive evidence-based analysis evaluating individual institutions, which could perhaps then recommend a stronger international institutional architecture. Further fragmentation of the institutional architecture through creating more institutions could be counterproductive so instead it has been proposed that 'mandates, capacities and mechanisms' could be extended within the existing institutional architecture (Gustafson and Markie, 2009). The benefit of this approach

[37] It is useful to here reiterate once more the caveat that these are results arising from a Field Analysis *device*. Combined with the literature on the GFG Field, they offer a set of observations about features of global governance field which, in all, provide a foundation for the subsequent interviews and case studies and ultimately, the recommendations for effective food security governance at the end of this thesis.

is that it continues the multilateral system but a critique of this approach is that many of the key players have already had evaluations and reformed but despite this the global governance of food is still not effective in mitigating food security since the number of food insecure grows (Gustafson and Markie, 2009). Perhaps the most effective reform would be to establish one new body that could take leadership of the field and transform the fragmented and asymmetrical nature of the field to be a more effective governance space.

Identifying the Global Governance Field

The Field Analysis also describes and shows the global food governance field for the first time. If the Gates Foundation is removed as an outlier then in descending order of dominance, the actors dominate as follows: TNCs, IOs, Aid and CSO with CSOs a very small fraction of the economic capital. Aid Organisations have economic capital at less than one third that of TNCs' economic capital and one third of IOs' and CSOs, and are extremely peripheral to the field. Again, if the Gates Foundation is removed then the selected Aid Organisations consist of about 14% of the field. The big differential is the Gates Foundation, which holds 58% of the total economic capital of the sixteen actors selected for the Field Analysis. IOs, however, have the highest amount of political legitimacy (again if Gates Foundation is removed as an outlier). Aid Organisations are second, CSOs third and TNCs fourth in political legitimacy. With political capital however (also with the Gates Foundation removed) the equal first position in the field is held by both TNCs and IOs with Aid Organisations second and CSOs last at third.

As seen in both Field Analyses, the GFG field contains such widely variegated actors with dramatically differing rationales and disparate economic, political and legitimacy capitals, they are, literally, polar opposites. Coherence, consistency and agenda alignment must be difficult to attain and maintain across such diverse sectors and

governors. This explains some contradictions of the field, such as the misalignment between the trade agenda and food security agenda, as described by the Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food in his call to put food security first in the international trade system, (de Schutter, 2011). In fact, from the Field Analyses it can be estimated that the trade agenda must be in a dominant position in the GFG field due to the dominance of the TNCs. The actors who promote the food security agenda are less well positioned in the field and so countervailing objectives are at play across the members of the field. Also in the Field Analyses, GFG is dominated by a single, private foundation and to a lesser degree by IOs, with the CSOs in a very marginalised position, despite their legitimacy. So the structure of the GFG field is 'structuring', in that it reproduces the diffuse, fragmented and asymmetrical architecture.

Identifying the Dynamics of the Field.

A second results analysis theme concerns the dynamics of the field, namely the effect that economic capital, political capital and political legitimacy have on the GFG field. The asymmetric distribution of power across governors affects the key components of global governance of rules, roles, responsibility, accountability and processes (Rosenau, 1992) because in the field the positions are determined by economic and political capital rather than legitimacy. Accountability varies across sectors and actors and so is not standardised. The rules seem to largely protect the status quo, marginalise the CSOs, thereby diminishing representation and plurality. Using Rosenau's definition, needs and wants may be fulfilled but the question is whose needs and wants (ibid)? The Field Analyses indicate the absence of overarching democratic authority in the GFG field although dominance of the IOs and TNCs is in evidence, perhaps resembling Pareto's lions of conservatism and foxes of speculators (Pareto, 1963).

The main dynamics of the field for this research, economic capital, political capital and political legitimacy (as well as the dynamic of the 'structuring structure' of the field itself) although all interconvertible, vary in their effectiveness. Economic capital favours those who have it in abundance - here the IO and TNC sectors overall and

some of the Aid Organisations. Similarly, political capital benefits those who can wield it in largest measures, again the TNCs, IOs and, to a lesser degree, the Aid Organisation sector. In this GFG field, political legitimacy is the least effective dynamic since those who hold only legitimacy capital (the CSOs) are unable to convert it to either other forms of capital, such as political capital or to leverage significant outcomes from it. The marginalised excluded CSO sector holds the least economic and political capital out of the four sectors, therefore it follows that economic capital and political capital are the strongest dynamics for the actors in the GFG field with legitimacy capital a weak, inferior form of capital for this field. Since economic capital is convertible to political capital, then economic capital may even be the predominant dynamic. The dominance in the field of private actors is also evident and discussion on the effects on the GFG of such powerful private actors is developed through this thesis. Changing the logic of this field so that political legitimacy carries a stronger effect on the field would redress the power imbalance and constrain the hegemony in the field of agrifood TNCs.

There is political authority in the GFG field in the deployment of political capital but since there is hegemonic power, there is little legitimate political authority. As a result there is little impetus for co-operation or co-ordination in the field. Legitimacy and authority are often derived from the inclusion of interests and participation of groups in decision-making (Turner, 1998) but the GFG field, with its asymmetrical architecture, weak power-sharing and poor representativeness has limited legitimacy or authority. The GFG field is a sub-field of other fields of power so it is perhaps a reproduction of the features of the International Field of Power. This chimes with a constructivist interpretation of global governance as being constituted by identity and culture. The GFG field could be structured by the governance cultures of the International Field of Power in which case, does an international power elite dominate each governance field and regime?

Economic Capital Dynamic

The importance of economic capital in the Field Analysis is substantial. Both as an organising principle (in the Y-axis) and also as a constituent criteria in both the political legitimacy capital and political capital scoring. This is taken from Bourdieu's research design with economic capital in effect 'double-counted' with the organisations holding the highest economic capital also redeeming economic capital in the symbolic capital score. Another way to understand this is that the organisations without economic capital are doubly-disadvantaged. Yet as discussed in the earlier section on defining the symbolic capital, Bourdieu was clear that economic capital must also exist as a criteria in symbolic capital. Notwithstanding, it can be seen that actors with the highest amount of economic capital dominate the field for political capital as well as economic capital. Since political capital is interconvertible from economic capital, then this fits with the understanding of how economic capital can 'buy' political capital. Where the economic capital is from trade, then this creates the political capital to prioritise trade concerns: "…this increasingly globally oriented corporate control over the food system is resulting in a privatization of food security, whereby we see 'an emerging world agriculture subordinated to capital'*"* (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:6, citing McMichael, 2005:280). True to Bourdieu's conceptual understanding of a field, there were also differences across the actors in each of the criteria in political capital and this demonstrates that each of the sectors are not monolithic. Whilst there may have been vertical and horizontal integration of, for example, TNCs to form ultra-corporations, each of these are not identical transits. There are variances in practices, financial commitment to lobbying and, in the political legitimacy criteria, differences to open-ness, inclusiveness etc. That these variances exist shows that alternative *modus operandi* are not only possible but can also be successful. This forms a recommendation to private and commercial actors in the GFG field.

Another important observation from the results are the differences on how this economic capital is manifested in GFG. [38] For the second largest economic capital sector, the IOs, the purpose of the economic capital is to address the manifestations of food insecurity, (e.g. emergency and crisis measures) but political capital is also necessary to influence the political agenda at the international level. So economic capital is necessary as part of political capital. Therefore the economic capital is exchanged for political capital by governors. Examples of political capital include campaigning work and political negotiations which influence legislative outcomes at the national level and also influence summits and directives at the international land regional level.

Therefore economic capital buys political capital and so enables agenda setting by the most powerful sectors, the TNCs and the IOs. The income of the IOs is extremely significant and, considering the high level of food insecurity and the low level of effectiveness of the field overall on resolving food security, then how can effectiveness i.e. resolving and mitigating food insecurity, be better achieved from the economic capital of the International Organisations? The amount spent on food and aid in humanitarian crises was estimated by Mark Malloch Brown, former head of the UNDP as USD 360 billion (2002 figure) (Kristoff, 2002). Without the systemic causes of food insecurity being addressed, then this figure can only increase. Perhaps the IOs need to divert more economic capital to funding the CSO sector - so grass roots movements can increase their reach. Grass roots organisations are effective with food insecurity because local agriculture feeds people systemically. Also grass roots social movements increase the buffer against neoliberalism, in the idea of Tsing's 'friction' because they actively contest globalisation and neoliberalism.

[38] Measuring the total global governance field was considered but assessing the total volume plus number/types of actors would not have yielded the data required for the principle question in this thesis. A cross-section, such as the top four organisations of each sector was judged to be more relevant to the issue of better global governance of food security.

This link between economic capital and effectiveness inevitably leads to the conclusion that reorientation of the IOs including the UN bodies, could be considered. This is not the same as the one-UN reform, which set process-orientated goals. Instead, results-orientated goals could be set for the reform of the IO sector so that food security can be best addressed which may include diverting more IOs' capital towards CSOs especially grass roots movements. There is also the flip side to the dynamic of economic capital in that those with low economic capital - here the CSO - are unable to convert economic capital to political capital, even with high political legitimacy. So the dynamic of economic capital is double favour to those members with high income and political clout and disadvantage those with low economic capital with lessened political capital.

Political Capital Dynamic

It now seems the case that economic capital plus political capital is not enough for effectiveness, and legitimacy capital and political capital also do not achieve effectiveness. Yet legitimacy capital, political capital and economic capital together can achieve effectiveness (where the *raison d'être* corresponds), so improving effectiveness over food insecurity can be aided by increasing the economic and political capital of the civil society groups - in other words, better funding, inclusiveness and representation. Increasing political legitimacy capital alone will not increase effectiveness.



Figure 15: Political Capital by Sector

As can be seen from Figure 15 above the organisation with the most political capital is the Gates Foundation followed by the World Food Program then, in decreasing order; Monsanto, FAO, Syngenta, Cargill, CGIAR, IFAD and Oxfam International, who each have the same political capital score but varying economic capital. Action Against Hunger has lower political capital partly due to a lower annual income. So here the IOs, Aid Organisations and TNCs are vertically assembled with Monsanto and the World Food Program the most similar behind the clear leader of the Gates Foundation. It is interesting to note that the Civil Society sector arguably has almost no placing - at the low end of political capital showing low levels of political and economic power. Revising the economic capital of the Civil Society sector would also raise the political capital.

Since the agendas of the governors with the highest political capital dominate, this is a driver which structures and restructures the field. The membership is kept inaccessible and the governance ineffective because the status quo suits those who benefit the most from its preservation i.e. those with the highest political and economic capital. Rather than pursue effectiveness in mitigating food insecurity as a goal, maintaining the status quo benefits those most successful members, and become de facto goals of the GFG Field. Those with least political capital are, according to Bourdieu, the most dominated, therefore, their continued participation in the game is not guaranteed (Bourdieu, 1993). Being so dominated means that the rewards, or convertibility rate, are so low that the CSO actors could 'leave the game'. For example, they may seek to pursue their objectives outwith this field of power and enter another where they are less dominated. Or resort to only direct action methods to achieve political capital. Another option is that those with the most political capital, i.e. the least dominated, power-share with those who are most dominated. The benefits of doing so would be to exchange some political capital for political legitimacy, to stabilise the field of power and/or to stop the CSO actors leaving *Le Jeu*.

Political Legitimacy Dynamic

Political legitimacy capital here includes the criteria of *raison d'être* , inclusivity, transparency, public facing accountability, regulation, ethical practices and economic capital. The results in Figure 16 below show that the most legitimate according to these criteria are, in descending order of economic capital; WFP, FAO, Oxfam International, World Vision, CGIAR and IFAD followed by Action Against Hunger. The next most legitimate are FIAN, GRAIN, Urgenci, then LVC but this is partly due to lower economic capital. The Gates Foundation is included in this grouping (although with significantly higher economic capital). The least legitimate but with the highest economic capital are Monsanto, then with increasing legitimacy capital and decreasing economic capital, Syngenta and Potash. Needless to say, the opportunity exists for actors with low political legitimacy to increase it by improving on any of the criteria such as transparency, inclusivity, public facing accountability and ethical practices etc. As discussed, political legitimacy capital seems to have the poorest exchange rate in the GFG field of all the symbolic capitals in that it does not easily translate into political capital in this context. Those sectors with only political

legitimacy have less of a voice and less power in the GFG than other sectors, who combine political legitimacy capital with economic capital or with political capital (or with both). Despite the importance of representation and inclusion, the sector with only political legitimacy capital have less voting rights and influence over legislation and admittance of new members is more difficult for this group than those with high economic capital or high political capital. This poor dynamic of political legitimacy in the field can only inhibit the effectiveness of the GFG field in resolving food insecurity. The figure below shows the political legitimacy score by sector.



Figure 16: Political legitimacy capital score by sector

Figure 17 below shows a comparison of political legitimacy and political capital by institution and demonstrates some concurrence of political legitimacy and political

capital for IOs and the Aid Organisations, but more disparate connection between political capital and political legitimacy for TNCs and the highest disaggregation is between political legitimacy and political capital for CSOs. The value of holding high political legitimacy and little or no political capital in a field of power seems low, because political legitimacy is not valued in the Field. Especially of note is the high political capital and the low political legitimacy held by TNCs. Yet the combined force of political legitimacy and political capital of IOs and Aid Organisations does not effect many changes to the field either. Is lip service played to political legitimacy or is it the case that it is not recognised at all in the structuring structure of the GFG field or field of power? Political legitimacy seems to have no effect on the field on its own otherwise it would have converted into high political capital or even economic capital. Those who have low political legitimacy are at a disadvantage in such a system and are dominated by other sectors. Therefore the logic of this field of governance is to respect political capital and economic capital over political legitimacy. Thereby the GFG field is, at present, set up to fail to change, or represent, include or incorporate all the agricultural voices or consider systemic solutions to food security since these issues cannot be represented, analysed or solved without a more inclusive, polyvocal form of democratic governance.



Figure 17: Comparison of political legitimacy capital vs. political capital scores by organisation

Perhaps the GFG field is, in effect, set up for on-going continual crisis response and not for establishing food security. If so, this would agree with some of the criticisms in the literature review. Therefore this GFG field, which does not value legitimacy capital, needs urgent and drastic reform. Yet the status quo seems to not only prevail but to renew itself. It seems to ensure the continuance of neoliberal ideology, where market practices and commercial objectives dominate. The GFG structure is hardwired to the past and so the CSOs will remain dominated.

Effectiveness in the Global Food Governance Field

There is discussion by some of the interviewees in Chapter Four that the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) is a step in the right direction towards a more democratic GFG field. The counterpoint is that this viewpoint assumes a dynamic of change whereas a little measure of power, albeit new, can remain just exactly that size. In the context of the urgency of the situation, better and quicker effectiveness is imperative. A more democratic food secure-orientated field which recognises and rewards political legitimacy would, if the CSOs were politically enabled, be more effective in mitigating food insecurity. The economic capital of the IOs could yield a more effective political capital dynamic in the field. The status quo then, is deadening not only this prospect for change to the GFG field but, going on the forecasts for global hunger, will also result in billions more being denied access to affordable and nutritional food. Therefore the status quo is also one of the causes of food insecurity. Since, of the three dynamics selected for analysis here, political legitimacy capital is the weakest, the question needs to be asked why legitimacy capital is so weak in global food governance? The question is can legitimacy capital be valued and new members admitted so that the GFG field is reformed to enable public governance rather than *laissez faire* global governance to flourish?

From the review of literature (pages 69-76) and in the interviews that follow, it is made clear that the views and knowledge of agriculturalists such as peasants and smallholders could be placed at the fountainhead of improving change. With reform, restructuring and regulation of TNCs, dynamics other than economic capital could be valued and a power shift could result in establishing pro-food secure positions, policies and practices (rather than only position-taking). In the face of such an escalating and catastrophic problem, is improved power-sharing enough to guarantee effectiveness? [39] The CSOs have only recently been admitted to international arenas like the Committee of World Food Security, and only as non-vote bearing members (since 2009). The membership of the GFG field could be therefore revised by reducing TNCs' political role (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009) and increasing the Civil

[39] Parallel regimes on the same scale, such as climate change, offer interesting comparisons and opportunities for appreciating the rate of improvement required.

Society Mechanism in not only the CFS but also their position and role in the field. New actors could also be admitted and allowed voting rights for committees set up by the IO sector, such as the UN Committee for Food Security. The Aid sector could horizontally integrate and co-ordinate with refocused priorities aimed at results. The barriers to entry to the GFG field could be made more porous.[40]

This ineffective global food governance field helps to explain contradictions such as there being enough food to feed the world but the number of hungry is rising. Both can be true under this current governance format. It would also seem that the narrative that the 2008 global food crisis revealed new dynamics of hunger is not wholly correct. Instead, food crises are systemic and endemic to the food system, as is the on-going hunger problem because of issues such as the governance system giving power to the 'hidden hand' of the TNCs. The 2008 food crisis revealed how big the hunger problem had grown, fuelled by globalisation and neoliberalist practices, such as the commoditisation of food.

Considering this vast scale of global hunger and the David versus Goliath position of the TNCs versus CSOs, perhaps the IOs, as the framers of the international political structure of committees and summits, and gatekeepers to membership of this international political system, could ratchet up the political capital of the Civil Society sector by admitting them further, sharing more economic and political resources as well as building the capability of the Civil Society (and the Aid Organisations) to engender change and crucially address food insecurity. If the current structure of global governance has, at the very least, perpetuated current levels of food insecurity, then the current structure must be urgently changed.

[40] Barling and Duncan (2015) propose that the Civil Society Mechanism of the CFS is an example of the improving democratisation of the GFG field.

Similarly, to redress the democratic deficit the political access of the TNCs could be ratcheted down by the IOs as gatekeepers. The rationale for the inclusion of the TNCS in global governance: that of an assumed neutrality of technical expertise, can no longer be tenable in the light of the dominant political capital and economic capital in the field and the low level of effectiveness in mitigating food insecurity. Added to the examples of bad practices by the TNCs arising from reports and eye-witness accounts, a picture arises where some TNCs are, due to their recent vertical integration, powerfully asserting their own agenda through sizeable political capital. Unlike the other sectors in the field, since their objective/raison d'être is to increase economic capital, then this is inconsistent with decreasing food insecurity. In fact, the aims of decreasing food insecurity and making profit may be competing contradictions, or at best dissonant, disconnected autonomous objectives.

In addition to ratcheting down the political role of TNCs in the GFG field, the question of regulating TNCs at national and regional level is also important. Through the practices of some TNCs it is clear that some practices do exacerbate food insecurity, for example, on the issue of seed sovereignty: "At a time where mega corporations want to control our food, it is imperative that we stand together to protect our food, the planet and each other" (Shiva, 2014). Seed sovereignty is a growing civil society movement which links seed sovereignty with food sovereignty, land sovereignty and water democracy into an earth sovereignty movement which resists TNCs and the implementation on Intellectual Property and seed patents into national and regional legislation (Navdanya, 2014). Promoting biodiversity and food sovereignty as democratic rights, the seed sovereignty movement sets up seed saving banks and conservation and training centres for subsistence farmers and peasant across India in response to Indian farmers' suicide and so called 'terminator seeds'. Navdanya is now becoming a global movement with an aim of fighting 'mega corporations'. The national level of government and the regional level of governance, such as the EU, could impose legal restrictions on TNCs with the justification of protecting 'earth sovereignty'.

Some steps have been taken by International Organisations towards power-sharing with CSOs (McKeon, 2009). Some CSOs have commented that the International Organisations do support their activities and their assertions over issues such as

patenting and intellectual property of seeds (Navdanya, 2014). Yet LVC mainly avers any involvement with IOs since their experience is that they are invited into partnerships which benefits the IOs but their views are often misrepresented or funnelled (Desmarais, 2007). These exogenous perspectives are supplemented by endogenous perspectives established from the interviews detailed in Chapter Four. So depending on the *raison d'être* of the actors, some of the economic and political capital of International Organisations and Aid Organisations is put to use in mitigating food crises and emergencies, reflected in the moral capital and good practices factors, whereas it seems that almost all of the political capital of TNCs is deployed in profit generation. This push-pull dynamic across sectors may contribute to the overall ineffectiveness.

In summary, this Field Analysis of global food governance has mapped out the GFG field for the top actors in the four sectors. The results demonstrate who holds most capital in the field and how the three types of capital selected, economic, political and democratic legitimacy capital are distributed across these actors, according to set criteria. The results show the dominant position held by private power – the agrifood TNCs such as seed companies, agrochemical companies etc. and that through horizontal and vertical integration they now control all aspects of food from fertilisers to the plate. It also shows the extent of that private power with the hegemony of the Gates Foundation, demonstrating which sector is excluded to the outer limits of the field and the rising predominance of the new governor, the private Gates Foundation. As discussed on pages 22-25, the discourses of these sectors and actors; Productionist, Food Sovereignty and Civil Society will also be at play across the field to varying degrees of salience according to their position in the field.

Maintaining such a status quo will inevitably have devastating consequences. 18,000 children and 7,000 adults die of starvation each day and over one billion people starve each night (Molla, 2011). The global governance of food, which could address this,

falters, beset by problems of poor representation, asymmetrical power-sharing, conflicting trade and food security agendas, conflicting discourses, domination of legitimate grass roots movements by private actors and the dominance of a private commercial elite who hold a significant amount of economic and political capital in the GFG field. This Field Analysis research asks how can food insecurity be effectively remedied and what role would effective power sharing take?

Food security governance is ineffective at least partly due to the above factors. Other factors include variables omitted from this study such as national-domestic governments, the role of Financial Organisations and other contexts and dynamics such as political will. GFG can better address food insecurity through a range of measures such as reforming along more inclusive lines, promoting pro-food secure agendas and practices and gender inclusion. Hunger can be put at the centre of GFG by regoverning agrifood markets to identify, set and achieve pro-poor development goals. Regulating TNCs to end practices such as the abuse of TNC buying power in agrifood markets and enforcing guidelines for transparency and accountability for all actors in GFG will also improve effective governance. Representation and inclusion will also aid effective governance.

By implication, the inefficacy of current GFG makes current initiatives such as the Comprehensive Framework for Action seem too incremental and ineffective. This need not be the case but neither should the assumption be held that there is time for gradual improvement, given the 25,000 deaths per day. Some of the interviewees talk about a 'tipping point' where the global food system may need to urgently and drastically reform. The announcement by the IPCC in Yokohama in April 2014 of a climate change- induced catastrophic food and water shortage may be the clarion call of such a tipping point. Heeding such a call and creating an effective food secure centred governance field could mean the capability to manage any tipping points or crises is already in place.

Even barring any future food disasters, it is clear that the global governance of food needs reformed. The agenda-setting by actors who dominate by dint of their economic

and political capital, despite an apparent lack of legitimacy, means that the current global governance policies and practices are, on the whole, not effective enough and not fit for purpose. Accepting this begs many questions about how to reform and what should be reformed? For example, how can agrifood markets be regulated? How should global institutions respond to the future threats of food security? How can the 'democratic deficit' in the GFG field be addressed?

Conclusion

As with climate change, partial reform may not be enough. Small steps in the right direction, whilst reassuring, may not be justifiable nor effective enough in light of the scale and pace of food insecurity. There is an assumption about small-scale improvements - that they show a 'bounce' in a downward trend or herald a new upswing which will bring the problem to an end. That only one in eight people are hungry now rather than one in seven is not a success, it is a failure and a renewal of previous failures. Consequences of such harrowing magnitude require great leaps forward not just little steps of success.

The next chapter, Chapter Four, offers interviews with organisations in the field and outlines short case studies of one representative organisation from each of the four sectors, introducing individual perspectives on scenarios of food insecurity. Chapter Five contains the overall analysis and recommendations.

Chapter Four: Views From The Field

"Squeezing the lives of people is now being proposed as the saviour of the planet. Through the green economy an attempt is being made to technologise, financialise, privatise and commodify all of the earth's resources and living processes." (Vandana Shiva, 2000).

With the global governance field now mapped out by the Field Analysis it is useful to have an actor (governor), level of analysis. Through this lens the view of the GFG field is from their perspective and the issues and viewpoints on GFG that affect them, such as co-ordination, distribution of power and effectiveness of IOs. As outlined in the methodology section in Chapter Two, through qualitative research – firstly interviews then case studies – this chapter considers the dynamics, power and membership of the GFG from ten governors' perspectives. The first half of the chapter contains the results from the ten interviews and the second half has four case studies and comparison. The chapter concludes with some analysis and interpretation of the results from these two methods and the next and final chapter continues the analysis and sets out recommendations.

Part 1. The Interviews

The importance of self-reflexivity in qualitative research is evident in interviews, since the interviewer is also a participant in the research. As such, interviews offer both risks and opportunities to the researcher. The risk of researcher bias accidentally shaping the results versus the opportunity of data that offers insights and knowledge not previously known.

A Semi Structured Interview Approach.

Although the interview protocol (Appendix 9B) appears on paper to be structured, the actual approach to the interviews was semi-structured in that points raised by the participants in answers were immediately followed up and the participants were also given opportunities to raise their own points or add their own commentary on items

not on the interview protocol, so that the questions were open-ended. In this way the protocol was used as a prompt for the interviewer but mostly dialogue flowed between the interviewer and participant in a formal but responsive way. The interview protocol lists the main questions and some possible follow-up questions but probes were also used as questions during the interview, when possible, and it was these probes and follow-up questions that demonstrated the responsivity in the interviews, according to Rubin & Rubin's description of responsive interviewing (Rubin & Rubin, 1995:16). The operational difficulties of conducting international interviews over the phone should be highlighted here too, as well as the difficulties in gaining access through gatekeepers, gaining the confidence of participants and establishing a rapport when there is no face to face validation (Creswell, 2007: 120). It was also extremely difficult to *retain* access and participation. With it taking months to secure both participants and interviews in many cases and almost a year in the case of the TNC participant it was also a challenge to secure a date for the interview slot with the participant or gatekeeper, even when permission had been granted in principle. With perseverance it was possible to conduct semi-structured interviews, to audiotape and then transcribe them, which constituted the data collection. The one part of the interview process which proceeded easily, however, was the issuance and signage of ethics approval sheets and participant information sheets.

As a lone method the interviews would not have been robust since not enough interviewees chose to participate, so they are not representative of each sector but are representative of the GFG field in a holistic sense and their perspectives on the global governance of food are represented. As a supplementary method, however, the interviews offer useful new insights into the food governance field. The interviews combined with the case studies offer an endogenous view of the GFG field that augments the Field Analysis. This endogenous view of the GFG field is important to develop issues raised in the literature review such as power-sharing between actors,

silo mentality and the effects of corporations, to collect recommendations for improvement such as inclusion and scrutiny mechanisms and also to appraise in a wider sense how food security is understood amongst the agency, commercial and charity workers who work on it.

Research Process and Participant Selection

As mentioned there was significant difficulty in securing participants to take part in the interviews and the challenge was two-fold in that it was also difficult to get them to reply to contact, or participate in the interview. In some cases it took persistent emailing, verbal coaxing and assurances to obtain participation. One food security expert explained that this was typical and the issue was suspicion across the food security governance field. Mostly Aid organisations replied, sometimes with offer of participation, probably because they have a public facing role and remit, with a mission statement to raise awareness and they also seek funding from grant-awarding sources. 90 potential respondents were approached with a request for an interview from a master list of 107 organisations (see Appendix 3). The master list devised for the Field Analysis shows that the personnel are a mixture of senior management and field workers. The head of the organisation was approached first and it was often then delegated by them to a more junior (and perhaps more relevant) person. For more generic organisations, research was conducted into the most relevant role to approach. The most typical response from many was either non-response or declining to get involved. Another common response was to agree but then to not respond to the interview phone call.

A total of ten respondents were interviewed from nine organisations; seven by phone, two face-to-face (in the same interview) and one completed the interview protocol by email. An additional two replied to a later follow up email interview although this was a truncated version of the questions (see Appendix 9 for versions of the protocol). The responses to this email largely tended to point out website links.

The interviews are anonymised and each of the four sectors are represented by at least one interview. The 'aid' sector (AID) offered six interviews (from five organisations, participants B, C, D, E and G) and the other three sectors have at least one participant each so there is one interview each with a national Governmental Organisation (Participant A), an International Organisation (Participant F), a Trans National

Corporation (Participant H) and a Civil Society Organisation (Participant I) (see Table 6 below). The Governmental Organisation interview has been used here although not part of the quadripartite sectors of the GFG field. One of the Aid Organisations was the pilot interview. The gender balance is six men and four women. Three participants are based in the UK, three in Europe and four in the USA and there was a wide span of the working age demographic.[41] It is regrettable that Asia and Africa are not represented here. This perhaps reflects the geographical bias of the field, the constraints of unfunded doctoral research and the domain of the researcher.

A	GO
B	Aid (pilot interview)
C	Aid
D	Aid
E1 E2	Aid
F	IO
G	Aid
H	TNC
I	CSO

Table 6: Interview Participants' code by Sector

Although, as mentioned, each sector is represented, the interviews are not fully representative of the total GFG field. The findings from these two methods

[41] Although demographic detail was not formally asked for, this data was ascertainable from research into the participants.

(interviews and case studies) are illustrative and, combined with the Field Analysis, provide a foundation for observations, analysis and some recommendations. Due to the low participation rate in the interviews there are, however, a number of 'missing voices'. As well as other geographical areas, the biggest player in each sector, namely Monsanto, the Gates Foundation, World Food Programme and La Via Campesina all declined to be interviewed. As a result these organisations are chosen as the case studies so that their profile could be set out. Future research into the GFG field that both overcomes this Euro-American bias and specifically includes interviews with the larger players would offer a further important step forward in understanding Food Security. Unfortunately this was outwith the reach of this research.

Although the difficulties in securing participants were consistent and enduring, no pattern can be drawn from non-participation in the interview other than it was a common response, given that more than 80 other participants also declined. In the most extreme example it took twelve months to obtain an interview, that of the TNC. It was very important to the research so polite persistence and perseverance was imperative. In the same way that abstaining from voting is a form of democratic expression, not participating in the interview can be seen as an expression towards the question, the investigation and perhaps also towards academic research generally.

Email correspondence with a number of potential participants drew positive comments on the importance and relevance on the research and frequently there were requests for a briefing paper or some form of dissemination of the results but there can only be speculation on the reasons for their subsequent non-involvement. Referral to websites or corporate publications was another typical response, which shows a preference for unidirectional mode of communication. Some, such as La Via Campesina, have a policy of non-disclosure via online, by publication or even by interview, but overall these non-disclosing organisations tended to be non US-based organisations. Interestingly and of note for future researchers, La Via Campesina's position is to reject academicism (and so studies are rare).

Of the nine organisations who did participate, eight gave at least 30 minutes of interview time and were generous in offering supplementary information. Advice sought from five food security or global governance experts confirmed that these responses of non-participation are a typical stance and sectors only deal with or care

about their own sector so pan sectorial co-operation and oversight are rare. This may go some way to explain why an overall specification of the membership of the field has been absent. The interviews were conducted from August -September 2013 with the preparation starting in February 2013. The results do indicate differing points of view from across sectors and show contradicting and competing opinions and understandings of effective GFG.

The Interviewer's Approach

As mentioned, although the interview protocol appears to be structured (see Appendix 9) the approach for the interviews was intentionally more semi-structured. Open-ended and open questions were asked and answers which were interesting or opened up new topics were followed up with further off-schedule questions as part of the semi-structured approach. The interviewees were also asked if they wanted to raise any part of global food governance, or comment on any issues. This enabled narratives to be established and the responsiveness gave the space for a wider range of observational and analytical data to be drawn from the participants (Appendix 10).

Reflections on the Pilot Interview and the Questions

Reframing the interview questions and nomenclature awareness became apparent during the conduct of the pilot so post-pilot, a second version of the interview protocol was devised (Appendix 9, B). The pilot/first version had 32 questions which were a mix of primary and secondary questions and duplication, overlap and some slight leading of the participant were evident but this initial version was a necessary precursor to creating the final version of the protocol (see Appendix 9, A). The main reflections from the pilot are on the praxis of the research, (such as the recording equipment failing to record and so the importance of detailed note taking as a backup). The semi structured approach taken in conducting the survey was again

demonstrated by asking the participants for comment, or any other points they wanted to add.

For the next interviews, the participants' publications were read and 'brief sheets' started on their organisation, work etc. In the pilot I slightly dominated the interview, not letting the voice of the participant come through well enough but I did stay objective, only steering the participant to remain 'on topic', not drifting off onto seed or advocacy (which the interviewee wanted to). When piloting the questions I also realised that there was still a slight mix of primary and secondary questions together under topics such as reform, field, and regulation so this ordering was sorted for the remaining interviews. Plus the pilot interview took too long – overall the interviewees gave much more comprehensive questions than expected and also anticipated questions, so to get around interviewee fatigue I rearranged the order of some of the questions, frontloading the most arduous questions that required the highest cognitive load to the beginning. I also collapsed the first two questions on personal role/organisational involvement since most interviewees spoke only about their organisational involvement with a brief sentence on their role involvement. I also frequently asked if they had issues, points or questions. Overall it went well and operationalising the interviews brought the topic to life and the enabled the data collection.

Interview Themes

Once redrafted, the final version of the interview protocol (Appendix 9, B) worked well. The questions for the interview were divided into three sections of personal involvement, GFG and reform of GFG, each with an open question on that theme at the end. The conclusion was one open question on any aspect of the topic. There were thirteen questions in all which covered the participant's role in food security; asked for their evaluation of the effectiveness of current GFG; the sectors in GFG; the architecture, oversight, reform including possible leadership of any reform; scrutiny of TNCs, Aid organisations and International Organisations and also opinions on profood security policy innovations.

Towards the end of the interview, if time allowed, a question was asked about which issues the G8 should prioritise (although this question was also implicitly asking what

it was going to take to improve food security). Answers given to question four (on the main sectors of the GFG field) were applied to the Field Analysis. A point on nomenclature was raised by a few interviewees at the start, since food security and global governance definitions do vary but this was quickly reconciled during the interview.[42]

Logistical Difficulties

For all of the post-pilot interviews physical challenges predominated. For example the logistics of recording over poor phone signals, time zone alignment, unkept appointments, note-taking at speed, interruptions and delays were all repeatedly overcome. But the biggest challenge remained the lack of uptake, sometimes on the day. The response rate really depended on the head of the organisation. The focus of the interviews was to capture opinions rather than facts (since facts are in the public domain) and the questions were designed to avoid duplication with publicly available information. Once the interviews were all concluded an email 'sweep' of unfulfilled interviewees was conducted with a truncated version of the interview protocol of five questions. In research terms I felt that by the time I had completed the interviews, my decision to do the Field Analysis was again validated in that there was no map of GFG nor overall sense of actors involved even amongst many of the governors themselves. The lack of interview uptake and tentativeness of the interviewees meant that interviews alone would not yield a complete view of who was involved in GFG since the actors and sectors themselves are very siloed and Balkanized.

[42] Interestingly another observation is that the nomenclature of 'Non Governmental Organisation' did not transfer across sectors. The danger is of non-fully articulating definitions is misspecification but a few participants pointed to the need for aligned nomenclature as a prequel to their interviews.

The only face-to-face interview possible was with one aid organisation and this was a much better quality of data-yield than the rest. Face-to-face interviews as standard would have been better since the data quality was so much improved. So another observation is that it is not easy to do organisational interviews on a very low budget and with no prior relationship nor access. Despite being persistent and the importance of the topic there was almost no response from the 'Roman Forum', International Organisations and TNCs. The faith based organisations, however, did reply. This widespread lack of reply is a reflexive conclusion in itself but also speaks to the opaqueness of the field. Perhaps Bourdieu's concept of social capital also applies to social researchers?

Paradoxically, for a governance field so static, another of the challenges of the research generally was incorporating the numerous developments in such a vast topic area. For example, between starting and completing the research, the Gates Foundation came out from the 'left field' so the Field Analysis was revised to include the Gates Foundation and was changed from three sectors to four sectors. Measuring the effects of the Gates Foundation on the GFG field could be an entire research project in itself. Discovering that LVC did not disclose data any more was another surprising development. With their secretariat now based in Zimbabwe and a recent policy of non-transparency (with the justification of not revealing funders or funding) LVC's non-disclosure reset the narrative of the research into a more complex, shaded picture. These developing changes justify the methodology because by consistently asking systematic questions across sectors and not accepting only the received wisdom, interesting and sometimes surprising results can be obtained.

To sum up, despite thorough planning, carrying out the research was an exercise in solving a series of problems. Obtaining 'thick, rich data' was difficult but since the purpose was to garner endogenous viewpoints from the global governance field, enough new 'thick, rich' data was obtained. The response rate was not ideal but this also unburdened this researcher from one of a researcher's more judicious decisions. Rather than stopping when the data was satiated, the interviews ended when all the respondents who were willing to get involved were interviewed.

The Interview Data

The interview themes in the protocol are drawn from the themes arising from Chapter Three namely, governance architecture, dynamics, effectiveness, power and membership. Taking the first major theme, membership, the first question asked the participant about the role and involvement of their organisation in food security. The Aid Organisations commented that their organisations either fed into UN organisations e.g. the Committee on Food Security; promoted agricultural development (Participant C); conducted campaigns, lobbied and offered advocacy services (Participants D and G), or pursued economic-based approaches to food insecurity. This shows the wide range of activities by the Aid Organisations who participated in the interviews. The Governmental Organisation provides oversight and scrutiny of the food security activities of the legislative arm of the US Government. The International Organisation commented that it achieves economic development through agricultural growth. The TNC stated that it improves the supply chain by supporting farmers to access markets. Lastly Participant I, the CSO, commented on their role in GFG:

> "[We] work with the CFS, not as a member (only states are members), but as an active participant in the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) to the CFS. [Organisation name] has, in the context of the respective CSM working group, co-facilitated civil society input to two important processes in the CFS: the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Forests and Fisheries, adopted by the CFS in May 2012, and to the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition, adopted by the GSF in October 2012."

These answers to the first question provide descriptive rather than analytical data but are useful in identifying how the actors view their involvement in food security. But it is clear that for some of the respondents' secondary activities, such as feeding into the CFS or lobbying and campaigning and their primary role in food security, whereas

for others their work in food security is primary, involving direct action via agricultural growth, economic development or, in the case of the TNC supporting farmers access market. Each of these fit into the productionist discourse, although the advocacy activities of aid organisations could be said to also relate to the food sovereignty perspective and civil society discourses. This intermediary role has been criticised by LVC who reject intermediaries and demand direct routes to power. The civil society organisations show the circumscribed role of civil society organisations in the CFS. Although the Voluntary Guidelines and the Strategic Framework are important landmark guidelines, the international organisation participant comments that these guidelines "don't go anywhere", which demonstrates the restricted although progressive, membership that the civil society organisations are allowed in the governance of food.

Whereas the first question dealt with a description of roles in the global food governance field the theme of the second question is effectiveness of members within the current GFG field. Answers to the second question varied dramatically across sectors. The Aid Organisations commented on factors which have a huge on GFG, specifically the global trade policies of multilateral agencies which they saw as being self-fulfilling. Participant B commented: "They [agencies] have unintentional influence but the question remains - how can we get to an effective GFG regime?" This chimes with the point on the effectiveness of the GFG field and comments that multi-lateral agencies can even inhibit food security.

Participant C pointed to a compacted stasis across the field:

> "…however with international governance there is need of global trade regulation and compliance to create a more even playing field. There is impasse on Doha work on GFG. The last 5 years have been impasse [so] there is more to be done, especially with clearer resolutions."

The relates to the perceived need for resolution to the stalemate over the WTO Doha round on global trade negotiations, as described in further detail on page 176,, which has impacted on developing countries and on the global governance of food. On global trade regulation this participant specifically highlighted access to markets with the need to improve food security by increasing trade opportunities, and developing

greater access for developing markets, which is consistent with the food justice discourse.

The failure in the GFG system, particularly in its lack of response to climate change threats and worsening trends, was highlighted by participant D who commented:

> "The current GFG system does not provide adequate responses to the rise of food prices…looming water problems… rapid concentration in multinational agribusiness corporations without the necessary institutional innovation to guide them. [There is a] lack of progress in addressing scarcity; adverse impacts of climate change on agriculture; widespread nutrition problems, including hunger, obesity, and chronic diseases; and agriculture-related health risks, such as avian influenza."

National Governments and International Organisations in particular,

> "…have notoriously underinvested in public goods related to food, nutrition, and agriculture, such as rural infrastructure, agricultural research, and rural institutions, which have international spill over effects and global impact." (Participant D).

Participants E were also critical of the international institutions, commenting that the UN is a "super-talker" and pointing to the WFP delivering aid in Karnega in Uganda for 46 years, even though the need for structural investment would be obvious over this time period, commented participant E_1. Participant E_2 confirmed this.

> "Any gains have been lost. Co-ordination levels range from crisis to non-crisis, country to country with a better coordinated approach needed. There is a lot of evidence that it is improving but it still has a long way to go. In major stakeholders voices vary and small voices are often lost so participation of smaller stakeholders is key. It is caught in an emergency situation and this is recurring so a systemic way of dealing with hunger would be better."

This points to a need for systemic coordinated approach to dealing with hunger specifically including smaller stakeholder voices. It also points to global governance fragmentation, also contained in the literature review (page 126)

The need for a strategic systemic approach is also underlined by participant G who points to the FAO as a lead body:

> "So in particular, as you will see, the rights of the CFS are run out of the FAO which used to be, and I'm not completely knowledgeable about its origins, but from what I understand, it wasn't always a strategic body."

The viewpoint of the TNC participant (participant H) is that GFG is weak and extremely ineffective:

> "I mean there is no real international governance of this. It is national with some international guidelines around policies."

However, hope of change is also perceived in the UN's top-down approach in the albeit slow improvements seen in the CFS. For GFG to be effective, comments Participant G:

> "There is much more of an effort to be inclusive of nationally based local organisations, local movements such as the various peasant movements and organisations around the world as well as NGOs and I think that has played quite an important role in terms of mapping out priorities that are more relevant, more in line with different interests and priorities somehow [as with] the High Level Panel of Experts in food security and nutrition…with the understanding that there needs to be global coordinated action to stop that scale of crisis from happening again."

The TNC participant also stated that it was their belief that the ultimate responsibility for implementing food security lay with national governments:

> "I mean there is a Committee on Food Security in the UN now, which means it is pretty much all encompassing of countries, which looks at food security and coming up with recommendations for national governments. So there is a forum, if you like, where global issues of this kind can be discussed, the implementation and recommendations going into national governments. That is where executive power lies, [and] so to some extent [it] is around what national governments do with these recommendations. I mean could you improve the system? I am sure you could, do I have…? I mean a lot of it is to do with how well national governments implement guidelines."

This position is a good example of the productionist argument as put forward by agrifood TNCs generally, that they are neutral technical actors with no power, and they also point to the executive power of Nation-States and the discursive power of the UN and Committee of Food Security, which shifts the focus away from scrutiny of TNC power, which is the considerable power of private actors. This illustrates TNCs' denial of their power in the GFG field which itself contradicts the viewpoints of some of the other interviewees.

The TNC participant also commented that this ultimate national government-level of action should apply to food aid and social protection policies:

> "For food security and from the FAO and organisations like the Committee on World Food Security there are recommendations around these kind of things but, at the end the day, it is down to national governments to implement and for various reasons they may not do that some of them do, some of them have done very well and some have not."

This demonstrates a desire for national governments to implement social protectionist policies to mitigate the excesses of the market for producers and consumers. These policies, it is suggested, could flow from recommendations by the FAO and CFS or by National governments themselves. This, rather than global trade regulations, would improve the effectiveness of Global food Governance. This illustrates a TNC viewpoint and agenda in Food Security governance. Participant H felt went further and indicated that private sector actors like TNCs deliver food security in the global system by creating an 'enabling environment' to support farmers:

> "In my view a lot of the time it is private sector players who deliver food security - everyone from farmers to the companies who are involved in the food system. I mean, they are the people who are actively day-by-day bringing food to the rest of the population people who need it. I mean what

> governments need to do is create an enabling environment and that enabling environment includes private sector actors who do that better and that enabling environment includes public infrastructure - roads and electricity in developing countries - straight through to forces that might help farmers access input like fertilizer or credit that help farmers access market that help markets function across local regional and international markets that help trade because different countries have different resources some countries can produce a lot of food and there are others who produce very little then you have to enable food to flow from areas of surplus to areas of deficit."

This TNC position attributes national governments as the prime agents who should be resolving food insecurity by implanting CFS recommendations, providing social protection policies and infrastructure, and enabling the private sector who "deliver food security." Yet it is TNCs who do provide food security by helping farmers trade. This does not take into account the point raised in the Field Analysis that the raison d'être of TNCs is to maximize economic capital, not 'provide food security'. It also represents a view of food security where the failure is at national government level since their role is to facilitate food trade. Also of note is the lone food producer here aligned with the ultra-corporation. This viewpoint is in direct contradiction with points on TNC practices outlined earlier. It omits the issues of TNC practices such as terminator seeds and patenting which causes so much damage to famers' livelihoods. This position that the TNC promotes a productionist discourse and mercantilist world view is aligned with the food justice and right to food movement.

The Civil Society participant focused on the UN Human Rights system rather than food security *per se* in the GFG, representing a rights-based discourse:

> "As the international human rights organization on the right to adequate food, we work also on food issues with the different organs of the UN Human Rights System, based in Geneva."

This illustrates the competing perspectives and discourses on effectiveness from a rights-based approach by CSOs to the viewpoint of TNCs of their role as food security enablers. Each sector points to each other's sector as the source of ineffectiveness or, as with the CSO, sees themselves as pushing their approach

through to change the status quo. Overall these competing perspectives, agendas and disparate understandings of GFG vary considerably and can only serve to impede rather than improve food security. There are also disavowals of where the power lies, presumably to conceal the true balance of power and lack of power-sharing in the food governance system.

Cross sector opinions also varied widely for the third question which asked, what should be done to improve GFG? The GO (Participant A) focused on inefficiencies in the system of delivering food aid, dealing with the corporate culture and internal controls of agencies. Participant A also pointed out that,

> "With food aid, a lot of it is logistics. So issues like modernization and inefficiency in the emergencies. Using local and regional procurement for example.… So we look at the internal controls of agencies. For example, the World Food Program didn't sufficiently track from the port of entry to the recipient and we expressed concern re their data on losses. …We make recommendations but bearing in mind the environment in which they work."

Better co-operation amongst the organisations and agencies involved in governance and a number of issues such as improving co-ordination amongst agencies plus the need for 'more and better' fora which include more smallholder producers, was highlighted by Participant B (Aid) who stated:

> "Civil society gives the credibility to the [CFS] Secretariat and offers critical contributions since their personnel has been involved for a long time. Important too for the UN agencies to talk to everyone more freely since Governance knows vital information. It should be relatively easier now to
>
> establish a stable food regime since there are smallholder groups like La Via Campesina involved so there is stronger network with decades of experience."

This more diverse and inclusive form of Global Governance was also recommended by Participant D (Aid) who commented on the potential for the EU to support the

CFS,

> "In order to strengthen global governance, the EU should give full support to the multi-stakeholder UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) to ensure it fully emerges as the 'foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform' operating at the global level. It should: Support ongoing CFS negotiations on the new Principles for Responsible Investment (RAI) in the context of food security and nutrition. Secondly, it is important to promote and operationalize new CFS negotiated Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests;[43] and thirdly, promote the creation of a proposed Global Fund for Social Protection for 48 Least Developed Countries".[44]

Better information about production levels of food in countries would also improve food governance, commented participant C, since the current system,

> "…is too slow to update the systems with information like market prices. This [is a] need for better food balance sheets and better links to countries re trade bands and tariff setting. This indicates price volatility. There is also the need for better stores, such as the farm bill process in the States. In India and Asia large TNCS work more closely with governments."

Both better organisation and wider participation of global actors, in particular African actors, was highlighted by Participant G (Aid) who commented that things were overall on the "right track" and that the CFS is,

> "An important first manifestation in terms of process… the private sector obviously has an added value to support that process but I think it does need to be government led and civil society led."

The TNC participant (H) put forward a perspective which focused on the role of TNCs in GFG as being only stakeholders involved in the governance process: "We don't give input into the governance of food security but we do give input into the *process* of governance."

This articulates the role of TNCs as neutral technocrats which chimes with Clapp and Fuchs (2009).

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[43] For FAO (2012) Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, *s*ee FAO, 2012.

[44] The participant offered to provide arguments for this proposal.

This description of power does not describe the degrees of influence which stakeholders have over those with 'decision-making' power or how much the decisions made reflect the interests of stakeholders such as power-sharing. From the Field Analysis we know that governors vary considerably in size, economic capital and also in political and legitimacy capital and applying this to the 'process' means that the leverage will also vary considerably. The distinction between inputting into governance or inputting into the process of governance is an interesting one. This interpretation is that GFG actors, such as TNCs, do not make the decisions (so no executive power) but it could be argued that by their inputs into the process involves other forms of power such as discursive power (promoting agendas, lobbying, negotiating etc.) or instrumental power. The actors can also still wield instrumental power, albeit through the soft power of negotiation and persuasion. This may also explain the narrative given by the TNC participant to the previous question that TNCs provide food security and that national governments should enable them to do so. This represents an example of the position-taking by corporate power which underplays the extent of their power and by aligning (falsely conflating) themselves with single food producers, many of whom experience negative effects of TNC practices, the neoliberal logic of market-driven solutions to food insecurity, outlined in Chapters One and Two, is again identified here.

Additionally the 'input into governance process not decision-making' is a useful distinction for TNCs to make since it legitimizes their involvements in GFG by categorizing them as 'stakeholders' with an accompanying presumption that only executive power is instrumental power. This chimes with the assumption of the technical neutrality of TNCs in the food governance system but ignores the dynamics of not only GFG but also power itself. Such as, the amount of 'stake' (political and economic capital) held by an actor determines their ability to 'influence the process'.

It avoids the bigger question of whether TNCs should be stakeholders at all

(legitimacy). Or if that question does arise, 'stakeholder' implies a benign detached distance from the governance of food rather than a much more immediate, active role in the food system to the extent where, as we shall see in the Monsanto case study, the Foreign Policy actions of governments are aligned and acting on the needs of home corporations to impose their controversial products on resistant nation-states. 'Stakeholder' status dilutes or masks a reality where the commercial activities or business practices of TNCs (or of other divisions in their corporations) should, according to some commentators, preclude them from being 'stakeholders' or having any involvement in the governance process at all (Participant B).

Furthermore, commercial power and practices might even dilute 'executive power' of GFG power, where they weaken food security measures or Right to Food discourses, rather than strengthen them. By creating this distinction between degrees of governance involvement in this way, elements of governance have been delineated but it is possibly the unofficial degree and extent of influence over decision-makers which matters, not the official position taken. To this end political capital, legitimacy capital and economic capital are useful measuring sticks of political and economic power and Field Analysis, which sets out actors' symbolic capitals in the field of power, becomes a very useful method to set out a 'power map'. The relationship between power and political capital is discussed earlier but in brief, the more resources that an organisation can marshal and convert to exercising power (political capital), then the more influence the organisation can levy. It stands to reason that any actor would take full advantage of the leverage available to it, if not limited by other means.

On effecting change and establishing effective GFG either ideally or practically, Participant B (Aid) felt that only a shock would improve the system:

> "A disaster or scandal will happen – the only question is how bad and of what magnitude will it be? Then reason will prevail over agribusinesses. They may become decentralized and smallholder production will come to the fore." Whereas Participant D (Aid) felt better co-ordination and effectiveness was the right approach for change: "Political will and more coordination among the different

Institutions. This is a similar answer to the question on diffuse architecture."

The International Organisation, Participant F, pointed to the need to reset this question to GFG more generally:

> "This unitary body or what comes closest is probably the CFS but that said, it is a global *committee* on food security. It can make recommendations but it cannot proscribe. It can provide guidance etc. etc., but this guidance would need to be adopted by sovereign states but ultimately we are going back to the level of nations although these nations need to determine jointly what their interests are for food security for now and in 10, 20, 50 years to come and that is where I think, for that you need a global body... I mean, where do we have the bodies that make authoritative decisions? We are firmly in the sphere of international law there and we know how difficult that is. A lot of the decisions made for food security…are not International soft law, so they are not hard law and mostly are not captured at all."

Participant F's opinion means that that an authoritative decision making organisation with legal power to implement its decisions is needed in the GFG space. So either enhance the CFS to enable it to make these decisions and implement through international law or better, through hard law such as national sovereign law, although this is fraught with political difficulty and unlikely since it needs the harmonization of states' legislations. The current role of the CFS in making recommendations is, Participant F proposed, not what is needed to globally govern food security. Extension of the CFS would mean new governance structures with powers and the cooperation of national governments. This could emerge from the governance space currently occupied by the CFS but the current situation would remain with their decisions neither captured nor implemented. Otherwise it remains a committee which makes guidelines and the self-interest of member states, including their commercial elite and trade interests continue to dominate. This 'Realism' analysis tempers the Cosmopolitanism which enables the design of a new global unitary food governance body.

Participant G (Aid) reiterated the need for civil society being taken into account by governors to identify and establish priorities from the ground up and for agencies to partner more with governments and CSOs.

Participant F, (IO) called for a unitary international body to govern food security, overcoming the silos:

> "A forum like the CFS needs to be able to overcome the individual interests of its members for real dialogue to happen, for real decisions to be made. The next stage is not just to agree on a set of international soft law instruments but to make an international unitary body so the CFS needs to monitor progress. That is a great challenge that the CFS will need to live up to in the next few years"

The idea of an international unitary body revisits the concept of the World Food Council which would offer legislation to be adopted nationally. This could also manage food stocks, oversee TNCs and reduce price volatility by addressing commoditisation and trade practices. This could also enable public-private partnerships so that TNCs were better regulated yet were encouraged to participate in agricultural development across the board along guidelines proposed by smallholders and peasant farmers.

The TNC respondent pointed to the role of TNCs in effecting change and establishing effective Global Food Governance:

> "That is what we do. A lot of our work, particularly in developing countries for example, where you are providing a market for smallholders farmers for example cocoa in Ivory Coast or Ghana, we systematically help to train the farmers in growing the cocoa trees on their farms better. How to harvest the cocoa at the right time; how to ferment it properly; which is an activity that is done on the farm and by doing this help to raise the income usually between 30-50% of the cocoa farmer which much improves their ability to feed themselves… which builds resilience into the next generation… For example, we have trained over 2 million farmers over the last 10 years in china, basically in animal husbandry; how to get pigs healthy and grow them to optimum weight and grow grain. So just basic kinds of agriculture extension work which the public sector are not doing which are really to move a lot of farmers out of poverty and farmers are a big part of the hungry, then that is what needs doing."

To sum up, these comments overall show that there was no solid positive evaluation of GFG across the interviews. The answers range from the commentary that the CFS is a 'step in the right direction' to the TNC viewpoint that there is, *de facto*, no international governance.

Question Three was on the theme of membership asked the participants if they agreed there are four main sectors in GFG. The answers are utilized and discussed in the Field Analysis in Chapter Three but there was broad agreement of this. Additional points made include suggesting the inclusion of National Governments (by Participants A and C). Participant D proposed that the aid organisation sector be divided into development agencies and NGOs. It is interesting to note that, despite the domination of the Gates Foundation in the Field Analysis, not one of the participants mentioned the role of private non-TNC actors. Participant F (IO), did comment on the regional variance of private actors, here meaning TNCs: "in some perspectives MNCs might play a major role but in other geographic areas they don't." That there is geographically-segmented variance in the roles that actors play is an important point to be raised and offers an opportunity for future research by conducting geographical field analyses by region of GFG.

Participant G (Aid) also suggested including other governance groups, especially where they function outside of the UN or regional governance-led bodies, for example, the CAADP which comes out of the African Union and out of the NEPAD process. [45] NEPAD promotes agricultural development in the African continent;

[45] NEPAD is a technical body of the African Union. Agricultural development is key to NEPAD's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) which brings together major players in agriculture including African leaders, policy makers, scientists, partners and farmers to engender agricultural growth and sustainable development. It is seen as being the legitimate policymaking organisation with a mandate which states should respect. Some commentators think that

"…it is a programme, which is government-led and specifically African Union government-led so [it is] outside of the UN or International Organisations [so] it should be included and it should be international…and that is another important stakeholder which you might want to include."

This is a significant point about the representativeness or democratic deficit of the existing GFG field. Participant H, the TNC actor, also questioned who is an IO or an NGO and asked if CSOs include Aid organisations such as Oxfam, which demonstrates the uncertainty of membership of the GFG field especially who the other sectors in the field might be and how they might be populated? A silo mentality is clearly operating across the field, with less awareness of membership than might be expected.

On the topic of how the architecture of the GFG effects food security (Q. Four) participant A (GO) chose to focus on the ad hoc nature of decision making:

> "In deciding emergency aid there is the UN and its agencies such as FAO, WFP, and if there is a declaration then we liaise with national-level providers. Many decisions are ad hoc decisions made in real time with differing sets of participants. Internationally there is, for example, the CAADP system. After which they make their plans, involving many parties including companies. The US and UK liaise and say how these plans will be implemented."

This again highlights the absence of legitimate policy-making organisations like CAADP from the GFG field. the recognition of the centrality of the CFS as the legitimate policy-making body is a common theme but for some participants, despite this central role, governance is also perceived as becoming increasingly fragmented. Participant D commented:

> "Food security governance has become increasingly fragmented, leading to a lack of coherence and conflicting interventions. The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) is the legitimate policy-making organisation which

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CAADP should guide international agricultural development efforts across Africa which would help increase the effectiveness of the currently fragmented and disconnected governance system (Participant G).

should guide international efforts to ensure coherence and avoid fragmentation; this mandate must be respected by states."

Participant E_2 (Aid) also agreed that the governance structures are diffuse and that the UN should invite NGOs from Less Developed Countries to remedy the democratic deficit.

The International Organisation, (F) believed that linkages could be improved but without "reinventing the wheel in terms of governance" but the lack of authority,

> "…is so diffuse because the key question is who is making the decisions? Who has the competencies to make decisions about what and we need to become much more sophisticated."

On the point on lack of lack of oversight of TNCs and how this affects global governance, Participant A declined to answer since it was outwith their remit to do so. Participant B (Aid) responded that:

> "It is unlikely that there would be a major reduction in agrifood practices of TNCs. At the UN level what it was trying to do in the 1940's it was still doing in the 1970's but it all ended in 1993.[46] It lost its general oversight especially of anti-competition regulations and corporate corporations are no longer monitored. For example seed companies should not be more than 25% ratio of the Global Governance field. Companies should not be allowed to be seed and fertilizer companies to more than 25% of the GFG field. The UN is making changes but they are small steps."

Also from the aid sector participant C commented that:

> "There is a balancing act since over regulation from governments produces its own distortions over regulations. Over governance caused wine lakes and

[46] When the World Food Council was broken up.

> butter mountains… International companies –food security and food safety is severely monitored for food security and food safety."

Participant G (Aid) commented on TNC oversight,

> "Yes there needs to be more [oversight] and they need to be partnered by governance partners in places where they are present and their actions need to be in line with governance and there needs to be stronger oversight. And in places where there may not be strong government because in these places they are allowed to run free. Also the international financial sector and the role of speculation in financial markets and the role that that played in terms of driving up global food prices. That is a completely unregulated sector that requires immediate, IMMEDIATE attention in terms of greater oversight."

This echoes the point made by the TNC participant about moving from food aid delivered via the WFP. For this question, the TNC participant pointed to the importance of GFG investing in the agricultural economy although it should be noted this builds up TNCs' customer base too:

> "So an emphasis that futures away from just delivering aid to actually developing agricultural and rural economics to be stronger and more resilient is, I think, the approach that needs to be followed. And over the years we should see a diminishment in the need to give food aid if we can develop the agricultural sector." [47]

Agricultural development is here seen as compatible with TNC objectives as was investment in agriculture in Question Two. The contentious form of agri-development will be discussed in the La Via Campesina case study at the end of this chapter. This chimes with a view by Participant E that commercial partners and public-private partnerships are essential for delivery of food security. Yet concerns have been raised about cherry-picking by public-private partnerships so that only the most profitable agricultural schemes or zones are actioned, leaving many parts of the globe still food insecure.

Still on the theme of membership the next question asked for comment on the effect of TNCs as members on Food Security Governance and specifically how they effect

[47] This is taken to mean NGOs and CSOs.

food governance itself. Some of the Aid Organisations pointed to the increased demanded for private-public partnerships and, to varying degrees of appraisal, to the role of TNCs in food security. Participant A replied.

> "In Food aid [the role of TNCs is], minor. The food is purchased in the local market. In food security we are seeing that it is becoming an important part of food security. In research and development though there is an increasing push for public-private projects."

The charity which Participant E works for specialises in pursuing such private-public partnerships (PPP), with TNCs taking significant roles in many of their projects:

> "TNC involvement is important, for example, with partnerships such as Western Union, Nike, ING, Wal-Mart etc. and their activities. They come in as actors (before funders) and the connection can be beneficial. They are part of the global intellect which can reduce disaster risk. [50] As the agency that brings that together re commercial crop insurance and pastoral livestock insurance we ask, how can we integrate?"

Of all the Aid organisations involved in these interviews, E's organisation is the most TNC-facing, actively seeking out joint projects with TNCs to alleviate food insecurity. They argue that such PPP can increase the Corporate Social Responsibility of TNCs when they are involved in shared value partnerships.

Participant B, however, takes a directly opposite position on the involvement of TNCs in food security, commenting with emphasis that "They are just a disaster." A more middle ground position highlighted the need for scrutiny of TNCs was held by a number of participants with Participant D commenting,

> "At the EU level TNCs could be scrutinised by a new Transparency Directive that applies to corporations outside of the extractive industries sector.[48] [This] could be useful to control corporations investments and speculation".

The TNC participant (H) chose to focus on the role of NGOs which follows the discourse about NGOs perpetuating the 'hunger business':

> "I think it is more difficult for NGOs [than TNCs]. I think it depends on their business model how they raise money so, for some NGOs, the shock factor of crises is a way of stimulating funds and that is how they raise money and get funding for the work that they do. They may find that developing resilient rural agricultural systems is less dramatic and maybe less of a fundraising model for them and therefore they may be less interested in doing that.

This is again indicative and representative of pointing out other sectors' weaknesses but nonetheless resilience is a growing trend in food security policies.

The scrutiny of other sectors/members such as IOs and Aid Orgs involved in GFG is also important in addition to TNC scrutiny. Aid organisation participant E_2 again emphasised the need for change in NGOs' activities to address systemic economic problems:

> "NGOs have had a slow awakening. NGOs are traditionally minded which is sometimes inappropriate to the change that people want to make. More thinking needs to go into NGOs to find new solutions and ways of responding. For example developing the resilience debate in food security [which] highlights root causes and advocates a systemic approach otherwise their actions can't always be sustained. It is important to resolve problems with a vision for change, some soul searching and in collaborations with TNCs if necessary."

The International Organisation Participant (F), commented on the importance of scrutinising governance overall and one step towards this to overcome the silo mentality:

> "Different sectors need to talk to each other and different sectors/areas and silos challenge [governance] in the face of continuing fragility in a 21st century of food insecure 1 billion people and 1 billion people micronutrient

[48] The EU Transparency Directive improves the financial disclosure and regulation of publicly traded companies.

> deficient. Donors get tired and want to move onto something new but it will catch up with us again and again and it is the solid foundation for sustainable development and if we don't tackle it we are all falling back. We might have huge economic growth rates but they won't be sustainable and they will leave lots of people behind and inequality will grow and my wish would be that we focus on it and finally do what is taking us so long."

These responses present a wide range of opinions and governor's discourses on scrutiny within the GFG field. At one end of the spectrum is the viewpoint that TNCs work to solve food insecurity and other sectors, especially NGOs, should be scrutinised for perpetuating hunger by not fully addressing it, and at the other end of the spectrum it is proposed that TNCs urgently need to be scrutinised and assessed for the 'damage' they do to food security and that they wield too much power. There are multiple viewpoints along the spectrum too; that TNCs are useful, that TNCs are neutral or that other sectors and governors are self-interested and therefore impede progress. This demonstrates once again the disputatious and incoherency in the food security governance field, and evidences the analysis made by Clapp and Fuchs (2009) of the fragmented global food governance field and the concerns about TNC power in the system.

The next question, ten, asked how GFG should be reformed to maximise effectiveness in reducing food insecurity and who should lead the reform? Participant A declined to give an opinion since, as a governmental organisation it was outwith their remit but did offer a report on their recommendations which included better use of the WFP's Audit Committee to assist in monitoring the effectiveness of WFP plus strengthening the monitoring of the WFP, as well as increasing local and regional procurement for food aid.

Participant B (Aid) pointed to a problem with large industrialised nations dominating food trade and therefore global governance:

> "There is a capacity problem. Large nations, large countries dominate the global trade of food. Developing countries with 'wobbly' trade and poor negotiating teams can't put their case to sophisticated audiences. [You] can't pull off the greenest commonwealth group and negotiate on *behalf* of Africa."

Participant C (Aid) highlighted this inequity of members,

> "... the capacity of the ministers in key countries [that] don't have good information and economics - they are emasculated and fiddle at the edges. Several organisations are like that in east Africa. 10 years ago things were brighter but reform never happened."

Participant D (Aid) referred once more to the need for including civil society. Participant E again mentioned the importance of investing in social enterprises to resolve food insecurity and such initiatives should be driving resilience and placed at the heart of Global Food governance's actions:

> "It is interesting that where there is a culture of doing so, having a social impact is win-win because there is more pressure from the shareholders. Investment is important in making social enterprises and sometimes this means overcoming prejudices. For example Coca Cola has a strategy for 2025 to bring 20 million women into the value chain so in Nigeria they are retraining the women (voluntarily) to be micro retailers for coke. Training is a workforce initiative which gives them options. It raises their morale since they are an employee and they receive training whether they go on to become a micro retailer or not."

Participant G (Aid) again emphasized links to agriculture and the importance of not thinking in siloed ways.:

> "In particular, it is knowing how to better link food security and agriculture to positive nutrition outcomes and there is quite a bit of work in various forms at global level and at local level; to work on that; to not think in a siloed way. It is about achieving food security when there are many other things which are important for a household in achieving overall a high level of welfare."

The TNC Participant (H) also criticises siloed ways of thinking in governance and comments on the linkages between infrastructure and agricultural trading policies and food pricing policies whereas a more 'holistic' approach is needed to resolve food insecurity.

As semi-structured interviews, some of the participants responded with additional points and discussion or, if they asked for a prompt on reforms, they were asked which policy innovations or which issues GFG actors should be prioritise. This approach brought out a range of themes and points not already covered in the interviews.

Participant C pointed out the usefulness of the work of FoodNet in East Africa who do post-harvest monitoring and agricultural enterprises. They also pointed out the need for a Global Action Plan for food security alone. On the issues that the G8/G20 should prioritise participant E_2 said:

> "Long term: one, more money in countries re information on food balance sheets –there has been no improvement. Two, [look at] RATIN in East Africa: more like that in Africa and Asia re info on process. Three, national governments more careful regarding food bulking Four, don't have commodity markets running. Five, food aid should be local procurement. Six, the farm bill –reduce subsidies. Lastly, provide opportunities." [49]

Participant E_1 discussed food waste and the food and water network:

> "60% of food security is agriculture. So projects and solutions like the agrifood mobile where smallholder farmers facilitate the provision of the finance for trade. Mobile technology is used to bundle agricultural and the financial aspects together. It is a multiple partnership which facilitates trade

[49] This is the Regional Agricultural Trade Network. The major task of RATIN is to supply traders with improved early marketing and trade information which can lead to more efficient and competitive transactions in food trade between surplus and deficit regions in East Africa (African Growth and Development Policy Modeling Consortium, 2014).

> because the smallholder can access credit through his or her mobile, it increases their financial literacy and they can meet their agriculture requirements on the mobile platform, promotes communication and improves co-ordination."

Also on the theme of policy innovations, Participant G commented on the need for greater oversight of financial markets and improved trade policies:

> "I would like to see reformed trade policy…I think that trade has major impacts on food security so reform international trade policy and, as I said before, greater oversight of financial markets and I think both those things would do quite a lot in terms of broader policy to influence greater food security."

This enabled the work of FoodNet, RATIN and the agrifood mobile to be researched and linked into this research and Participant G's call for regulation reiterates the points by Harvey in the literature review on regulation of financial markets (Harvey, 2006).

Interview Results Summary

In summarising the interview results, the main themes in the answers of course correspond to the questions' themes. For example when gauging the effectiveness of GFG (Question two) or the architecture of the GFG field (Question five). These develop the themes of governance architecture and effectiveness, dynamics, membership, power, and legitimacy derived from the Field Analysis. But the interview participants also each responded in a unique way, sometimes communicating what they wanted to say or answering from the context of their own experience, position or sector. Additionally, as a semi-structured interview there were a number of points made which offered supplementary opinions and analysis. Together the answers offer a range of endogenous views of the GFG field. These are now summarized, grouped by sector or thematically, depending on the overlap between participants' answers.

The Aid Organisation participants outlined a number of factors impeding effective governance including the trade policies of multilateral agencies (participant B), lack

of effective global trade regulation and equitable trade agreements within the international economic system thereby creating lack of access to Western markets for developing countries (participant C). The lack of responsiveness of the GFG system in reacting to rising food prices as well as underinvestment in public goods and infrastructure was highlighted by participant D. The UN is also seen as a factor in food insecurity by participants E_1 and E_2 in that it is an ineffective 'super-talker' and caught perpetually in food aid delivery for emergency situations. The CFS in particular is seen as not being strategic (G), having a top-down policy that is controlled by UN bodies and associate bodies (also Participant G) and the CFS's High Level Panel of Experts needs global coordinated action (G).

National governments' exact responsibility in GFG was raised by the TNC participant (H) who commented that the UN is a forum for discussion but executive power ultimately rests with national governments. This moves the agency from the global or international level to the national level. So that private sector actors deliver food security but only national governments can create the enabling environment for private sector players e.g. public infrastructure.

Viewpoints on improving GFG also varied widely with Participant A (GO) commenting that logistical problems of food aid such as better targeting and also internal controls of agencies were key. Better inter-agency coordination, co-operation between the governors, and 'more and better' fora that are more inclusive to include smallholder producers (since CSO give credibility and legitimacy to the secretariat but UN needs to "talk to everyone more freely") were proposed as improvements by Participants B (Aid).

Better information about production levels of food across countries would also help improve GFG since the current system is too slow to update with information such as market prices. This would enable better food balance sheets, and give earlier indications of price volatility. Also the need for better food stores and working more

closely with governments, especially in India and Asia was raised by Participant C. Other measures mean that national governments should be more careful on food bulking, and commodity trading on essential foodstuffs should also be stopped. Food aid should use local procurement and also provide opportunities for local workforces.

Participant D proposed that the EU should support a multi stakeholder CFS to enable it to emerge as the foremost intergovernmental forum and the EU should also support on-going CFS guidelines especially on Principles for Responsible Investment (RAI) [50] and also promote credibility of the global fund for social protection for 48 least developed countries (also Participant D).

Participant G proposed better organisation of GFG and wider participation of global actors, especially stakeholders from Africa (although it is recognized that the CFS is an important step). GFG also needs to be government and civil society-led suggested Participant G. The WFP has the central role in GFG and the TNC participant viewed it as quite effective in emergency assistance, but the WFP should aim to improve its effectiveness in prevention and implementing sustainable farming. Participants E_1, E_2 and G believe that crises may be addressed but the root causes of the crises are never properly addressed. Also there is a lack of resources going into rural communities to build capacity and resilience amongst subsistence farmers. Developing agriculture in developing countries could diminish the need for food aid and civil society (meaning NGOs) could move away from aid delivery to resilience-building programmes. TNCs are stakeholders in the UN process but are not the organisations with executive power since these are mostly national governments stated Participant H, (TNC). The UN comes out with guidelines which "don't go anywhere" unless national governments adopt and implement them. Stakeholders give input and information into the UN process, but do not make the decisions.

[50] The Committee on World Food Security (CFS) adopted the voluntary ***Principles for Responsible Investments in Agriculture and Food Systems*** in 2014. The Principles aim to promote responsible investment in agriculture and food systems to support the right to adequate food in the context of national food security. Investing responsibly in agriculture and food systems is seen as essential for enhancing food security and nutrition, creating decent employment opportunities, eradicating poverty, fostering social and gender equality, and ensuring sustainable development. In 2012 the CFS also endorsed the *Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security*. These guidelines call upon all parties to "ensure that tenure aspects of land, fisheries and forests are addressed when preventing and preparing for natural disasters and their responses to them". This includes drought (Global Mechanism, 2014).

Question four asked if there were four main sectors within GFG (see Chapter Three). Suggestions included national governments and the need for a more inclusive regional differentiation. Specifically including actors from Africa who function outside of UN governance (such as the key players in CAADP) were the answers which deviated most from this question. Some also commented on the need for clarity on who was an IO, an NGO or CSO in GFG terms.

On the topic of the architecture of GFG Participant A pointed out when responding to international emergencies, *ad hoc* decisions were made in real time by agencies such as the UN, WFP and FAO and decisions involved different sets of participants. Very often the US and UK liaise to say how these plans will be implemented. Participant D indicated that the architecture is more than diffuse - commenting on the "increasingly fragmented" nature of GFG with no coherence and conflicting interventions and the mandate of the CFS is not always respected by states. Enabling outside of an emergency is a major failing of the GFG, proposed participants E, since GFG does not happen to the level required plus civil society is not connected with international counterparts since they are such "small players". So new formats of GFG are required to involve small players since they are not currently 'invited in' to the UN cluster.

The UN has fixed ways of working and works mostly with governmental people and tends not to 'encourage' NGOs in the countries they work in (Participant E_1). Additionally there are 40 or more UN organisations in governance and so the UN should be regarded as a business. National governments should also be held accountable due to the widely varying standards across governments.

Linkages could be improved without starting again, proposes Participant F (IO) although the key question is who has the competencies to make the decisions? GFG needs to become much more sophisticated. Participant F also thought the salience of TNCs in GFG is a challenge for forums like the CFS, since overcoming individual member's interests to make real decisions (with an example given of the CFS

guidelines on fisheries) conflict with national interests on food security. Taking GFG onto the next stage goes beyond just agreeing on international soft law instruments but setting up a unitary body so that the CFS can monitor progress and the guidelines and recommendations of the CFS can be implemented. More than a tick box exercise, a new unitary body would need to capture reality, the interests of members also give constraints for countries to adopt into their national legislations.

In contrast, the TNC participant pointed to the vital, central role that TNCs play in establishing food security by building resilience with agricultural extension measures such as training farmers in growing, harvesting as well as building up local markets, which public sector actors do not do.

Leaving the global governance of food in its current form is unrepresentative and unable to deal with the issues and so global governance reform should therefore address the 'capacity problem' in GFG, where large nations dominate the global trade of food and smaller countries with unstable economies cannot negotiate, proposed Participant B. Participant C commented that developing countries are 'emasculated' and not having good information or economies, are left not dealing with the key issues. Several organisations are like this and the globalisation in East Africa is an example. Reform was planned but never happened.

Both Participants E point to the importance of workforce training and investing in social enterprises in partnership with TNCs, which are effective measures in reducing food insecurity, rather than specifically governance solutions. With such a large percentage of food security being agricultural projects, solutions that help the smallholder are of benefit. Other policy innovations could include looking at population growth, food waste, the food and water networks felt Participant E_2.

Participant G saw improving links between food security and agriculture on a local level as key to improving food security but it was important for governors and actors not to think in a siloed way about food security. And the debate needs to broaden to think about positive outcomes for households and communities so that the view is of working towards establishing positive nutrition, rather than just food security. Reformed international trade policy and greater oversight of financial markets would also achieve a lot as policy innovations.

The scale of the problem is very large particularly in developing countries, commented participant H, covering basic infrastructure, cultural barriers, educating farmers as well as changing a system of governance which does not count the farmers or their need to access markets. Governments are siloed and look at agriculture as separate from infrastructure, trading policies for food prices and so the real problem in food security governance is that it is multi-dimensional, with governments needing to look at all these things in a holistic way. Participant I (CSO) takes a rights-based approach in their work and partnerships and the food sovereignty discourse is guiding principles for many of the GFG civil society actors.

Interview Results Analysis

To analyse the interview results overall, there is almost no satisfaction with the current GFG format across the interviewees with each commenting on the ineffectiveness of the main actors, the UN and the Committee of World Food Security. The WFP was also seen as a key player. National Governments are viewed as having divisive interests by some, which often reflect TNCs' interests. Better coordination, information, implementation and direct action would improve the global governance of food. The perception exists that many actors in the regions most affected by food insecurity - Africa and Asia - were left out of the global governance process, with a democratic deficit existing in the Global Food Governance sphere. There was also mention of the context of the International Economic system – specifically the effects of the impasse from the Doha round on developing counties. There was also confirmation of the 'diffuse architecture' of the current global governance (as described by Clapp and Fuchs, 2009). There was much though not unanimous support for a new governance body or new governance space which could manage food trade, stimulate agriculture and generally improve GFG. Others felt that the Committee of World Food security was a step in the right direction although one

or two participants felt that the main agency involved in food governance - the UN - was perpetuating a governance system which did not work. E_1 commented that:

> "Firstly, regard the UN organisations as a business. There are 40 organisations of the UN in governance. Secondly hold national governments more accountable – since there are such different standards across national governments."

An interesting observation can be made that the participants articulate the discourse associated with their sector. The TNC participant talks of working with farmers, infra-structure and access to local markets. The International Organisation articulates the food justice discourse but also as part of the productionist discourse, which McKeon calls the dominant food governance discourse (McKeon, 2009). The aid participants' discourse varies along the spectrum of productionist (as can be seen with participants E) to advocacy of the civil society discourse, held by participant I. Participants E are in fact critical of the International Organisations and action programmes that serve the productionist discourse. Whereas the Field Analyses show the *extent* of private actor power, the interview results indicate the *distribution* of power amongst actors and the competing discourses at play within the food governance field. It could be said that the varying strengths of the discourses also reflect the democratic deficit of the global food governance field, with the dominant productionist discourse not only promoted by Trans National Corporations but private actors and, to a more muted extent, by International Organisations and actors in other sectors too, such as evidenced by the interview with the aid organisation E. This adds another dimension to the strength of private actors like the Gates Foundation. They dominate the field not only in economic and political capitals but also with discursive power and by promoting the productionist discourse. This chimes with the Held and Hale (2001) and Biermann and Pattberg (2008) point about a dynamic and changing global governance system where new actors can arise and dominate the field. In the case of the Gates Foundation this via multiple forms of capital, including discursively.

This is representative of the asymmetrical power balance across the global food governance field, with private actors dominating and civil society organisations, along with their civil society discourses, marginalised at the edge of the field.

Another common theme was the amount of power that a few member nation-states hold over the system. This neo-Realist perspective tended to sit alongside the Cosmopolitan perspective for some participants, whilst other participants expressed exasperation and frustration with the system without holding out hope for a better governance system – only the prospect of a substantial shock to the international system would enable a better governance system (participant B). Lastly, the views on TNC involvement were mixed with some viewing them as a 'disaster' in global governance driving nation-states' interests. Some viewed them as 'stakeholders' in the food governance system but need regulated. Three participants, E_1, E_2 and F, saw them as working in the space created by gaps in the governance system, developing partnerships in farmer micro finance and projects or farmer and community training. Comment was made that the WFP was trying to move into sustainability and resilience building, but is constrained by its food aid operations and obligations.

It is interesting to note that in the main, the interview results correlate and enhance the Field Analysis results. Many of the governors mentioned in the Field Analysis are also mentioned in the interviews. There is nothing in the interviews to contradict the levels of economic capital, political capital and political legitimacy capital shown in the Field Analysis. There are however some interesting omissions. The Gates Foundation and the three smaller CSOs are not mentioned by the interviewees, despite the significant size of the Gates Foundation and the democratic importance of the Civil Society Organisations to the GFG field as demonstrated in the Field Analysis. This point is carried forward in the next part of this chapter, in the case studies on The Gates Foundation and La Via Campesina.

Overall, the available endogenous views from the GFG field seem to express some dissatisfaction with the governance. Compartmentalised ways of thinking, or silos, are evident and there seemed little awareness of governance involvement from other sectors. Except for nation-states as members of the CFS, there was almost no

mention of other players from the 'international field of power' such as the WTO, World Bank or Financial Organisations. Issues such as commoditisation and TNC regulation were mentioned regularly and there was conflation of CSOs and NGOs by some of those interviewed and CSOs such as La Via Campesina not being named at all. There is some mutual suspicion between sectors and some organisations do feel strongly about issues but have 'parochial concerns'. All this points to a field without leadership or failed leadership. In a way, this obfuscation confirms the lack of cooperation and co-ordination across the field mentioned in much of the literature, such as Clapp and Fuchs (2009). Clarity and change are recognised as being sorely needed. Recommendations and proposed remedies drawn from these interviews contribute to the final chapter. In the next section four short case studies are considered to extend this endogenous view of the field, drawing on the knowledge of the structure of the Field obtained from the Field Analysis.

Part II: Case Studies

Case studies enable descriptive illustrations of points already raised in the research. Such real-world description completes the research picture by bringing 'colour' to the tonal measurements of the other methods used and depicts some of the detail of the major governors' actions.

Therefore the purpose of these case studies is illustrative- to enable a deeper understanding of one member from each of the four sectors. This might provide the opportunity for a temporal comparison of these organisations in the future. They are briefer than IR case studies typically are due to the multi-method research design and approach of this research.

For consistency's sake each case study follows the same format of six parts. Firstly, a description of the organisation which covers history, size, income and raison d'être. Second is a lobbying and main 'issues' section. Then, some criticisms of the organisations are outlined, followed by a fourth part on their role in GFG. The fifth part of each case study outlines the scoring from the Field Analysis criteria of economic capital, political capital and legitimacy capital (detailing scoring on the measures of moral capital and ethical practices, inclusivity, transparency, public facing accountability, regulation compliance etc.). The sixth and final part sets out

the conclusion of the case study. These conclusions feed into both the summary at the end of this chapter and the analysis in the subsequent, final chapter. The case study is designed this way to focus on and offer examples from each governor on how the scores were arrived at in the Field Analysis. That is, how the measures of each criterion were decided and how these criteria were applied to achieve the scores for political capital and political legitimacy.

The first case study is Monsanto, followed by the Gates Foundation, the World Food Programme and, lastly, La Via Campesina. The economic capital, political capital and political legitimacy capital of each are looked at in more depth.

Case Study 1: Monsanto.

The largest corporation in the TNC sector, Monsanto, is an American agrochemical and agricultural biotechnology corporation. Founded in 1901, Monsanto is headquartered in St. Louis, Missouri, USA but registered in Delaware (Monsanto website, 2014). With over 21,900 employees Monsanto posted revenue in 2013 of USD 14.8 billion (ibid). Monsanto was a major producer of plastics by 1940 and manufactured DDT, PCBs, Agent Orange and bovine growth hormone which were to become controversial products. In 1987 Monsanto also pioneered field trials of genetically modified crops. Monsanto applies the business practices of the 'biotech' industry to agriculture, for example with the cost of significant investment in research and development being recuperated through the enforcement of biological patents (Schneider, 1990), often by litigation (ETC, 2003). These business practices conflicts with farmers and small-holders traditions of developing, saving and sharing, plant varieties (Burrone, 2006). Monsanto's seed patenting model has been deemed biodiversity-threatening biopiracy by some critics (Shiva, 2012) and its role in these commercialisation practices, litigious defences, production of biotechnology products plus its insistent lobbying of governments has earned Monsanto a controversial reputation.

Monsanto positions itself as a sustainable agriculture company that delivers agricultural products that support farmers all around the world. Their focus is empowering farmers to increase their yields, become more efficient and reduce on farm costs. They also strive to conserve more of the world's resources. Recognised as a rewarding employer who encourage diversity amongst its workforce, Monsanto also receives regularly recognition for its Corporate Responsibility initiatives (Monsanto website, 2014).

However size and market dominance of Monsanto has raised concern from civil society groups who comment that the 'gene giants' (the 'big six' of Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Dow, Bayer and BASF) seek 'philanthrogopoly' (or charity cartelling) to conceal their agrifood monopoly of their market dominance which looks like an anticompetitive oligopoly (ETC, 2013). For example, the 'gene giants' launched a series of initiatives which includes the "false promise of cheap, post-patent GE seeds to mollify antitrust regulators and soften opposition to transgenics while advancing their collective market control" (ibid). This philanthrogopoly tag has also led to criticism of the CFS due to its inclusion of the 'gene giants', admitting them to their fora and not challenging their oligopoly (despite warnings from the now former Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food of the impact on global biodiversity and the Right to Food). Furthermore, critics of Monsanto state that the Special Rapporteur should "be invited to explore the private sector's role in other multilateral agencies related to food and agriculture – including CGIAR" and also business practices such as seed cartels (ETC, 2013).

In the United States, Monsanto spends around three quarters of a million dollars each month on lobbying, in particular lobbying Congress and the United States Department of Agriculture on GM food regulations and other biotech issues (Business Week, 2011). In 2008, Monsanto spent USD 8.8 million on lobbying [51] and in 2011, over USD 6.3 million was spent on lobbying in the US, more than any other agribusiness firm (Open Secrets, 2011). Monsanto's lobbying expenditure has increased over the last two years (Source Watch, 2014).

On the political donation side of its lobbying, federal candidates received USD 186,250 from Monsanto in the 2008 election cycle through its political action

[51] Of which USD1.5 million was to outside lobbying firms with the remainder used by in-house lobbyists (Business Week, 2011)

committee (PAC) with a 58:42 per cent ratio party split in favour to the Republicans. In the 2010 election cycle Monsanto gave USD 305,749 with a slightly smaller advantage to the Republican candidates this time of 52:48 per cent ratio although the 2014 PAC shows a jump to a 73:27 per cent ratio party split in favour of the Republicans (Open Secrets, 2014) on a total contribution of USD 467,000 (ibid).[52]

Monsanto is also a member of the world's largest biotechnology trade association, the Washington D.C based Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) which has the following aim:

> "We create and advance industry policies on all food and agriculture biotechnology issues related to international affairs, government relations, science and regulatory affairs, and media and public affairs. We work for a safe and clean supply of healthy food for a growing global population" (BIO, 2014).

In 2010-11 BIO spent a total of USD16.43 million on lobbying initiatives and regularly spends over US USD8 million p.a. (Open Secrets, 2010). Monsanto is also a member of the European Europa Bio, which is Europe's largest Biotech industry organisation. Other members include Bayer and other GM organisations (Vidal, 2011).

Monsanto successfully lobbied the UK and US governments in the late 1990s to raise the legal glyphosate levels in soya beans to enable the UK to import the beans, and Monsanto also won over the Codex Alimentarius, (the joint FAO-WHO agency). The then Agriculture Minister in the House of Lords commented on the negotiations with Monsanto: "all such information is kept secret" (Monbiot, 2000:267). In the 20 months after the 1997 British General election, Monsanto representatives held over 20 meetings at the departments of Agriculture and the Environment and the then Labour

[52] For a full breakdown of Monsanto's lobbying expenditure on issues see SourceWatch's website.

government was later questioned in Westminster in regard to "trips, facilities, gifts and other offerings of financial value provided by Monsanto to civil servants" (Monbiot, 2000: 267).

The representation of various interests at the Codex has, Smythe argues, historically enabled more input from food processors and producers and other non-state actors than other international organisations such as the WTO have (Clapp and Fuchs 2009:97). This improved participation is specifically targeted at International NGOs rather than Civil Society groups and it is interesting to note that of the 2,578 participants on the Codex committees in 1993, 660 represented industry with Monsanto at the fore (Smythe in Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:98).

The 'March against Monsanto' movement holds a day-long march across the globe each year to protest against GM crops and the company's practices of disinformation (March Against Monsanto, 2014). At time of writing the most recent day was May 24 2014 and part of the campaign focussed on farmer suicide. The movement claims: "In India, more than 250,000 farmers have committed suicide after Monsanto's Bt cotton seeds did not perform as promised. Farmers, left in desperate poverty, are opting to free their families of debt by drinking Monsanto pesticide, thereby ending their lives" (ibid, p2). It goes onto explain that livelihoods of farmers in other countries are also lost due to " false promises, seed patenting and meticulous legal action on the part of Monsanto and other big agrifood interests. In many parts of Africa, farmers and their communities are left to choose between starving or eating GMOs" (ibid).

As for its specific role in GFG, Monsanto were delegates to the Fortieth session of the Committee of World Food Security in 2013 and the attendee, Brian Lowry, is not only Deputy General Counsel for Monsanto but is also currently co- chair of the United States Council for International Business.[53] Lowry also participates through the Global Business Alliance for Post-2015 Development to convey U.S. business views. Other TNC delegates to the 40th session of CFS include Mars, Unilever,

[53] (Along with Tam Nguyen, Global Head of Sustainability at Bechtel Corporation). In 2014 Nguyen commented on the role of business in development as "Unlike the MDGs a decade ago, U.S. multinationals are more informed and engaged,…they have shifted from mere observers to participants in promoting sustainable development" (speech 18/2/2014, Chevron forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies). The CSIS also promotes genetically modified foods for resolving food insecurity in Africa (CSIS, 2014).

DANONE, Ethanol Europe and Futura Gene (CFS, 2015). As such, Monsanto is a stakeholder in the Committee of World Food Security, which reports annually to Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC).

Even US diplomats have lobbied the EU on behalf of Monsanto and were not only promoting Monsanto GM food but urging retaliation on European countries which moved to ban GM foods (Vidal, 2011). Disclosed through Wikileaks in 2011, US diplomats in the G.W. Bush regime, including the US ambassador to France, Craig Stapleton, recommended a 'military-style trade war' on European countries that were moving to ban GM food, especially Monsanto corn. Stapleton is quoted as writing a diplomatic cable saying:

> "Country team Paris recommends that we calibrate a target retaliation list that causes some pain across the EU since this is a collective responsibility, but that also focuses in part on the worst culprits…The list should be measured rather than vicious and must be sustainable over the long term, since we should not expect an early victory. Moving to retaliation will make clear that the current path has real costs to EU interests and could help strengthen European pro-biotech voices" (ibid).

This reveals a glimpse into what can only be assumed to be customary practices of diplomats and confirms not only the elision of political and corporate elites in the US but also that US Foreign Policy actions serve corporations to such an extent that 'retaliation' is taken on countries which seek to reject to regulate US corporations' products. Diplomacy, it would seem, can be an extension of corporations trading objectives: diplomacy being business 'by other means'. The relationship between 'big business' and US governments has always been symbiotic and there are many examples including of political-commercial elites elision such as Ronald Reagan and General Electric, Dick Cheney and Halliburton etc. The role of corporations such as ITT in Chile and Nicaragua, mentioned in Chapter Two, were also seen as extensions of US Foreign Policy. Another example of this is the actions of Firestone in Charles

Taylor's led Civil War in Liberia in 1992 (Miller, 2014).

Yet the WikiLeaks exposé flips this picture around and demonstrates that US Foreign Policy has, at times, actually been driven, dictated and actioned by the interests of the corporations. This 'smoking gun' is a new dimension of apparent unctuous complicity with at least the Bush-era US government towards Transnational Corporations. This reframes the food security governance debate by begging the question 'where it satisfies the interests of the agrifood corporations, is the ineffective global governance of food in fact a sought outcome - a deliberate 'state of play'? By extending this logic, there is also a question of the 'extent of the intent', that is, 'is this ineffective GFG maintained by corporations of the world's superpower?' This recasts the other issues such as 'food aid as a sticking plaster' and 'the Hunger Business' mentioned in this and the preceding chapter. Do practices such as philanthrogopoly serve as a facade for furthering corporate profiteering? If so then this would be, to return to the typology of ineffectiveness definitions set out in Chapter One, malfeasance. And presuming that the WikiLeaks cable is a snapshot of commonplace current practices, it was the US Government which was malfeasant and, that being so, then its position as hegemon in the International System means that an unstable and ineffective food security regime may not necessarily be accidental but attributable to the protection and promotion of US corporations interests by the departments and agencies of the US Government, as well as the Government itself. This renders hollow the anti-hunger rhetoric expressed by the US Government, where that hunger conflicts with the US-TNC's interests. Judgment of the devastating and pernicious human cost of this apparently US-government aided domination of the TNCs put aside, this reframing of the food security global governance debate changes the causes and contributing factors and therefore alters the focus of the remedies towards tight regulation and scrutiny of the TNCs. This point will be picked up again in the final chapter.

However, without further, more recent disclosures, it cannot be fully established that this is an ongoing situation. Under the Obama regime, the US-European trade relationship is currently being developed into a free trade area by the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which, similar to the existing Trans Pacific

Partnership (TPP), is a trade pact to facilitate trade, this time between the EU and USA. Critics point to the likelihood of the TTIP increasing corporate power and disabling the ability of countries to regulate trade for public benefit whilst opening them up to litigation by the US for attempting to do so (Monbiot, 2013).

In the Field Analysis Monsanto obtained a high total political capital score of five but a low total political legitimacy score of minus five, scoring a minus one in the criteria of moral capital (due to its practises and *raison d'être*, ascertained from document research and literature review). It also scored minus one for the legitimacy criteria of raison d'être, inclusivity (due to lack of representativeness, established by document research and research reports (McKeon, 2011) and transparency (there is little disclosure by Monsanto of its own practices as revealed by others, instead the narrative tends towards company rhetoric (see Monsanto website for examples). For this reason Monsanto also scored a minus one for accountability (of its practices), minus one for its compliance with legal and statutory oversight (the 'subject to regulation' criterion) due to its lack of compliance with national regulation, particularly in developing countries and also for its efforts to lobby for regulation in the US and UK, which favours Monsanto's practices. It also scored a minus one for the ethical practices criterion, due to its controversial practices. Therefore, by these measures, Monsanto has high political capital but low legitimacy capital in the GFG field. This means that this major governor has poor legitimacy in the field. These actors, such as Monsanto, who are most powerful, sustain that power in spite of their poor legitimacy, not because of it.

Overall Monsanto's role in GFG seems to be that by adopting the rhetoric of development, philanthropy and sustainability, they further their own rationale, that of business interests and profit seeking. In fact, the TNC participant interviewed for this research said that their organisation saw their role as supporting development. There is dissonance between this corporate position-taking and the practices of some TNCs

(as reported by smallholders such as the Adivasi and criticism by activists such as Shiva (2012) of seed patenting, terminator seeds and overcharging). This leaves aside substantial contentions about GM crops, which some proponents state that technological innovation such as transgenics (new genes) or genetic modification have kept agricultural productivity apace with population growth (Brush, 2001; Sagoff 2001-2002; Trewavas, 2002, Williams, 2009).

To conclude, the instrumental power of Monsanto is increased by lobbying policymakers and regulatory authorities and their attempts to influence legislative contexts. It has also lobbied the US trade agenda conducted by the US Governments at Monsanto's behest against other trading blocs. Its position-taking as pro-development and pro-poor increases perceptions of its legitimacy and influences the legislators who design and implement policies such as regulatory frameworks for food security. As with many biotech organisations, influencing US elections is a significant part of Monsanto's corporate objectives and it also increases their structural power (Smythe in Clapp and Fuchs, 2009: 109). Direct participation in governance also augments their instrumental power although the battle for control over the narrative, to increase their discursive power (to "increase a normative consensus" according to Williams in Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:157) is more contested, with consumer action groups and activists applying direct action in demonstrations or deploying counter-propaganda techniques as a form of dissensus. As seen from the interview with the TNC participant in this research, agrifood TNCs actively promote their business as being pro-poor, pro-agriculture and pro-development with the logic that increased food productivity of any manner addresses poverty alleviation and global hunger. This is to improve their legitimacy and moral capital. Yet behind the 'corporate veil' they seek to quash rivals, from smallholders to great nations, to impose their products and values on the market at a toll few can afford to pay. Of all the agrifood TNCs, Monsanto is the most controversial and contentious. This disconnect between perception and reality, between Monsanto's public reputation and their praxis is exemplified by Monsanto being awarded the 2013 World Food Prize (in conjunction with Syngenta) (Aronsen, 2013).

To establish an effective and stable food security regime, clearly the realities of TNC practices need to be identified and addressed. In this the voices of smallholders and subsistence farmers are essential, not only in bearing witness to those on-going

realities of TNC practices but in being able to also contribute to the remedies at global governance level.

Case Study 2: The Gates Foundation.

The next case study, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, was founded in 2000 and alongside the Gates, a third partner is Warren Buffet. B&MGF is reportedly the largest 'transparently operated' private foundation in the world (Bates, 2012: iv). The primary global aims of the foundation are to promote global healthcare, global development (its role in food security arises from the latter) and its US Division promotes education and has a Global Policy and Advocacy Division (Gates Foundation, 2014). The operational side is the Foundation whereas the Trust is the investment arm both of which will cease operations 20 years after the Gates' deaths.

Based in Seattle, the Gates Foundation has an endowment of USD 40 billion (Desmond-Hellmann, 2014). It currently has just over 1,200 employees and has made grant commitments since inception of over USD 30 billion (all figures as at October 2014) (Gates Foundation, 2014). Despite their considerable assets and the scale of its global operations, the B&MGF has not been researched in regard to its role in the Food Security field and as a result information is scant (much of the information in the public domain concerns their US education work). Food Security Organisations (such as CGIAR), which were once publicly funded, have now formed partnerships with the Gates Foundation (Sell, in Clapp and Fuchs, 2009:212) and to them and others the Gates Foundation provides grants and research, although its focus is always on direct grants (Gates Foundation, 2015). B&MGF's programme focus on nutrition is in the sub-Sahara and South Asia where their "nutrition efforts focus on delivering proven interventions and developing better tools and strategies for providing pregnant women and young children with the foods and nutrients they need" (ibid).

To this end their agricultural development work aims to:

> "… improve the nutritional impact of agricultural practices, programs, and policies for smallholder farmers in developing countries. Common areas of focus include bio fortification of staple foods, nutrition education, control of mycotoxins, policy and advocacy, and research" (Gates Foundation, 2014).

Their agricultural development programme is one of their largest areas of focus and to date USD 2 billion has been spent on smallholders (as at October 2014). They state that their strategy is to listen to farmers and address their specific needs:

> "Three-quarters of the world's poorest people get their food and income by farming small plots of land about the size of a football field. Most of them barely get by - struggling with unproductive soil, plant diseases, pests, and drought. Their livestock are frequently weak or sick. Reliable markets for their products and good information about pricing are hard to come by, and government policies rarely serve their interests well" (Gates Foundation, 2014).

From these 'conversations' the following priorities have been established by the Gates Foundation: firstly to increase farm productivity including the ability to purchase more robust nutritious seeds and effective tools and secondly to learn sustainable farm management practices and access reliable markets as well the ability to draw on locally relevant knowledge and emerging digital technologies (ibid). The Gates Foundation state that they establish the farmer and farming community at the centre of policies such as fostering sustainable agricultural policies and affords those policies reliable and timely data through their research arm. Also arising from these 'discussions', water has very recently become a focus of the B&MGF's food security strategy by way of the water-food-energy nexus, which shows the growing threat to food security of water scarcity, with an estimate that by 2030 almost half the world's population will suffer from water scarcity and water stress (Farming First, 2014). Yet the agroecology lobby are against the Gates Foundation (Greenpeace, 2014). With such a results-oriented strategy, more abstract activities such as lobbying do not figure significantly in the B&MGF's non-education activities. The Foundation's size and limited life-span also determines the type of activities it undertakes. There is very limited information available on its lobbying activities but there is evidence of the Foundation funding front groups, for example with the Rockefeller Foundation, together they formed the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) in 2006, as part of the 'second green revolution' (which promotes food production via crop

breeding using genetic engineering, fertilizers and pesticide. Currently all that can be established in regard to lobbying activities by the B&MGF are their personal approaches to the American political elite including the US President and members of congress and the USDA (Kinzie, 2009). The B&MGF's grant-making operations to organisations are another form of influencing, as are their advertising and media campaigns.

Criticisms against the Gates Foundation tend to be along the lines of their links with agribusinesses, such as Monsanto. This includes the Trust Fund's portfolio investment in Monsanto as well as companies like BP. It has been criticised for investing in companies who themselves have been charged with aggravating poverty in the very developing countries where the Foundation is working to relieve poverty. The Foundation did respond that it could use its voting rights to influence the practices of the companies it invests in but it is unknown if this is the case (Source Watch, 2014).

The former Special Rapporteur for Food Security, Olivier De Schutter has criticised private actors who will not invest in agroecology because it does not open new markets for agrichemicals or GE seeds saying:

> "To them, sustainability means bringing private innovation to the developing world. The Gates Foundation can donate billions to the fight against hunger, but when private companies like Monsanto stand to benefit, it makes feeding the world look like a for-profit scheme" (Ludwig, 2011).

One such example is that the B&MGF have investments in GM crop centres (Stevenson, 2013).

This commercial/philanthropic conflict also arises from the contrasting raison d'être of both the Gates Foundation and the Trust. The Foundation is primarily philanthropic

whereas the Trust's raison d'être is to increase investment and so the term 'philanthrocapitalist' is applied to both the Trust and the Foundation. By way of comparison, LVC has a raison d'être to improve the influence of its members and promote agroecology, gender equality and food security yet with its low economic and political capital LVC is completely eclipsed and marginalised by much more significant governors, earning these goliaths the title: 'The Lords of the Harvest' (Charles, 2002).

As with their lobbying activities, the B&MGF's involvement in governance receives little profile. At the 39th session of the Committee on World Food Security (2012) their partner organisation CGIAR was involved in the annual plenary. As of 2013 CGIAR is also a member of the CFS Bureau and Advisory Group under the status of 'International Agricultural Research Bodies' (the only member under this status). At the 40th session (2013) FIAN sent eight delegates under the civil society and NGO section of the membership, LVC 15 and Urgenci two delegates whereas under the Private Sector and private philanthropic foundations section, the Gates Foundation sent seven delegates.[54] At the 41st session (2014) LVC sent 14, but Gates only four.

However for the CFS Bureau 2013-15 the Gates Foundation is listed as a member of the CFS Advisory group, being one of two Private Sector/Philanthropic Foundations, the other being the International Agri Food Network (FAO, 2014). This increased discursive power may account for the decreasing number of delegates being sent to the annual plenary each successive year.

As discussed in the Field Analysis, the B&MGF's economic capital is significant for the field. At USD 36 billion p.a. it dwarfs other organisations and has ten times the annual income of the Word Food Programme, although part of this is for education initiatives. In the Field Analysis the B&MGF scored highly in political capital (six) and slightly less high for legitimacy capital (five) and is the largest, most significant 'aid' organisation in the field, (although it is actually a private sector philanthropic organisation). For political capital it achieved a full score of one for most criteria of

[54] DANONE are also in this section (1 delegate) as are E-pure (2 delegates) Ethanol Europe (1) Futura Gene (1) and the International Zinc association, Mars, Monsanto, Unilever, Yara who all had 1 delegate except Yara who presented 2. Observers include mostly academics and also organisations such as the World Farmers Organisation (CFS, 2014)

both variables but scored a zero for lobbying since the measure of this criteria is that its expenditure is less than USD 5 million per annum (= score of one) but more than USD 1 million p.a. (score of minus one). Combined with the high economic capital score, this makes the Gates Foundation a powerful player in the GFG field.

The Gates Foundation scored one for each criteria of political legitimacy except for a zero score in accountability and a zero in subject to regulation. The measure for the accountability criterion is that the organisation is publicly accountable for its practices. The measure for the 'subject to regulation' criterion is that it is subject to regulation internationally as well as its home country. Paradoxically, whilst the B&MGF is transparent with an apparently open governance (so a score of one for transparency) and clear disclosure of its income and management structure, the B&MGF is not fully accountable in that, as a private foundation, some of its activities seem to be covert. For example, it has become clear from undertaking this research that the Gates Foundation and Trust are not accountable for some of their field activities, relationships with TNCs, partnerships with NGOs and civil society actors such as CGIAR, investments and lobbying activities. Since there is partial accountability of the B&MGF evident from document research then a zero score was awarded for accountability. The zero score in 'subject to regulation' criterion is awarded by completing the measure 'not proven' in regard to its compliance with legal and statutory oversight'.

In sum, the B&MGF offers an interesting anachronism for the field of GFG. It is economically powerful and extremely active in some areas of the field, it has some legitimacy on the basis of its work to achieve food security yet, along with the Gates Trust, it is a privately owned commercial enterprise with a humanitarian raison d'être that choses to be transparent but not completely accountable. With good political access yet, with no apparent lobbying and no political agenda, it is still part of what

Overbeek called ‘the current neoliberal agenda’ (Overbeek, 2004; see also Weller, 2003). It behaves as many private foundations do in the US. It has no grass roots base, it discloses what it needs to, to comply with accounting and legal statutory regulations in the US and has many philanthropic objectives yet selects those objectives carefully. Unlike some private philanthropic foundations it does not do so piecemeal but has strategies for future activities, including, unusually, its own closure.

In averring any roles or actions in GFG, preferring direct action projects, perhaps it silently condemns the GFG for its inaction and ‘super talker’ status (as described by interview participant E). Another way to look at it is that perhaps the B&MGF does take a position or role in the GFG. In its results orientated projects it does what the UN and agencies and the CFS do not do, or do too little. It uses its economic and political capital to take action.

Case Study 3: The World Food Programme.

The next case study, the World Food Programme, was formally established in 1963 and is the food assistance branch of the United Nations and the world's largest humanitarian organization” fighting hunger worldwide” (WFP, 2014). The WFP reaches more than 80 million people annually providing food assistance in 75 countries (ibid). Headquartered in Rome and with an executive board of over 36 member states, it has more than 80 country offices around the world with a staff of just under 12,000 people (as at 2011) of whom 90% operate in the field. It is a member of the United Nations Development Group and part of its Executive Committee and is voluntarily funded (ibid). The WFP operations are funded by donors such as world governments, corporations and private bodies amongst others, with the latter donating around USD 500 million from 2008-12. In 2011, the WFP's total revenue was USD 3.73 billion (ibid).

The WFP works with a number of official partners in emergencies and development projects.[58] It describes itself as the UN’s food aid arm and the four objectives of its current strategic plan are, firstly, to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies. Secondly, to support food security and nutrition and (re)build livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies. To reduce risk and enable people, communities

and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs and, lastly, to reduce under nutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger (WFP, 2014).

There is also little information on lobbying by the WFP. Lobbying monitoring websites such as Open Source state that is below the threshold of USD 10,000 (Open Secrets, 2014). It does campaign for fundraising however, targeted at corporations and the general public.

The WFP has been criticised by some development economists and political leaders, particularly from the African continent. Kenyan economist James Shikwati has explicitly criticised the WFP and their role commenting that "aid to Africa does more harm than good" (Thielke, 2005). According to Shikwati, food aid increases corruption of local kleptocrat politicians and boosts local black markets which in turn depresses prices for local farmers, "no one can compete with the UN's World Food Program" (ibid). Shikwati also claims that the WFP "are in the absurd situation of, on the one hand, being dedicated to the fight against hunger while, on the other hand, being faced with unemployment were hunger actually eliminated" (ibid). The former President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, echoed these sentiments during the 2008 Food Crisis when he criticised the WFP and the FAO for exacerbating the price rises: "[The FAO/WFP is a] waste of money largely spent on doing very little…the current situation is largely its failure and the cries of alarm will not help at all" (BBC, 2008). Wade went on to comment that FAO's work was duplicated by other bodies that operated more efficiently, such as the UN's International Fund for Agricultural Development and that the FAO should be scrapped. Wade also called for the FAO to be relocated from Rome to a country in Africa (ibid).

Other criticisms of the WFP include a lack of 'grass roots' partners and the low amount of food bought in local markets (and surplus dumping) although the WFP have countered this by pointing to 1.7 million tonnes of food bought in developing

countries in 2011 through their cash and vouchers food assistance tools (WFP, 2014). In general, criticism of the WFP is attributable to their position as an UN body, [55] and this also extends to the CFS which is an offshoot of the FAO.

The CFS consists of a Secretariat, Bureau and Advisory Group, High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) and has an annual plenary. Although only nation-states can be members of the CFS Bureau,[56] there are five participant categories in the Advisory group component of the 'Bureau and Advisory group': UN agencies and other UN bodies; civil society and non-governmental organizations; [57] international agricultural research institutions; international and regional financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, regional development banks and the World Trade Organisation and, lastly, private sector associations and philanthropic foundations. The CFS comments that:

> "The Advisory Group helps the Bureau advance the Committee's objectives in particular to ensure linkages with different stakeholders at regional, subregional and local levels and to ensure an ongoing, two-way exchange of information" (FAO, 2014).

[55] Failure of the UN generally can be ascribed to its genesis and structure. Freedman points to the Charter of the United Nation which established that membership would be open to 'peace loving states' and so it was never imagined that the UN would be an organisation open to all countries nor function as a world government. Waging war or gross violation of human rights by members results in gentle rebukes at the UN and the founding members list of breaches is perhaps the most significant (Freedman, 2013). The Security Council, specifically designed to prevent or respond to threats to world peace yet with the greatest powers on the council; China, Russia, France the US and the UK, is an extremely undemocratic structure, designed in the immediate post-World War II environment. Each of these members has a permanent seat on the Security Council and the right of veto. As a result many commentators believe that the UN has been left 'toothless' (Freedman, 2013: 18). Yet the UN's other bodies, such as the FAO, have far less powers, especially in terms of immediate and practical measures. Instead their most effective significant power is passing resolutions, or decisions, which are not binding. As a result, most of the UN's work focuses on political information-sharing, for example fact-finding, discussions with experts in the field, and holding discussions across groups. Although these outputs are politically important, such soft powers mean that crises or issues are rarely resolved in a way that is meaningful to people's lives.

[56] More widely, the membership of the CFS is open to all Member States of The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) or The World Food Programme (WFP) and non-Member States of FAO that are Member States of the United Nations.

[57] Particularly organizations representing smallholder family farmers, fisher folks, herders, landless, urban poor, agricultural and food workers, women, youth, consumers and indigenous people (FAO, 2014).

The Bureau is the Executive Arm of the CFS and consists of 12 member states and a Chair. Observers are invited to the CFS as interested organizations relevant to the work to "observe entire sessions or specific agenda items" (FAO, 2014).

The main role of the WFP in the CFS is as a member of both the Advisory group and also the Secretariat. [58] The CFS has a permanent Secretariat located in FAO Rome which includes members from the World Food Programme (WFP) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The CFS states that the task of the Secretariat is to "support the Plenary, the Bureau and Advisory Group and the HLPE in their work" (FAO, 2014). Yet as an UN arms-length agency, WFP's role is, by dint of its status, more significant than other non-UN affiliated organisations especially given that 36 member states form their Board. Their role in GFG is, along with other members of the Roman Forum, central to Food Governance. The WFP's role in GFG, however, is not limited to its role in the CFS. It is also an active stakeholder in the FAO and takes other roles at the UN level. The discursive and legislative power of the WFP to influence GFG is considerable, given its core positioning in the CFS, and its status as a member of the Roman Forum.

In the Field Analysis the WFP scored highly for both political capital and political legitimacy variables, which demonstrates high levels of symbolic capital. WFP is the largest IO in food security with an annual income of USD 3.7 billion (2012) and a staff of over 12,000. The closest IO in terms of income is the FAO with an annual income of USD 2.4 billion, followed by IFAD with USD 144 million p.a., with much of this amount spent on food aid. WFP scored a six in the political capital criteria with a plus one in all the criteria except for high lobbying expenditure (seen as an

[58] During 2009 the Committee on World Food Security underwent reform to improve effectiveness and includes a wider group of stakeholders. Another part of the reform was the creation of a High Level of Panel of Experts with the aim of keeping CFS up to date with emerging trends in food security and leading to "more informed policy debates and improve the quality, effectiveness and coherence of food security and nutrition policies from local to international levels" (FAO, 2014b).

important tool for achieving political capital), on which it scored a zero. The measure for obtaining a zero score in lobbying expenditure is over USD 1 million but below USD 5 million p.a.. Due to WFP's need to raise funds for crises and their salient role in governance, this was calculated from figures and measures available in in the public domain. Its score of six for political capital sets it alongside the other Roman Forum organisations as well as CGIAR, the Gates Foundation and the larger of the charitable organisations such as Oxfam International. WFP scored the maximum of seven, for political legitimacy, with a one for each criterion. This ranks it as highest for political legitimacy.

Positioned with strong political legitimacy, political capital and economic capital, the WFP is ideally placed to drive forward agendas and lead the governance of food. Due to its remit and core functions, it cannot lead the GFG field at present. In addition is there a conflict of interest with the 36 members of its Board who also members of the CFS? Which way does the influence flow? More research would be needed on the role of the WFP's board members in the CFS to establish this but the potential to realign and reform the WFP to lead GFG is there.

Case Study Four: La Via Campesina

Widely considered to be the world's most important and perhaps largest transnational social movement, the fourth case study, La Via Campesina, is a civil society organisation,

> "a transnational movement embracing organisations of peasants, small and medium-scale farmers, rural women, farm workers, and indigenous agrarian communities in Asia, the Americas. Europe and Africa. These groups are linked together through their intimate connections to the land…. [it] has become an increasingly visible and vocal voice of radical opposition to the globalisation of a neo-liberal and corporate model of agriculture" (Desmarais, 2007:6).

Via Campesina states that it is an autonomous, independent network that "represents an estimated 200 million peasant families globally" (Grass Roots, 2014) and seeks to gain legitimacy for the food sovereignty discourse. It brings together more than 200 million small-scale farmers and producers, landless farmers, women, youth, indigenous people, migrants and agricultural workers and defends small-scale sustainable agriculture as a way of promoting social justice and dignity" (FAO, 2014).

Described as the largest and most significant peasant and farm movement, LVC's international profile was established following the Uruguay Round of the GATT in 1994 (Desmarais, 2007).[59] LVC continued to establish itself as a grass roots organisation as it emerged from autonomous peasant organisations which had grown in response to the "withdrawal of the state from rural areas [which] simultaneously weakened corporatist and clientelist control over rural organisations, even as conditions worsened in the countryside" (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2012:149). LVC experienced increasingly reduced success in participation in international debates as they sought to speak directly to International Institutions rather than through organisations that represent them. By 1996 LVC was an active political actor at the World Food Summit convened by the FAO in Rome and lobbied the FAO to recognise their legitimacy by granting delegate status on the basis of their representation of peasants and small farmers. They also led the anti-neoliberal marches at WTO conferences and demonstrated in protest against the IMF, the World Bank and the G8 (Desmarais, 2007).

It has incorporated other organisations such as the Rural Coalition (USA) and advocates family farm-based sustainable agriculture. LVC's members from over 70 countries are divided into nine regions, which are each represented by a male and female at the International Coordination Committee. Since 2013 its Secretariat has been based in Harare but the location rotates every four years (Via Campesina, 2014). "Today La Via Campesina is an international reference point for rural issues and problems, for social movements, for the construction of proposals, mediated by the legitimacy and trust forged through its years of struggle. It is a new space of 'citizenship' " (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2007:170; Borras, and Franco. 2009).

[59] The organisation was formally constituted in 1993 by farmers' organizations from Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa and originally was headquartered in Belgium.

Although still suffering from low visibility, LVC has recently developed more prominent leadership roles with issues such as gender and opposition to TNCs increasingly foregrounded (Martinez-Torres and Rosset, 2010).[60] Through its member organisations LVC is also attributed with achieving regime change in Ecuador (2000) and Bolivia (2003) and defended the regime in Honduras (2009) (Edelman, 2005: 337).

The main criticisms against LVC are about its non-full compliance with current global governance due to its position-taking on this but, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, there are signs of change on this with the current Secretariat. Criticisms of their lack of transparency have also been addressed earlier. No data is available on how much per annum income LVC receives but on funding there is the following statement: "The movement is funded by the contributions of its members, by private donations and by the financial support of some NGOs, foundations and local and national authorities." (Via Campesina, 2014). The amount given to the UK by LVC is estimated at around £10,000.[61] However, it is assumed that its lobbying budget is zero, in line with other CSOs such as FIAN, who have disclosed this in their annual financial information.

LVC has also been criticised for holding agroecology as one of its main tenets. As the three pillars in the construction of food sovereignty, agroecology is promoted as an alternative to sustainable intensive agriculture alongside defence of land and local and national markets, each of them central issues for LVC.

> "As both a science and set of practices…[agroecology is] created by the convergence of two scientific disciplines: agronomy and ecology…as a set of agricultural practices agroecology seeks ways to enhance agricultural systems by mimicking natural processes, thus creating beneficial biological interactions and synergies among the components of the agroecosystem." (De Schutter, Report to UN HRC, 17 December 2010, p6).

[60] It has an increasing profile in the anti-globalisation or 'altermundista' ('another world') movement, as manifested in protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO) and Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), in the World Social Forum (WSF) process. This includes critiques of World Bank land policies (Via Campesina 2004, Rosset, 2006; McMichael, 2006; Patel, 2006).

[61] This figure was provided confidentially by an associate of LVC in the UK.

LVC and other proponents of agroecology argue that agroecology continues to reject the science and modern technologies such as transgenic crops, of sustainable intensive agriculture and point to its top-down productivist technologist objectives. Alternatively agroecology offers a localised bottom-up to alleviate food insecurity and hunger, with its behavioural and socio-political causes (Kershen, 2013). This 'productivist objection' at the heart of agroecology restricts agroecology to not using synthetic fertilisers, relying instead on animal manures or cover crops. This and modern breeding with GM plants makes agroecology very land inefficient so land use will need to be much larger if it is to address the predicted increase in food insecurity. As such agroecology may not be able to reduce agriculture's environmental footprint due to the significantly increased land use needed to meet the population explosion, the very time when the international system needs agriculture to increase production. The sustainable development side of the 'contested vision' for agriculture's future development lay the charge of prioritising ideological thinking at the door of all proponents of agroecology, such as the LVC, with the argument for agroecology based on,

> "…political statements having little to do with science and having the purpose of prescribing a romantic understanding of agriculture upon farmers, whether farmers want that proscribed understanding or not" (Kershen, 2013:35).

Aligned with the aim of bringing the farmers' knowledge back into agronomics via agroecology, the main focus of LVC is the assertion of rural peoples' rights: rights to farm, to own land, to produce food and, ultimately, the right to exist. In addition to peasants' rights, campaigns include defending farmers' seeds, fighting gender violence and sustainable agriculture/agroecology including agrarian reform. In defending small-scale sustainable agriculture it defends the peasants' way of life and promotes social justice and dignity. These priorities inevitably conflict with the "corporate driven agriculture" promoted by TNCs which LVC claims is "destroying people and nature" (Via Campesina, 2014).

La Via Campesina's lobbying capacity is extremely limited due to lack of economic capital and so inclusion in UN committees and the chance to address institutions directly are imperative for the promotion of their agenda. Social media and local organisations go some way towards mobilising support but there is a performance gap in influencing legislation where, for example, legislators cannot be briefed about the aims of the LVC nor can legislation which is counter to the interests of the LVC, be fought effectively. Direct action such as marches and demonstrations do get the message across to the members of the public, when they are reported, which may in turn influence political elites and have an effect on political will, (assuming that politicians act according to the rational actor theory), but without economic capital, the political capital of civil society groups like La Via Campesina remains low, despite their 'grass roots' 'bottom-up' representation. Power-sharing from those who dominate the GFG field becomes all the more important then, if inclusivity and representation are to be allowed to be incorporated into the governance system. In this governance constellation the most powerful governors are gatekeepers for inclusion and power-sharing since those without political or economic capital cannot influence the agenda except by direct action. This is despite political legitimacy, which, as discussed, is not enough in the GFG field on its own to bear influence. The fact that the International System means that those 'gatekeeper governors' produce guidelines and recommendations rather than actions results in the paralysis of the food governance system (Participants B and F commented to this effect in their interviews). Political lobbying, such as donations to PACs are presumed to be outwith the financial reach of LVC.

However, LVC's role in the FAO has strengthened recently, with an informal technical 'partnership' formed in 2013 and an informal agreement to collaborate to address two objectives of FAO's five strategic objectives, [62] drawing on LVC's field activities (FAO, 2014).

[62] FAO's five strategic objectives include: To help eliminate hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition; make agriculture, forestry and fisheries more productive and sustainable; reduce rural poverty; enable inclusive and efficient agricultural and food systems and increase the resilience of livelihoods to disasters (FAO, 2014c).

To more adroitly examine the role of LVC in GFG, it is helpful to first disaggregate the term 'civil society' actors since NGOs and CSOs have very different experience in their respective roles in GFG. Throughout this thesis the distinction is made between NGOs (who are not classed as Civil Society actors in this research) and peasant/people's organisations (who classed as CSOs). Desmarais sums up the distinction:

> "In general NGOs have different aims, purposes, interests, organizational cultures and structures, and mechanisms for decision-making and accountability than peasant organisations… I use the term NGO when referring to development non-profit organizations that channel funds – received from private donations, governments, corporations and international institutions –for development projects (presumably) in support of mass-based organizations" (Desmarais, 2007:84).

Organisations that seek funds to conduct research and run development projects on issues concerning the marginalised are also included in this category, for example, NGOs with 'middle-class' professionals for whom their continuance is contingent on such funds (Desmarais, 2007). This professionalisation and institutionalisation tends to "soften the challenging nature of their claims" so NGOs act as advisors, critics, monitors, or 'challengers' to dominant forces (Rucht 1999: 218-20). As a result "the epistemological hegemony of modernity" dominates, (Pollack 2001:197) and alternative perspectives receive little space (Desmarais, 2007).

Indeed the purpose of NGOs, to give voice to the voiceless, is circumvented by those voiceless people's organisations (such as peasants' organisations). The question needs to be asked if the *de facto* effect of NGOs in global governance is to contribute to a situation which Hurd described as the International System maintaining the *appearance* that it is working (Hurd, 2008). NGOs, by purporting to represent civil society but in reality acting as "authoritarian technocrats", legitimise this global governance system which places peoples' organisations at the very periphery of the

international system (if they are involved at all). This is another layer of the 'false promise of International Institutions' (to adapt Mearsheimer's definition and concept, 1994) which perpetuates a system in which the status quo means one in seven go hungry and NGOs, along with other institutions, have the 'unintended effect' of helping the globalisation project to consolidate. Of course NGOs are diverse and varied and should be not be viewed as monolithic but, it is argued here, neither should they be categorised as civil society actors. Social movements such as La Via Campesina, which directly represent grass roots or community origins, seek inclusion, access and power-sharing in the international system with the view of changing it, to democratise sites and structure of power to redefine the world order. This is their objective, not to justify the existence of proxies or intermediaries such as NGOs to mediate their relationship to executive power.

Civil society actors involved in the GFG field also differ from each other, although all have very small portions of power., "…conformist or reformist views are more likely to be accepted within the WTO, while grassroots social movements with more critical views have had little if any access" (Scholte, O'Brien Williams, 1998:19). Greater access and engagement stems from being closer to the sites of power (e.g. Geneva or Washington), as does influence over nation states. Desmarais draws comparison between two civil society actors in GFG; IFAP (International Federation of Agricultural Producers) and LVC, pointing out that they use different strategies, have different ideological frameworks and represent different constituencies and interests. IFAP engages in dialogue with multilateral economic institutions whereas LVC's "opposition to the WTO is implacable" (Desmarais 2007:26). LVC has a rationale that more radical strategies and positions will address the crisis in the countryside(s). Desmarais comments that: "In forming the Via Campesina, they effectively created a progressive alternative to the IFAP" (Desmarais, 2007: 26).

LVC scored low in the economic capital criteria in the Field Analysis due to its low income. Whilst the income of LVC is not known with any certainty, as discussed an estimate was made based on the income for one country (the UK) and multiplied by the number of countries in the coalition of LVC. An economic capital minus one

score is quite a straightforward categorisation according to income and consistent with other CSOs.

The score for political capital for LVC from the Field Analysis is also low at minus five and this is drawn from a minus one score on the criterion of lobbying expenditure (with the measure of less than USD 1 million p.a. giving a score of minus one). It is established that LVC does not lobby governments outwith the consultation processes. There were also minus one scores on the criteria of political access, role in governance, agenda-setting, contribution to legislative outputs and economic capital (as above). Together these form a minus five score. This represents the low level to which LVC are admitted to the governance and legislative spheres and the relatively powerless position it holds in regard to agenda-setting in the global governance arena. It scored one on the criterion of moral capital, (with the measure being *raison d'être* - representation of peasants and gender issues plus praxis (its practices are to promote food sovereignty and gender representation), giving the total score for Political Capital of minus five. This demonstrates one way of scoring the low level of political capital of an organisation which is grass roots, recently admitted and not given full voting rights in global governance.

LVC's total score on legitimacy capital is zero, which consists of three 'plus one' scores for the criteria of *raison d'être*, inclusivity (where the measure is that an organisation with strong inclusion and representativeness is one) and ethical practices (the measure is that ethical practices raise a score of plus one). There is a score of zero on the criterion of subject to regulation, (where one corresponds to complete compliance to legal and statutory regulation and zero is 'not proven'). LVC had

negative one scores for the criteria of transparency [63] (where the measure is open governance equals one but closed governance equals minus one) and accountability (with the measure of 'accountable for practices' gains a measure of one and 'not accountable' is minus one). It also scores a minus one for economic capital, as discussed in the political capital section preceding this.[64]

In summary, La Via Campesina offers an important counterweight to neoliberal practices yet its role in global governance is still very small and restricted, despite its ethical practices and representation of grass roots movements. Its uncompromising stance on contentious issues such as agroecology combined with its rejectionist and isolationist positioning are also problematic for assimilation into global food governance. However, with low political capital it fights against the global status quo, often at high stakes.[65] Its legitimacy capital score (zero) arises from its stated non-compliance with financial and corporate regulation disclosures. Other CSO who do comply would have scored more highly on political legitimacy. Is this an issue for how the value of legitimacy is constructed to fit in with a neoliberal GFG system? Should dissent from the system perhaps be a criterion for legitimacy?

This is, of course, only a snapshot of a moment in time of a 20-year old organisation and the legitimacy capital may be improving and building over time. The political capital may also grow over time, as more collaborative partnerships are developed. Allowance can be made for LVC's relatively new status (and recent admittance to the GFG), compared to organisations such as WFP (at 60 years old) or some of the TNCs which have been around over 130 years. The Gates Foundation, however, is the

[63] There is conjecture on the reasons for their nondisclosure which includes for reasons of perhaps maintaining autonomy, to protect donors, to avoid conflict (between actors and between LVC and other actors - often the cost of travel for social movement actors are covered by NGOs or other actors (FAO, IFAD, CSM) and if the budget came out maybe this would be challenged (although this justification is less robust) (Barling, D; correspondence dated 20 May 2014).

[64] This is a criticism of Bourdieu's method where those actors with low economic capital have this 'double counted' in both the X and Y axes. Since those with low economic capital can only achieve a total score of five in each category of political capital and legitimacy capital one solution would be to show the political capital and political legitimacy as percentages of total possible scores allowing for low economic capital but this would then both lose the data on the criteria scores and result in an "apples and pears" comparison. This temporal comparison could also reintroduce 'habitus' into the analysis.

[65] At the time of writing a Campesina founder, Margarita Murillo, had been murdered in Honduras and her son was still missing (Via Campesina, 2014; Global Witness, 2014).

youngest organisation here and also has a stated shelf-life, although the date of closure is as yet unknown. One future research possibility is to develop a Z-axis for the GFG Field Analysis, where the value of Z equals time. This could show the trajectory of organisations in the GFG space measured in political capital, political legitimacy and of course, economic capital. This temporal comparison is a further modification to Bourdieu's method.

The role of La Via Campesina and other CSOs like them in global governance is critical to developing an effective food security regime. To expedite this, the role of LVC in the international community could be increased to enable power-sharing. Admittance as a full member into GFG bodies and committees such as the CFS would raise to prominence some of the issues that LVC promotes: agrarian reform and water, biodiversity and trade, sustainable peasants' agriculture, as well as food sovereignty. Since only nation-states can be members of the CFS then it has a Westphalian bias, food sovereignty and the concept of entitlement to food remain a sideshow to the 'committee-style' approach of guidelines and soft power that dominate the global governance of food.

Summary of the Case Studies

In summary, the four case studies present the range of positions taken by one governor-actor in each of the four sectors in the GFG field. Each also had declined to be interviewed for this research. The issue of the WFP remit of dealing with crises came up in the case studies, as it did in the interviews, so the WFP is locked into effects-focussed rather than cause-focussed solutions. There also seems to be an expectation that the WFP (or the FAO) would take a central role in GFG but instead, as can be seen from its genesis as a UN agency, it has evolved to responds to needs for food aid. The Gates Foundation has, to some extent, plugged this gap and is

providing for projects to address some of the systemic causes of food insecurity, although there is controversy about some of its Trusts' investments and, by implication, its association with agrifood TNCs such as Monsanto. Such powerful private actors in the governance field is also of unknown full significance, although it does imply a democratic deficit, lack of scrutiny, accountability and regulation.

If the WFP does not take a more central and active role in GFG, then that asks the question who should? From the Field Analysis it can be seen that the FAO's CFS is the main intergovernmental platform for this but involvement of the grass roots civil society groups such as La Via Campesina, is very limited. This is echoed in the interview results, as is the lack of a central unitary body for global governance. Each of the four case studies is involved in the CFS yet it remains hardwired to the past in its structure and also in its scope being a forum for discussions and guidelines. Where these conflict with member states' interests and that of TNCs (if they manipulate the nation-states), then the needed food security measures will fail.

In this governance format the wicked/super wicked problem of food security can be seen - that the remedy put in place perpetuates the problem by conserving the status quo and impeding new measures that could develop in response to the critical food insecurity situations. The case study of LVC, however, shows that the land workers they represent promote democratic inclusion. Yet the Field Analysis scores discussed in each of the case studies showed the huge disparity in economic, political and legitimacy capitals. Small civil society groups such as LVC cannot mobilise capital for political purposes, cannot agenda-set due to lack of resources and in any case are so recently admitted to the fora (such as the CFS) that their David and Goliath situation cannot change under the current system. Private sector Goliaths such as Monsanto and the Gates Foundation dominate the GFG, by virtue of the scale of their political and economic capital, which allows them discursive and instrumental power. Legitimacy is the least effective convertible symbolic capital in the GFG field because the system does not value it. By not positively discriminating towards actors who hold legitimacy, the UN system favours hegemonic states - the 'peaceable nations' in its charter.

To change a global governance system such as this, structural reform, democratic pluralism, inclusiveness and effective results-orientated leadership (with the means to enforce compliance to innovative pro food-secure policies) are essential. The

developing global emergency of food insecurity needs effective governance, especially given the context and pace of agricultural degradation from climate change. The next and final chapter sets out recommendations for governance and policies to achieve these changes.

To have power in the current food governance system, more than legitimacy is needed. Political capital is also needed but perhaps economic capital is key. This leaves little hope for power-sharing for grass roots organisations. The organisations who could take a leadership role in the field (e.g. FAO or IFAD) are not powerful enough to argue for power-sharing or, like the WFP, are charged with mitigating the worst effects of hunger by food aid rather than changing the logic and democratic participation of the field.

Chapter Conclusion

In conclusion, to end hunger, the entitlement to and means of acquiring food must be at the disposal of all across the globe. To achieve this, effective governance is required. The current GFG configuration does not achieve this so the question now is, how should it adapt, given it is not 'fit for purpose'. For many, the centre of this issue is the smallholder/subsistence farmer and global governance needs to remove any obstacles between the 'peasants' and the sustainable seeds they need to sow, the fields they own and plough, the crops they tend and harvest and the access to the fair markets for the equitable prices on which they rely. Until changes are made to happen, the status quo will continue. A status quo where national and international legislative contexts which support access to markets are promoted, legal redress for those smallholders who suffer from oppressive trade practices is available and the global governance of food becomes more democratic and effective. Without change one in seven will still go hungry. By 2030 one in two may be deprived of water. By 2050 the sea may well be without fish. The food system is universal and so the global

governance of food needs to address these particular issues, since from this research it is clear these local and national patterns seem to be reproduced across the globe, in a dark mirror of globalization. These are not lessons of equanimity, equality, inclusivity, participation and transparency only for the global governance of food but for global governance in its entirety.

Exogenous shocks, such as food crises and climate change will, it seems, inevitably rent the International System so better inter and intra-elite co-operation between the governors and the governed will be essential to deal with these threats. To fail to create a viable food governance field now may beg a price that all of us can ill afford to pay. This includes the growing numbers of food insecure within the West. The next and final chapter summarises the issues and analyses raised here and recommends changes to the GFG structure and processes to achieve a stable and effective food security regime.

Chapter Five: The Bitter Harvest

"There are 2700 calories produced per person per day produced today so there is already plenty food to feed the present population with the present development. …As long as food is not a human right, we don't have the governance structures and institutions to make sure that people have access to safe food and drinking water… Everyone is in their own silo….[For] most of the people in the sub-tropics, almost everyone is involved in agriculture but very few of them are growing food for themselves. They are growing food for someone else and they are getting an income from it and then they are buying food."

(Professor David Battisti 'Climate Change and Global Food Security. Our changing World Lecture Edinburgh University 4/11/2014).

As illustrated in the above quote, it is clear that reform of the food governance institutions is needed to address the unequal access to food across the globe. Also that the context of the International System and the concomitant neoliberal approach to global governance inhibits the establishment of an effective food security regime. The neoliberal approaches of International Organisations, Trans National Corporations and Aid Organisations in the global food governance field plus the exclusion of representative grass roots organisations such as La Via Campesina are now manifest. These effects mean that the status quo is perpetuated. Reform of these factors form part of the remedies and conclusions, as do policy recommendations in this final chapter. Alternatives to reform are also considered.

Redefining the Food Security Problem

Firstly though, it is useful to revisit the original definition of the food security problem with the findings of this research in hand. As discussed in Chapter One, as a wicked or super wicked problem, the problem of food insecurity may not be fully understood until the formation of a solution (Conklin, 2005). This means reframing

the problem in light of the insights offered by the interview respondents, the descriptions mapped out by the Field Analysis and the case studies. Indeed, GFG *failure* is now identified as a key factor in the causes of chronic food security by some interview participants and in the case studies on the World Food Programme and Monsanto. The polarity of intent may vary: perhaps misfeasance on the part of the World Food Programme and malfeasance on Monsanto's part (with reference to the Wikileaks cable mentioned in Chapter Four). With chronic food insecurity being long-term and persistent, chronic food insecurity has been caused, in part, by ongoing structural and organisational governance failures of short-term transient food insecurity. The cumulative effect of ineffective global food governance and its repeated failure to deal with the systemic causes of food insecurity (but not necessarily the effects) means that this failure has become part of the problem.

These research findings and analyses necessitate a reframing of the food security problem originally set out in Chapter One. A reframing that adds in the failure of the global food governance system and the neoliberal context to the causes of food insecurity. This redefinition of the problem also takes into account the failure of the current food system and the distribution of power in the governance system anew in light of these research findings. A new, more accurate description of the GFG field is also part of the output of this thesis. These developments form part one of this chapter. Part two considers possible remedies to this recast problem and offers recommendations for governance and policy improvements (as well as methodological considerations) with the results and analyses informing the details of the problem, remedies and recommendations. This second section answers the part of the thesis question, 'what can be done to establish effective food security governance?' The conclusion and recommendations for the methodology are in part three. Each section also relates back to relevant points in the literature.

Part 1: Reframing The Problem.

The Failure of the Current Food Governance System

A significant factor in the failed food governance regime, as mentioned in the opening quote of this chapter, is the failure of Institutions. As seen in the case study of the WFP, this is partly due to the remit and set up of International Organisations, such as

the UN. Some of the interviewees commented that different forms of governance and alternative approaches to governance are needed and that any new body or bodies set up to deal with food security needs power to overcome member nation-states' and global governors' competing interests and to fully include civil society organisations in GFG. Referring back to Tsing's concept of 'friction' outlined in Chapter Two (Tsing, 2005) this means that conflicting social interactions would be allowed space in the GFG structure. If these areas of conflict were represented democratically in global governance, then the effectiveness of the governance would be much enhanced and the democratic deficit in GFG addressed, at least in part.

Another significant failure of the food governance system identified in the research is a lack of co-ordination both between the governors and across the GFG field. This inter actor and intra sectorial lack of co-ordination and co-operation has proliferated and prevailed due to the neoliberal context, which explains the terrain of silos in the food governance field. A context where commercial interests dominate and democratic discussions of food security are impeded. This lack of co-ordination and co-operation prevents planned cause-focussed solutions so instead ad hoc effects focussed actions such as food aid predominate. Although essential to those whom receive it, direct food aid also disrupts local food economies and distracts from addressing the structural reasons for food insecurity. As do practices by some actors, such as the example of excess grain dumping by USAID mentioned by Battisti in the quote opening this chapter.

Governors within the GFG field benefit from this status quo to varying degrees, depending on their economic and political capital and *raison d'être*. There is little evidence as yet of any 'post neoliberal framing' or changing logic of the field in light of the Post-Washington, Vienna, Beijing or Seoul consensi discussed in Chapter Two. The Field Analysis results present one possible 'power map' of the most significant actors in the global food governance field according to measures of economic capital, legitimacy and political capitals. Dominant TNCs and IOs and marginalised CSOs

are represented in the Field Analysis, showing a GFG field configured by neoliberalism – the 'structuring structure' which Bourdieu identified. As seen in Chapter Three when measured by economic capital, international organisations and TNCs dominate the field with CSO a very small fraction of the field. [66]

This facilitates a new description of the GFG field. If we recall the inner section of the 'field within a field' figure in Chapter Two (Figure 6), that is the GFG field, then the GFG section can now be represented as represented in Figure 18 following. A typology of discursive, executive and instrumental power is also applied to Figure 18, drawn from the interviews and case studies. Figure 18 shows the centrality of private actors such as TNCs in the GFG field, and in concentric squares; the GFG field, the 'field of power' with stakeholders who directly influence the 'International field of power' with actors from the International System who indirectly influence GFG and, lastly, a 'non-inclusion field' where some Civil Society Organisation actors, who should be involved in GFG but are excluded from the GFG. To improve GFG these CSO actors could be moved from the periphery and included in the global food governance field.

Those actors with the highest economic capital also largely dominate in political capital and, to a lesser extent, in legitimacy capital. Economic capital matters because, according to Bourdieu, symbolic capitals are 'interconvertible' with each other. So although not a measure of power in itself, economic capital can convert to political capital or legitimacy capital. The civil society organisations are dramatically less significant in each of the symbolic capitals and are therefore extremely marginalised in GFG, to a high degree of exclusion. Positive discrimination towards those stakeholders with negligible economic or political capital but some legitimacy capital could redress this position.

[66] If the Gates Foundation is removed as an outlier then in descending order of dominance the actors dominate as follows: TNCs, IOs, Aid and CSO with CSOs a very small fraction of the economic capital (at a percentage of under 0.06% to TNCs and 0.06% to IOs). Aid organisations have economic capital at one third that of TNCs' economic capital and one half of IOs' overall, CSOs then, are an extremely small fraction of the field.



Figure 18 The Reframed Global Food Governance Field in detail [67]

[67] Applying Field Theory and the research results to the Global Food Governance Field. 1 = International field, 2=Field of Power, 3= Global Food Governance Field 4.= Non-inclusion Field. Note that although Civil Society Organisations are included in the Global Food Governance field, their symbolic capitals are so low as to make their inclusion negligible. Size of the field not indicated here. There are other fields within the International Field of power and Global Governance fields. The suggested power type follows the typology of power proposed by Clapp and Fuchs (2009). The global political and economic context of neoliberalism exists across all four fields.

Representation Deficit

There is little meaningful representation because the field is effectively dominated by actors with the most economic capital, such as private actors, as with the Gates Foundation. The fragmented and incoherent architecture, lack of leadership and organisation's overlapping and opaque mandates are mentioned in the interviews. This elision of commercial and institutional elites serves the status quo with this institutional/commercial elite acting as hegemons. This relates to the domination and hegemony theory outlined in Chapter Two which argues that hierarchies of capitalist society can be reproduced, in this form in a governance field. It was also suggested in the Field Analysis that legitimacy capital is the least dynamic of the symbolic capitals and actors in the GFG field who possess only legitimacy capital fail to reduce the problem of food security in this current food governance configuration. This means legitimacy (in this definition at least) is not valued in the democratically deficient food governance field.

Both the effect of private actors' domination of the governance of food and also the idea that governance of hunger is a business in itself for some actors also came through in the interview results. Some of the participants also highlighted this unequal distribution of power in the governance systems, as well as other issues. The range of viewpoints covered issues such as, if power should rest with national governments because if there is little power-sharing, then power is inequitably held in the hands of a few, perhaps less legitimate actors. The interviews with the Aid-actors in particular showed that the participants viewed their involvement in GFG as primarily feeding into the FAO's Committee of World Food Security, although some did question the constrained scope of this role. The committee is working towards increased inclusion of the Civil Society Mechanism (Duncan and Barling, 2012) but as the Field Analysis shows, CSOs' position in the GFG is still, at best, Davidian to the Goliathian TNCs, for example, Monsanto and arguably relict IOs such as the FAO.

Lack of Effective Governance

Another issue raised by the interview participants was a systemic lack of effectiveness due to the setup of the UN and the effects of this working through the system, with one interviewee mentioning key competencies and the overall lack of executive

power. The features and practices of this current governance framework as a problem in the field was also identified by interview participants. This includes a lack of leadership. As discussed, it also includes the lack of cooperation between the governors and including the UN agencies such as the 'Roman Forum' who, according to one participant, do not "talk freely enough" with themselves or other governors. The silo mentality across organisations and sectors was also identified by interviewees and this confirms the point made earlier about operational silos of the IOs. The lack of oversight of TNCs was also identified by many interviewees and this points to a lack of scrutinising regulation or even regulatory apparatus.

Such ineffectiveness from failing institutions can be seen in the failure of the current food system, according to some interview participants. The ineffectiveness is partly visible in the lack of adequate response to food prices, water problems and the rapid concentration of TNC agribusiness corporations. This articulates the points made in Chapter Two (p.107) as well as in the Field Analysis, that TNCs in effect dominate the global food system. One reason offered for this growing power of TNCs is that devolution and globalisation have resulted in the 'hollowing out' of the nation-state (Macmillan, 2005). Also historic and on-going failure to address the causes of food insecurity (participant D) has seen national governments and Institutions underinvesting in rural infrastructure, rural institutions and agricultural research.

Not only TNCs or UN organisations benefit from such lack of accountability and democratic control. The literature discussed that the same is true of the IMF, WTO and World Bank (Harvey, 2006) and this led to American investment banks' interests dominating. The example of Goldman Sachs trading food staples as derivatives was given in Chapter Two (Kaufman, 2011). This is possible in a global system where neoliberalism is the 'governing technology' and by generating entitlement sets, facilitates who has food and who does not, often with private forces determining food access. Sen's analysis of food insecurity discussed that, at an individual level, food insecurity can arise as the entitlement sets are politically engendered and that

entitlement arises from 'functionings' which shape the level of capabilities and endowment individuals possess (Sen, 2011). These determine who has food and who does not. In short, globalisation allows 'accumulation by dispossession' and this 'recycled imperialism' and on-going exploitation remains an unmet moral imperative. The rationale for who accumulates and whom is dispossessed is political with, this thesis argues, neoliberal logic effectively acting as apportioner. [68]

Measures to Improve Food Security

A number of measures to improve food security were identified by the interview participants, such as addressing the global trade policies of multilateral agencies with global trade regulation and engendering the compliance needed to create a more even playing field. Subsidy levels were also identified as needing urgently monitored and addressed to establish a fairer food system, since subsidies lower the price of food traded. To this same end, developing countries also need better facilitation of access to markets. A few participants also identified the current international and national food price management system as being too slow to update with market prices. The weakness of food aid delivery generally was also identified in the research results with some interview participants proposing addressing specific issues such as; inefficiencies, logistical issues such as better stores and procurement. Better recipient targeting as well as improving nutritional deficiencies of food aid and better internal control of agencies were also mentioned. These failures in the current food system could be remedied by a unitary body for global food management implementing new policy directions. Without such a central body, the current GFG field with the characteristics already described is not configured to resolve such issues (and also has a track record for not doing so).

As with the TNCs, the neoliberal approach of the IOs has also failed to solve food insecurity because the solutions conflict with their *raison d'être* and organisational logics. They reproduce the structures of power and knowledge divined by history and institutional frameworks (e.g. membership, serial limited reforms etc.). The 'North',

[68] This describes the relationship between global food governance and the individual - its impact on plates of food in that the failure of GFG means that corporate forces dominate, dictating which crops are grown where, the seeds, the fertilizer used to propagate the seeds, the yield and the price sold at market. This capability dictates food availability and the price that smallholders can access food at (the functionings).

therefore, is an agent of food insecurity by proxy through GFG failure or by nation-states setting their foreign policy objectives to coerce their trade agenda, (as seen in the leaked cable in the Wikileaks release). Note also the liberal governance model, outlined in Chapter one, where indigenous values are replaced with liberal ones, so IOs can command civil populations (Tsing, 2009). These factors combine to erode indigenous agricultural structures and practices, along with the geographical spaces such as indigenous arable fields and forests, where livelihoods can flourish. Therefore, what is needed is a new governance framework where governance adopts a balanced approach that represents indigenous values and the grass roots organisations that represent them.

So with the failure of food security governance, the problem of food security now adds the 'failure of global food governance' to the factors and causes in Table 7 (below) which could be remedied by effective global food governance. This shows that the failure of global food governance is both a cause and a factor of food insecurity in itself by dint of its failure to remedy other factors and causes. The failure of GFG is catastrophic in the severity of the magnitude of its consequences. The international and national fields of power still influence the global governance field and this can be seen on issues like commoditisation and the neoliberal context. Reform of the GFG field or a new governance model would therefore have a multiplier effect on resolving food insecurity, once it is reconfigured to remedy the factors and causes under its remit as well as reform of itself. The specific features of this governance failure are shown in Table 7 following.

Global Food Governance Failure	Proposed Remedies	Suggested Remit
Unequal distribution of power	Reform. Inclusion. Power-sharing	IOs, N-S, CSO
Configuration of power	Reform	IOs, N-S, AID Orgs, CSO
Elision of economic and institutional elites (hegemons)	Transparency. Reform. Form New international panel (like IPCC)	International panel, N-S, CSO
Fragmented and incoherent architecture	Reform. New central unitary body (like defunct Food Council). Integration of "Roman forum'.	Panel. IOs.
Lack of effectiveness	Leadership. New body	IOs, N-S, Panel
Overlapping and opaque mandates	Improve co-ordination. Reform	Panel
Lack of leadership by IO	New body	Panel, IO
Lack of coordination by IO	New body	Panel, IO
Little meaningful representation	Expand membership. Improve inclusion	IO, N-S, panel, body, Aid orgs, CSO
Legitimacy not valued	Expand membership. Power-sharing. Positive discrimination towards civil society organisations.	All. Panel. Body.
Governors benefit from status quo	Revise distribution of power in the governance field	Panel. Body. CSO.
Neoliberal context configures the field	Code of practice for governors. Establish elements of democracy across field	All. Panel. Body
Lack of coordination across governors.	Leadership and architecture	All body. Panel.
Lack of cause-focused solutions	New body. Establish priorities to address systemic chronic food insecurity	IO, N-S, Panel
Organisational silos	Internal Organisational reform.	IO
Practices of Financial institutions from field of power	Regulation	N-S, panel. Body. CSO.
Democratic deficit across field	Creation of new body could address power-sharing and revise executive power base.	Panel. Body, Aid, IO, CSO

TNC practices	Regulation	Panel. Body, Aid, IO, CSO
Aid orgs governance	Improve co-ordination of charitable	Aid, IOs Body
actions funnelled into feeding into CFS	organisations. Perhaps a sectorial federation or coalition?	
Lack of regulation of TNCs and private actors	International mechanism for regulation (which may cover other governance areas such as climate change). Legal reform to ensure redress/compliance.	IOs, panel, body
CSO marginalised and grass roots exclusion	Power-share with CSO. Include other actors. Increased economic and political support for CSOs.	CSO, IO, panel.
Gender blind policies and practices	Gender-inclusive policies and reform agenda	All
Indigenous agricultural practices overlooked	Prioritise pro-environmental agricultural objectives and policies	All

Table 7: Features of Global Food Governance Failure

Part 2: Remedies and Recommendations

This new conceptualisation of the problem also offers new remedies in addition to the existing panoply of known remedies. From the literature review, the 'building blocks' for better global food governance include reforming the CFS, establishing the Right to Food (as mentioned by Battisti above), smallholder and gender equality, integration of the 'Rome Agencies', regulation of TNCs (specifically barring any political role) and lastly including more non-state actors in the GFG (McKeon, 2009).[69] McKeon also proposed that global results-orientated strategies for reducing food insecurity should be pursued and actioned rather than only guidelines. McKeon proposes a Global Strategies Framework as a more incorporative democratic model of governance. Taking the constituent elements of the problem from both the literatures and research results the following remedies can be recommended, some of which incorporate these building blocks.

1. Regulation and Scrutiny of TNCs

Firstly, it is proposed that regulation and scrutiny of TNCs should be sought and initiated. This could be along the lines of the EU Transparency Directive and involvement in the global governance processes should be conditional on compliance with such regulation. As stakeholders in the current governance processes, the format of the regulation would inevitably be negotiated with the TNCs but other stakeholders such as CSO groups could be included. Part of this regulation could include the right to legal redress in the host (or donor) country for those involved in litigation, rather than the need to litigate in the TNC's home country. This would assist with the issue that many TNCs are registered in Delaware, U.S.A., (where corporations have the legal rights of an individual 'legal person'). The central question here is who would initiate such change and what would the legal framework be? Which is the 'executive

[69] Former FAO executive McKeon suggests creating the Global Strategies Framework for building capacity for effective global governance from state and non-state actors and ensuring accountability of not only the governing institutions but all actors in the global governance of food. It could create the right initial steps towards effective governance (McKeon, 2011). Regulation of TNCs is more difficult to achieve although there is some scope with monitoring corporate activities and technologies, antitrust and fair competition rulings plus reviewing bi-lateral trade agreements and again this is a role that the CFS could oversee (Clapp and Fuchs, 2009).

power' question in global governance and this takes us into the realm of 'soft' law.[70] Similar to media self-regulation, although *de jure* it seems like a promising mode, *de facto* self-regulation is ineffective because it conflicts with the actors' self-interest and often results in gestures of empty rhetoric or posturing such as poor Corporate Social Responsibility actions. So, as with EU directives on corporations' transparency and directives on corporate practices on similar issues such as land grabs and climate change, the need to establish norms and rules which are supported by regulation is clear but the issue is how to establish such regulation?

One possible way is to establish a tribunal, such as with the International Criminal Court, so that rather than fines, (which corporations develop a cost-benefit calculus for) the retributive transparency and negative publicity of such cases may act a deterrent. International law could be a framework through which this is examined. This would take a degree of international cooperation and also that the international laws are ratified. As with, for example, the S.A.L.T. and Law of the Sea treaties, ratification is key but possible in the nexus of transnational governance and international law. Compliance and enforcement are central issues, raising the question who could act as scrutineer? This could be a role of a working group in a new central unitary body. These questions are also being explored in climate change and international human rights.

As discussed in the Field Analysis and in the literature review, part of the TNC problem is that of vertical integration or 'super mergers' mean that there is now a concentration of power not previously seen. This affects not only food security and the developing world but also the home nations of the corporations.[71] Identification

[70] A remedy for food security via international law is an important part of solving food insecurity and is an area for future research.

[71] For example the 'Alcan scandal' of 2013-14 in the US saw TNCs profiteering from each stage of the aluminium process to the detriment of consumers. An example was given of the practices where the warehousing of the aluminium was needlessly extended so that increased storage fees were charged to

of this power and agreement of the conditionality for involvement in the governance process would assist food prices and improve the democratic balance of the GFG field itself. In theory at least, anti-trust regulation could also be enforced here both at national and international levels to circumscribe TNC activities yet in practice with such laws these monopolistic practices remain. Therefore, trade rules and trade agendas dominate the GFG. This is akin to the issue of lack of inadequate representation and democratic participation, which is discussed later in this chapter. But the trade agenda, set out by the G7/G8, can also mitigate the domination of developing countries with the cessation of excessive or pernicious trading practices. Cognisance of and actions on trade agendas is an important element in the construction of effective pro-food security policies and programmes and the regulation and scrutiny of TNCs is also an essential strand of GFG reform.

2. **Rededicate The Outputs Of Existing Institutions To Actions That More Effectively Resolve Food Insecurity.**

The criticisms of the inefficacy of the FAO and CFS identified in the interviews mostly centred on lack of action. Although credit was given to steps being taken in the right direction, especially in regard to inclusion of civil society organisations, the pace of change is still seen as being too slow and some participants felt that with the stakes so high, the discursive outcomes of the CFS distract from much needed actions. Therefore the second remedy proposed is the redesignation of the UN agencies to action-orientated outputs. This means the expansion of the remit and competencies of the CFS committee and also reforming the FAO and other institutions. The objective should be to establish a durable global food security regime. Two modes are possible for this. Either reform the institutions along the lines of more purposive physical outputs or consider alternatives to the international system of institution-led architecture. This segues into the third proposed remedy, reforming the international architecture of the institutional framework.

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another part of the same corporation. Similarly, transportation was extended beyond what was practicably necessary, again ratcheting up costs and profit. This adds cost at each stage of the manufacturing and distribution process with such 'rack renting' increasing the cost of the product. With costs snowballing at each stage of the production process and any rival competitors already acquired in the super mergers, there is no alternative but to purchase that product at that inflated price. In this case it was aluminium but the process resembles the effect of super mergers on the cost of food.

3. Reform of The International Architecture Of The Institutions Involved In Global Food Governance.

As discussed the 'one-UN' reform process has been completed yet food insecurity is still not remedied. So the questions remain how to restructure, what to restructure and how to further reform to best address food insecurity. There is some support for improving the mandates, capacities and mechanism of existing institutions. There is also recognition that the reform agenda needs to reach consensus to decide on an effective framework to be developed.

The question of the architecture of the system is also a question of power since power in the system flows from the architecture and membership. The existing asymmetric distribution of power affects processes of accountability, responsibilities and rulemaking. Reforming the architecture would enable a more symmetric balance of power and create new categories of membership – for example voting rights to associate members such as the La Via Campesina in the Committee of Food Security. This would empower the marginalised and reduce the effect of voting along the lines of member nation-state's interests, where the most powerful sustain a hegemonic control over the global governance or voting blocs of most developed nations vote along trade agenda lines. Integrating the three Roman Forum bodies would be an example of architectural restructuring. This was discussed by some interview participants.

Improved power sharing arising from an improved architecture would create a governance space where pro-poor policies and legislation could be developed and actioned rather than just existing as guidelines. It would enable a governance agenda which addresses the key issues of food security. Domination of legitimate grass roots movements could also be addressed by increased power sharing. Then the voices of those closest to agriculture, the smallholders and subsistence farmers, could also be

included. This would roll back the private commercial elite who act as illegitimate hegemons in the governance system and in the food system.

Such a change in dynamics could see political legitimacy, currently the least recognised symbolic capital in the global food governance field, given more premium. If the field's architecture dynamics, membership and power of the field changed then the field itself would also be changed. Although Bourdieu commented that fields are always in flux and changing, this might see a change in the logic of the field so that it is more democratic and pro-poor. There is evidence of some political will to do this but the rate of change needs to be increased dramatically, due to the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding across the globe exacerbated by predicted further effects of climate change on food insecurity.

Other ways to initiate these changes to the architecture, membership and power dynamics are to substantially better fund CSO groups to increase their political capital so that their legitimacy is respected within the field. With IOs reformed along results oriented goals rather than discursive outcomes, this would improve the ineffectiveness of the field overall and the IOs and CSOs specifically by reducing the silos. So membership of the governance field, which is in an historic gridlock of the given status quo, could be revised so that political legitimacy is a valued capital. The aim here would be to enable better governance by shaping the governance space thereby allowing this new corporative deliberative approach in GFG to initiate policy innovations that address the systemic causes of food security.

4. **Integration/Consolidation Of Aid And Charitable Organisations.**

Another possible remedy arising from the Field Analysis is that aid/charitable organisations could consider consolidating, even in a co-operative mode. Just like the proposal for integrating the Roman Forum agencies, the arguments are that it would allow economies of scale, avoid duplication of remits and, by coordinating in this way, new initiatives and policies could be developed. This consolidation of Aid organisations mirrors the vertical and horizontal TNC mergers which have successfully added to their weight in the GFG field. If correctly designed, it could also support CSOs. If the Roman Forum agencies also integrated this would create a more symmetrical field with better power-sharing possible. Many of the aid

organisations such as Action Against Hunger and Christian Aid provide direct food aid. Instead, with aid/charitable organisations integrating, programmes such as community and social enterprises, agricultural initiatives or micro finance schemes for subsistence or smallholder farmers could be developed and consistently rolled out. This supports community development and targets families and the most disadvantaged. These programmes could better and more systematically support peasant and gender issues and not only in existing schemes but also in anticipating food crisis and food price spirals and building resilience. Food could flow from areas of surplus to areas of deficit all by using local or regionally provided food from markets and with local producers and distributors benefitting. This could maintain sustainability and resilience, empowering subsistence farmers. As the effects of climate changes continue to ratchet, this approach, rather than flying over US surplus grain to crisis-hit areas, will be increasingly necessary.[72]

As seen in the impact on food governance of the Gates Foundation's size, this integration of aid organisations would also benefit not only the functions of the aid organisations but the political and economic and legitimacy capital of the consolidated aid organisations within the field of global governance. Rather than trying to reconcile competing visions, this could improve the implementation of the aid organisations' aims by dint of their collective economic and political power. Of course as individual organisations their genesis and *raison d'être* vary but it need not be a merger - it could be a co-operative model. For example, the role of faith aid organisations in food security is very significant and strong coalitions of faith orientated charities would prove effective both in governance negotiations and also on the ground.

[72] This would change the crops grown in countries in the North too but if the expected temperature increases due to climate change do occur then the crops grown in regions will change anyway (so legumes in the UK rather than continental Europe etc.)

5. **Develop Agriculture and Put It At The Centre Of The Initiatives.**

Developing community-based agriculture helps empowerment and resilience and is an important remedy to identify in its own right. Regional food programmes are an important strand to resolving food insecurity. The stimulus to communities of such initiatives reduces the precarious aspect of subsistence farming and enables food sovereignty. The criticisms of agroecology outlined in Chapter Four, such as the impact of the lack of scientific methods on harvest yield, land use and consequently on food security are important considerations so agricultural developments should not be limited to agroecology but all types of approaches to agriculture considered.

Each of these remedies mentioned could work towards resolving the causes of food security. For example, the commoditisation of food could be resolved by a newly powerful central body which would establish food as a right. With this right established, grain, millet and poultry could be delisted from the commodities exchanges. Of course, this will be difficult to achieve. This is about negotiation and political will. The TNCs will inevitably fight any delisting of food from the commodities exchange and ultimately divest such products from their businesses and fund portfolios, should delisting be successful. Yet food trade could still continue as it did before since it is the fast capital not the slow capital which drives the substantially increasing food prices.

6. **New Central Body – A 'World Food Council'?**

The lack of a central unitary body for global development was identified in both the interviews and the case studies with correlating issues such as the lack of leadership in GFG and little grass roots representation. Overall, TNCs' and member states' interests dominate GFG and so measures to improve food security will fail when they do not coincide with those interests. The case study results also identified expectations that the FAO would take a central role in GFG. As can be seen from its genesis as a UN agency, it has instead evolved to respond to need for food aid or to co-ordinate guidelines-producing committees such as the CFS.

This new institution could be established as a new 'World Food Council', perhaps arising as a reconstituted FAO. This would overlap with the IMF's role but the IMF

is coverall rather than specifically for food security. As well as providing leadership the new body could monitor prices, food trade and manage food stocks.[73]

This raises the question of how to effect such change. CSOs alone cannot change even the CFS not to mention the whole GFG system. It is unassailable for those marginal actors because, as seen in the Field Analysis, the power sits with the 'Goliaths'. Instead a case for change needs to come up through the IOs, perhaps instigated by key activists, nation-states or a consolidated consortium of Aid organisations and CSOs. The other sectors in the field could agree in support but the reform in the field probably needs to start with the IOs, given that the other dominant group, the TNCs are unlikely to do so. The chances of reform happening are small unless there is a tipping point to the food security regime - the 'cataclysmic event'. Otherwise there would need to be a pro-change hegemonic leader of the field to drive through the reforms.

The new central body or governance space could offer the leadership needed to change the GFG dynamics. This alternative to reform of the existing institutions is a more radical alternative governance framework, a new governance format in which this new body could address some of the governance problems mentioned by the interviewees such as; the lack of coherence in the governance of the field and the conflicting interventions and fragmentation as well as connect the disconnected CSO. Rededicating institutions and establishing this 'World Food Council', possibly in the space where the FAO or CFS exists, would be effective especially if it was given executive power. Membership could be open to many to create a more diverse, democratically pluralistic and inclusive form of GFG. Including Africa and Asia more in global food governance was recognised by some interviewees and in the literatures

[73] A cautionary note on food stocks is that similar but not identical ground has been covered on food stocks before, in Europe at least, with the establishment of the Common Market in 1974 when the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) saw wine lakes and butter mountains as food was stockpiled.

as an imperative, given the prognosis for climate change in those areas and also the proliferation of food insecurity.

By establishing a Global Action Plan, the new body could also change policy direction such as instigating and overseeing social protection policies and a global fund for social protection (McKeon, 2015). It could seek to achieve nation-state agreement and set priorities for the next 10, 20, 30 years and even partner TNCs with governance partners to ensure more oversight and establish large food trading houses run by agencies. Establishing an IPCC-style panel for food insecurity is another recommended remedy perhaps arising from an expanded High Level Panel of experts (HLPE) (part of the CFS) and this could be the cornerstone of a wider more inclusive panel of experts.

Such a changed GFG space could better respond and govern the redefined problem of food security yet the question is how to give the new body power. The key question remains of who will bring this about? Who could take the necessary measures to establish an effective food security regime including all the points raised in the results on this research? Additionally, if the GFG space could be changed in this way to respond to the redefined problem of food insecurity, how could the new body wield executive power?

Comparing this to executive power in other governance regimes, such as with climate change, it is recommendations from the International Panel whereas in genocide it is prosecutions via the International Criminal Court. The UN Convention on the Prevention of Genocide was instrumental in establishing the crime of genocide. Therefore the last recommendation returns to the Food Justice and Food Sovereignty discussion from Chapter Two (Bne Saad, 2009).

7. **Establish the 'Right to Food'.**

As with the Battisti quote opening this chapter, key to underpinning this new unitary body are the reformed institutional architecture and the democratically enhanced governance space, with an expanded inclusive membership is the 'Right to Food' (McKean also recommends this as a building block of food governance). This is recommended with the codicil that it is not enough to have a Right in itself but a Rights regime around food is necessary as a statement of universality, as with all

Human Rights legislation. Establishing the Right to Food could encompass the Food Sovereignty and Food Justice principles and initiate the development of legal and legislative frameworks (and legal tests etc.) to protect vulnerable communities and disadvantaged groups, for example, dispossessed female subsistence farmers, as well as those without citizenship, such as children. It is possible that, eventually, the Right to Food could be used to litigate against malfeasant actors, such as TNCs. The Right to Food is also emancipation or as Sen described it, development as freedom (Sen, 2011). But how that Right to Food is established again puts global food governance at the centre of the question.

8. **Policy Recommendations.**

A number of suggestions for policy initiatives arose from the interviews. Each of these could contribute to establishing a food security. The creation and implementation of these policies on a systemic scale would flow from a policy agenda created by the reformed global food governance field, with executive power flowing from the new World Food Council, legitimated by the democratic global food governance field. International Organisations within the food governance field would no longer have neoliberal approaches, instead refocussing on a combined Human Security approach and Rights based approach, supporting the Right to Food. Results orientated rather than process-orientated results would be held as a premium and performance of the IOs would be appraised by the World Food Council. The Bretton Woods Institutions, namely The World Bank and the IMF, if not reformed, could continue their Seoul Consensus approach, turning away from neoliberal values, funding groups within the GFG and the food secure policies emanating out of it, perhaps at country or regional-level. All conditionality for assistance could be removed. Financial organisations and the US Treasury would be delegitimised from the Global Food Governance field by establishing secure political boundaries to the field to limit the influence from the International Field of Power (see Figures 1 and

18). The Aid Organisations consortium would continue to contribute to the democratic governance of GFG and through its field workers could develop policies such as agricultural microfinance schemes. Civil society Organisations would continue to represent their members and, in partnership with the other GFG governors, roll out policies which address the concerns of their members. Therefore both the reform and redemocratising of the currently ineffective GFG field and the implementation of food security policies could create a stable and effective food security regime.

From the research results in this thesis the following policies were identified as potentially significantly contribute to a food secure world. Firstly, a global fund for social protection for the 48 least developed countries could be established, possibly by the EU if not the reformed GFG's 'World Food Council'. The fund should be fully supported by the new body and policies such as protection of land, fisheries and forests should be promoted and operationalised. Biodiversity policies, access to fair markets, trade bans, tariff setting, better food balance sheets and accountability mechanisms should be introduced and agribusinesses delegitimised from the governance field to enable smallholders' agriculture come to the fore.

As discussed there also needs to be transparency polices, regulation and oversight of TNCs' practices (including anti-competition practices), policies on price setting and price monitoring, gender-positive policies, pro-poor policies, agricultural policies and capacity building policies such as community supported agriculture schemes in urban and rural areas. Increasing capabilities and capacity building measures and policies increase families and communities resilience to chronic food insecurity and famine by increasing their 'functionings and 'entitlements', to use Sen's terms (Sen, 1981). These policies can be enabled by reducing politico-commercial elites elision and increasing the power and funding of civil society groups. Whereas private-public partnerships can undoubtedly be useful in initiatives such as micro-finance and farmer empowerment, social protection objectives should be the gauge to avoid 'cherry-picking' of the more profitable schemes.

The predicted changes in regional cropping due to climate change should be articulated more so that subsistence farmers can be offered training to enable their adjustments to the change. Also on the smallholder level, seed patenting and any cartelling , monopolistic or restrictive practices towards farmers could be outlawed.

Policies on cause-focussed solutions could be developed in tandem with effects focussed policies to address food insecurity on a structural systemic level. It is suggested that the issues in both Table 3 on the food security factors and causes and Table 7 on the food governance failures offer a more comprehensive menu of policy areas which, as in the example of, say, reducing institutional silos, would improve the governance of food security and contribute to the creation of a sustainable and resilient food secure system.

Conclusion

A thesis on a real-world problem deserves a real-world solution recommendation. To start this process of transformative change, governance and policy changes could be presented via the Civil Society Mechanism or the High Level Panel of Experts at the next Committee for World Food Security plenary with the objective of influencing the CFS Bureau and Advisory Group. The CFS has a role to play by negotiating action orientated guidelines or producing and disseminating a report, it opens up the debate to enable other stakeholders to contribute and for member Nation-States to debate. If produced by the CFS as guidelines or a report for governance reform and the creation of a more enabling policy environment then the next step would be to win political support for the changes from others in the wider governance field and fields of power.

As can be seen from the Field Analysis and interviews, a new body, a 'World Food Council' could arise from the space occupied by the FAO (and CFS) so in this scenario the seeds of change would come from within. The argument for changing the logic of the field is to improve the governance of the field, and the argument needs to be made by the very governors who will be transformed. This demonstrates the paradox of the solution to a super-wicked problem, in that the solution is also part of the problem. Without actioning the solution of transformation, however paradoxical, then the status quo may continue, a status quo which will likely exacerbate hunger. If

this is the case, then continuing this status quo is not the best option to take. Transformation and reform of the GFG field is the better measure. The democratic deficit and domination by private actors makes transformation more difficult yet better outcomes are possible and of universal benefit, ultimately.

Lastly, there are number of methodological recommendations. The benefits of Field Analysis are that it allows a measurement and description of a governance space which facilitates the definition of a global governance problem. The limitations of Field Analysis, as discussed, are that Field Analysis is neither a model nor a quasi-positivist 'experiment', in that there are not independent or dependent variables. There are also elements of value judgments and estimation evident. Yet it also revealed unknowns such as the role and position of the Gates Foundation, the domination of TNCs or the disproportionately small space given to CSO in the GFG field. Or that CSOs may not hold the most political legitimacy according to the *nomos*, or 'rules of the game'. So it is important to once again highlight that the global governance field as set out on the Field Analysis is one representation of the field from an adaptation of Bourdieu's method.

The recommendations for the individual methods are firstly to remove double counting of economic capital but also to appreciate that Field Analysis is, like a sketch, one interpretation of a real world governance configuration. The observation on the case studies is that they are very useful supplementary methods to Field Analysis since they lend real-world examples of practices but again they can be subject to researcher bias and as much a construction as the Field Analysis. These mini-versions of case studies suffer for their brevity yet are useful nonetheless in that had they been omitted, the research results would not have had the same real-world focus at organisational level.

The interview method brings the topic to life and corroborates some points gleaned from the literature. Since they offer attitudinal data then many varied perspectives and viewpoints are obtained so it also lets in the unknown or the unseen, more so than the case studies which involves self-selecting information. On this occasion the range of respondents was constrained by the social capital (and economic capital) of the researcher, in that getting key actors at key organisations was difficult by cold calling. Where participants are reluctant to get involved, as was the case here, then

social capital would have been helpful. Also where possible face-to-face interviews would have been preferable.

The discourses and literatures between academics and policymakers can be synthesised and although there is a cost to this - in that the thesis is less theoretical than originally envisaged - there is also a benefit in that it hopefully provides a stepping stone for future researchers and also proves that it is a possible format for other governance areas such as land grabs, climate change, genocide etc. The grey literatures offer useful case studies and the white literatures allow for critical thinking. A thesis only by literature review would not have contained the examples and the combination provides the springboard into analysis.

There are a number of other lessons here. Firstly, that another world is possible. That governance structures and formats are formed by their own habitus and exist due to the overall historical and ideological trajectories and contexts rather than their fit to purpose. But fields have logics and identifying what effective food governance would look like is key to making recommendations for that 'good' governance.

Secondly, the importance of laying out the methods, findings and recommendations of this research for future research. On-going research investigation is really a chain and this thesis a link in that chain so clarity is as an important part of research as consistency or reflexive practice. Also the contested space that is a field works well for the global governance and applying 'the field' to other global governance issues would be similarly beneficial.

Lastly, a lesson on the value of academic research in reimagining the future is also apparent. Within the timespan of this research, the food security situation worsened. A similar situation with the privatisation of water is developing. As well as increasing the impetus, this sharpened the understanding that democracy needs to be practice rather than rhetoric, that changes which improve democracy need to be identified and worked towards. Otherwise chronic hunger persists, opportunities for change are

squandered and food will continue to be apportioned politically. Another future is desperately needed because as each day passes, 18,000 children die of starvation. Also, without food justice, as with social justice, there can be no peace for any part of the world. This recast problem describes the 'new face of hunger' identified in my original newspaper article in 2008. It has become apparent that there is no solution in hand because global food governance has failed and largely continues to fail. However, research investigation can suggest a reimagining of alternative future scenarios and, in proposing possible solutions to the ineffective global governance of food security, illustrate that a better world is possible. The next step is to secure the political will for International Organisations and perhaps a coalition of stakeholders in food security to take leadership and transform the global food governance field, to create the effective food security governance so desperately and urgently needed.

Appendices Section

List of Appendices

Appendix 1: Newspaper Article On 2008 Food Crisis

Appendix 2 Barriers To Gender-Equal Food Security.

Appendix 3 List Of Organisations Researched For Inclusion Into Field Analysis

Appendix 4: Table A: Symbolic Capital Table For Criteria And Measures Of Political Capital

Table B: Symbolic Capital Table For Criteria And Measures Of Political Legitimacy

Notes On Tables A And B: Constructing The Symbolic Capital Criteria

Appendix 5: The Economic Capital Of The Global Good Governance Major Actors (With Notes)

Appendix 6: Variables Tables For Political Capital

Appendix 7: Variables Table For Political Legitimacy

Appendix 8: Field Analysis Of Global Food Governance: Symbolic Capital, Criteria And Measures 2

Appendix 9: Appendices for Chapter 4
A: Pilot Version of Interview Protocol

B: Final Version Of Interview Protocol

Appendix 10: Interview Records (On CD)

Appendix 1

Sunday Herald Newspaper (www.heraldscotland.com)

2008: The Year Of Global Food Crisis

8 March 2008

Special report By Kate Smith

It is the new face of hunger.

A perfect storm of food scarcity, global warming, rocketing oil prices and the world population explosion is plunging humanity into the biggest crisis of the 21st century by pushing up food prices and spreading hunger and poverty from rural areas into cities.

Millions more of the world's most vulnerable people are facing starvation as food shortages loom and crop prices spiral ever upwards.

And for the first time in history, say experts, the impact is spreading from the developing to the developed world.

More than 73 million people in 78 countries that depend on food hand-outs from the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) are facing reduced rations this year. The increasing scarcity of food is the biggest crisis looming for the world", according to WFP officials.

At the same time, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation has warned that rising prices have triggered a food crisis in 36 countries, all of which will need extra help. The threat of malnutrition is the world's forgotten problem", says the World Bank as it demands urgent action.

The bank points out that global food prices have risen by 75% since 2000, while wheat prices have increased by 200%. The cost of other staples such as rice and soya bean have also hit record highs, while corn is at its most expensive in 12 years.

The increasing cost of grains is also pushing up the price of meat, poultry, eggs and dairy products. And there is every likelihood prices will continue their relentless rise, according to expert predictions by the UN and developed countries.

High prices have already prompted a string of food protests around the world, with tortilla riots in Mexico, disputes over food rationing in West Bengal and protests over grain prices in Senegal, Mauritania and other parts of Africa. In Yemen, children have marched to highlight their hunger, while in London last week hundreds of pig farmers protested outside Downing Street.

If prices keep rising, more and more people around the globe will be unable to afford the food they need to stay alive, and without help they will become desperate. More food riots will flare up, governments will totter and millions could die.

Food scarcity means a big increase in the number of people going hungry," says the WFP's Greg Barrow. Without doubt, we are passing through a difficult period for the world's hungry poor." The WFP estimates it needs an additional $500 million to keep feeding the 73 million people in Africa, Asia and central America who require its help. We need extra money by the middle of 2008 so we don't have to reduce rations," says Barrow.

He also points out that age-old patterns of famine are changing. "We are feeding communities of people we didn't expect to feed," he explains.

As well as being rural, the profile of the new hungry poor is also urban, which is new. There is food available in the markets and shops - it's just that these people can't afford to buy it. This is the new face of hunger." The food shortages will also affect western industrialised nations such as Scotland, Barrow says. Scarcity means that some foods will get very expensive, or disappear from supermarkets altogether, meaning a move to seasonal, indigenous vegetables." Of the 36 countries named last month as currently facing a food crisis, 21 are in Africa. Lesotho and Swaziland have been afflicted by droughts, Sierra Leone lacks widespread access to food markets because of low incomes and high prices, and Ghana, Kenya and Chad among others are enduring "severe localised food insecurity".

In India last year, more than 25,000 farmers took their own lives, driven to despair by grain shortages and farming debts. "The spectre of food grain imports stares India in the face as agricultural growth plunges to an all-time low," warns India Today magazine.

The World Bank predicts global demand for food will double by 2030. This is partly because the world's population is expected to grow by three billion by 2050, but that is only one of many interlocking causes.

The rise in global temperatures caused by pollution is also beginning to disrupt food production in many countries. According to the UN, an area of fertile soil the size of Ukraine is lost every year because of drought, deforestation and climate instability.

Last year Australia experienced its worst drought for over a century, and saw its wheat crop shrink by 60%. China's grain harvest has also fallen by 10% over the past seven years.

The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has predicted that, over the next 100 years, a one metre rise in sea levels would flood almost a third of the world's crop-growing land.

A recent analysis by the Conservative Party leader, David Cameron, also pinned blame for the global food crunch" on the accelerating demand for allegedly green biofuels and the world's growing appetite for meat.

Meat is a very inefficient way of utilising land to produce food, delivering far fewer calories, acre for acre, than grain. But the amount of meat eaten by the average Chinese consumer has increased from 20 kilograms a year in 1985 to over 50 kilograms today. The demand for meat from across all developing countries has doubled since 1980.

The world's grain stocks are at their lowest for 30 years, Cameron warns. "Some analysts are beginning to make some very worrying, very stark predictions. And these analysts say politicians should start to rank the issue of food security alongside energy security and even national security."

Another key driver is the soaring cost of oil, which last week topped $105 a barrel for the first time. As well as increasing transport costs, oil makes crop fertilisers more expensive.

According to the World Bank, fertiliser prices have risen 150% in the past five years. This has had a major impact on food prices, as the cost of fertiliser contributes over a quarter of the overall cost of grain production in the US, which is responsible for 40% of world grain exports.

Tackling hunger has become a "forgotten" UN millennium development goal, says the bank's president, Robert Zoellick.

But increased food prices and their threat - not only to people but also to political stability - have made it a matter of urgency," he says.

Scottish farmers warn that food security is becoming an issue for the first time since the second world war. This is a perfect storm and the effects are being felt right now," says James Withers, the acting chief executive of the National Farmers' Union in Scotland.

"At the same time as demand for food increases, the amount of land we have available to grow food on is reducing," he adds. "An area twice the size of Scotland's entire agricultural area has been swallowed up by Chinese towns and cities in the last 10 years." John Scott, a Scottish Conservative MSP who farms in Ayrshire, goes further. "It's almost biblical," he says. "With all the wine lakes and butter mountains, we've had our 20 years of plenty since 1986." The prospect of global food shortages is now Malthusian, he suggests. One response from the UK and Scotland should be to grow more of our own food, and to try to reverse the decline in self-sufficiency from 75% in 1986 to 60% now.

It is possible for the UK, and the world, to feed itself, argues Robin Maynard from the Soil Association, but it will require big changes. He invokes the wartime spirit that saw gardens turned into allotments, and 50 mixed farms feeding Britain.

This is a wake-up call," he says. The choices we make now will determine whether we can feed ourselves in the future. If we get it right we can have a thriving food economy." Richard Lochhead, the Scottish government's environment secretary, has launched a public discussion to develop Scotland's first food policy. "I am conscious our generation has not experienced food shortages, but we should never take food for granted," he says.

"That is why the Scottish government will never allow food security to fall off the national agenda. We recognise the vital role of our primary producers in ensuring the long-term capacity and capability of our food supply." Why are we growing food to feed cars instead of people?

The global drive for a new green fuel to power cars, lorries and planes is worsening world food shortages and threatening to make billions go hungry. Biofuels, enthusiastically backed by the US, UK and other European governments, have been sold as the solution to global warming. Making fuels from growing crops has been marketed as the way to cut climate pollution while continuing to drive.

But now experts are warning that this could all be a disastrous mistake. Converting large amounts of land to crops for biofuels is reducing food production just when the world needs to increase it.

Last year a quarter of the US maize crop was turned into ethanol to fuel vehicles - and the US supplies more than 60% of the world's maize exports. According to the World Bank, this is putting pressure on countries' precarious food supplies.

"The biofuels surge makes things worse by adding high demand on top of already high prices and low stocks," said one of the bank's leading economists, Don Mitchell. "Ethanol and biodiesel produced in the US and European Union don't appear to be delivering on green promises either, making them very controversial."

There are plans by more than 20 countries to boost production of biofuels over the next decade. The US is talking about trebling maize production for ethanol, while the European Union is aiming to make biofuels 10% of all transport fuels by 2020.

The dash for biofuels came under fire last week from the UK government's newly appointed chief scientific adviser, Professor John Beddington. In a speech in London on Thursday, he said that world food prices had already suffered a "major shock" as a result.

Biofuels were often unsustainable, he argued. "It's very hard to imagine how we can see the world growing enough crops to produce renewable energy and at the same time meet the enormous demand for food."

Some of the proposed biofuels schemes were "hopeless", warned Beddington, formerly professor of applied population biology at Imperial College, London. "The idea that you cut down rainforest to actually grow biofuels seems profoundly stupid."

The Conservative Party leader, David Cameron, has also weighed into the attack on biofuels. "They are not a panacea," he told the National Farmers' Union last month. "Unless they are truly sustainable, they may well harm the environment more than protect it."

Like environmentalists and organic food experts, Cameron latched on to one of the most telling statistics highlighting the competition between food and fuel. "You could feed a person for a whole year from the grain that produces just one tank of fuel for a sports utility vehicle (SUV)," he said.

The same figure was used by Robin Maynard, from the Soil Association, which certifies organic food. "The US currently grows one-sixth of its grain harvest for cars, which is madness," he told the Sunday Herald.

"It is perfectly possible for the world to feed itself, but it depends on how we are growing food. If we continue to grow crops to feed cars rather than people, we're in trouble."

Appendix 2: Barriers To Gender-Equal Food Security.

Barriers to Gendered Food Security	Details	Global Governance policy solution possible?
Microeconomic factors	Family size, household obligations, access to wage labour, share in family and community decision-making, social constrictions on land use, productivity and intake.	Yes
Macroeconomic factors	Such as the emergence of neo-liberal capitalist policies imposed through the Washington Consensus which include Structural Adjustment Programs, austerity measures, and an emphasis on expanding export-oriented trade at the expense of small-scale producers and rural development.	Yes
Land Law and inheritance	Temporary or illegal use of land only, restrictions on females owning, inheriting or earning from land, cultural restrictions on single/married women owning land. Increasing privatisation ends communal lands. Patrilineal inheritance laws and cultures.	Yes (land redistribution programmes) and No (inheritance law reform)
Unpaid work/division of labour/time constraints	Burden of unpaid labour: rural areas, the use of women's time in agriculture is often constrained by obligations such as fetching water and wood, preparing meals for their families, cleaning, and tending to children and livestock. Load bearing work too.	Yes
Crop Types & feminisation of Labour	relegated to the production of subsistence crops on marginal land. In comparison, men tend to produce cash crops on land nearer to the home or marketplace for ease of access. The distance between a woman's home, crops, and the nearest marketplace can pose logistical problems in transportation, and create another type of time constraint.	Yes
Access to 'external world': credit, technology, education, markets, and government services		Yes

Source: Compiled from WFB, FAO, IFAD, 2009.

Appendix 3 List Of Organisations Researched For Inclusion Into Field Analysis

Organisation Name

1. 2020 Vision Initiative
2. ACF International
3. Action Against Hunger International *
4. Act Alliance
5. ADM
6. Afrique Verte
7. Alliance For A Green Revolution In Africa
8. ASEAN Food Security Information
9. Bayer
10. Bill And Melinda Gates Foundation *
11. Bunge
12. CARE
13. Cargill *
14. CARITAS International
15. Carrefour
16. Catholic Relief Services (CRS)
17. Commission On Human Security
18. Committee On World Food Security (CFS)
19. Community Food Security Coalition
20. Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) *
21. DEFRA
22. DFID
23. Emergency Nutrition Network
24. ETC Group
25. Europe Aid
26. Famine Early Warning Systems Network
27. FIAN*
28. FDA
29. Food Aid Convention
30. Food And Agricultural Organisation (FAO) *
31. Food Ethics Council
32. Food First
33. Food For The Hungry International
34. Forum For Food Security
35. GAO
36. Genetic Resources Action International
37. Global Agriculture And Food Security Program

38. Global Crop Diversity Trust
39. Global Food Safety Initiative
40. Global Partnerships For Good Agricultural Practices
41. GRAIN *
42. Grocery Manufacturers Association 43. Help Stop Hunger
44. Hunger Plus Inc.
45. Institute For Agriculture And Trade Policy
46. InterAction
47. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
48. International Alliance Against Hunger
49. International Assessment Of Agricultural Knowledge, Science And Technology For Development
50. International Centre For Trade And Sustainable Development
51. International Federation Of Agricultural Movements
52. International Food Policy Research Institute
53. International Food Standards
54. International Fund For Agricultural Development *
55. International Grains Council
56. International Labour Organisation
57. International Planning Committee
58. International Rice Research Institute
59. IOM
60. IPCC
61. Kraft Foods
62. La Via Campesina *
63. Local Food Plus
64. Louis Dreyfus
65. Lutheran World Federation
66. Making Markets Work Better For The Poor
67. Mennonite Central Committee
68. Mercy Corps
69. Metro
70. Monsanto *
71. Mosaic
72. NASS
73. National Association Of Wheat Growers
74. Nestle
75. North American Miller's Association
76. NRC
77. Overseas Development Institute
78. Oxfam International *
79. PepsiCo
80. Potash *
81. Relief International
82. Rockefeller Foundation

83. Syngenta *
84. Tesco
85. The Global Partnership Of Agriculture And Food Security
86. The Hunger Project UK
87. Third World Network
88. Urgenci *
89. UN Conference On Trade And Development
90. UN Development Programme
91. UN High Level Task Force On Food Security
92. UNEP
93. UNFPA
94. UNICEF
95. Unilever
96. United States Department Of Agriculture
97. United States Public Interest Research Group
98. Wal-Mart
99. WCED
100. West African Rice Development Association
101. World Bank
102. World Food Programme (WFP) *
103. World Health Organisation
104. World Trade Organisation
105. World Vision * 106. Yara

* = included in Field Analysis

Additionally, a list of the participants of the most recent session of the World Committee on Food Security (the 41st session) is available from here:
http://www.fao.org/bodies/cfs/cfs41/en/

Appendix 4: Supplementary Tables

Table A: Symbolic Capital Table For Criteria And Measures Of Political Capital

Criteria (resource)	**Measure**
High Lobbying Expenditure? (economic capital)	in excess of $5million p.a.=+1/less than £1million=1
Good Political Access (social capital)	to be determined by research into activities low =1/high =+1
Role in Governance (cultural capital)	to be determined by committee participation. Little or none = -1/high =+1
Agenda-setting capability (symbolic capital).	to be determined by forum-shifting power. Little or None =-1/High =+1
Contribution to legislative outputs (institutional capital).	to be determined by committee activity. Low activity and no voting rights=-1/high and voting rights=+1
Moral capital	to be determined by raison d'être and praxis low=1/high=+1
Economic capital	under $25 million p.a.=+1/$25-$50million p.a.=0/over $50million income p.a.=-1

Table B: Symbolic Capital Table For Criteria And Measures Of Political Legitimacy

Criteria (resource)	**Measure**
Raison d'être	public interest=+1/ self-interested=-1
Inclusivity	representative=+1/non-representative=-1
Transparency	open governance=+1/closed=-1
Public Facing Accountability	accountable for practices=+1/not=-1
Subject to Regulation	Complies with legal and statutory oversight=+1=complete/0=not proven/not=-1
Ethical Practices	good=+1, neutral=0, bad =-1 (as reported)
Economic capital	under $25 million p.a.=+1/$25-$50million p.a.=0 /over $50million income p.a.=-1

Notes on Tables A and B: Constructing the Symbolic Capital Criteria

Table A is constructed from the criteria for political capital, constructed from criteria looking at legislative outputs, lobbying expenditure, committee membership etc. The second variables, Table B is for democratic legitimacy looking at transparency, representativeness etc. These criteria are drawn from literature on democratic legitimacy (Keohane, 2011; Brassett & Tsingou, 2011) and political capital (Casey, 2008; Lopez, 2002).

(Explanatory research notes on Tables 6 and 7: Constructing the Symbolic Capital Criteria)

The criteria, drawn from the constituent elements of the definitions, are attributed to the GFG actors in the variables table (see Tables 9 and 10) and are awarded on a 3 point scale of -1 to +1, including 0. The award is made on the basis of a set of measures. The criteria and measures are set out in Tables 6 and 7. As can be seen each measure is derived from aspects of the criteria. So, for example, one variable of political capital is discursive power. Discursive power can be gauged by criteria of lobbying expenditure, participation in key committees etc. The number of criteria met determines the award (-1 to +1, with -1 least and +1 highest) of the criteria.

The Symbolic Capital

Political capital, as the first type of symbolic capital proposed for this Field Analysis, is not oppositional to economic capital, indeed political capital is a transubstantiated form of economic capital. Political capital is also the sacred principle of the global governance field in that political power enables agenda-setting, the power to maintain the status quo, admit actors or effect change and also to determine the logic of the field. It enables structural, instrumental or discursive power. In a Bourdieusian formula, political capital is the sum of economic capital and the constituent elements of political capital.

The second Field Analysis uses political (democratic) legitimacy as its symbolical capital. This is the sum of economic capital plus the constituent elements of political legitimacy. This Bourdieusian way slightly contradicts the typical definition of legitimacy, which is *sans* economic capital and so this is a critique of Bourdieu's definition of symbolic capital. After all, it is possible to be politically legitimate without economic capital. Again, legitimacy is placed on the X-axis, juxtaposed with economic capital on the Y-axis. It is useful to examine democratic legitimacy in global governance because it offers a measurement of how democratic/representative the field is. If it is not democratic then other organising power structures such as plutocratic or oligarchical may exist or dominate. This provides the possibility of comparing the amount of political capital in the first Field Analysis with political legitimacy in the second. These criteria of political power and scales of democratic power were constructed to evince the variables tables (see Tables 6 and 7).

Measuring the Symbolic Capital's Criteria

"A better global governance system necessarily requires respect for an inclusive, legitimate and democratic political process" (McKeon, 2011:13) [74]. Each resource, (criterion) in the variables table has a measure which enables a scalar value to be attributed. So the political

[74] This reflects the debate about the relationship between legitimacy and inclusiveness: that the worth of inclusiveness as a basis of legitimacy is perhaps of more importance to global governance because of the weakness of the institutional basis for legitimacy and its normative basis (see Scharpf, 2003, Risse, 2004 and Mayntz, 2010).

capital variables table has high lobbying expenditure as a representation of economic capital and the measure for this is expenditure in excess of $5 million per annum receives a value of +1, between $1-5 million = 0 and less than $1 million= -1. The value of these measures were applied in such a way as to ascribe a meaningful differentiation amongst the organisations. The data for each of these measures was obtained through financial reports, websites such the transparency index as well as extensive searches through the grey literature. The second criterion of the political capital table is good political access (social capital), and again the scalar value of -1 to +1 determined by desk research as are the criteria of role in governance (cultural capital), agenda-setting capability (symbolic capital), and contribution to legislative outputs (institutional capital). The last criteria of the political capital table, economic capital, is decided by measures of annual income under $25 million p.a. =-1, $25-$50 million p.a.=0 and over $50 million p.a.=+1. The variables were taken as the most important aspects of power and legitimacy of Global governance.

The political legitimacy criteria table follows suit with a *raison d'être* criterion (public interest = +1 not proven = 0, self-interested = -1). Again the measure was decided by publications from the organisations plus a number of source including grey literature or information in the public domain. The inclusivity criterion has representative = +1 and nonrepresentative = -1. Transparency has a measure of open governance = +1 and closed governance = -1, public facing accountability has measure of accountable for practices = +1 and not = -1. 'Subject to regulation' has a measure of a democratic structure or not, ethical practices has a value ascribed to the measure as good = +1, not proven or neutral = 0 and poor = -1 and economic capital, as with the political capital table has measures of annual income under $25million p.a. = -1, $25-$50 million p.a. = 0 and over $50 million p.a. = +1.

There were a number of challenges in executing this approach (including the use of 'shill' consultants as members of committees such as the Committee of Food Security) but further research into the identification of the client-base of the consultants was sometimes required. The measures were consistently applied to each of the top four organisations from each of the four sectors to ensure consistency of the criteria. These criteria form the data for the symbolic capital X-axis in the Field Analyses. As discussed, the Y-axis, economic capital is constructed from financial data – the income in USD for 2012. This scalar value is juxtaposed against economic capital to provide the first Field Analysis which shows the position of these 16 organisations in the juxtaposition between Economic Capital and Political Capital in the GFG Field. This is then repeated for the second Field Analysis, that of political legitimacy.

Symbolic Capital Table 9: Criteria and Measures of Political Capital

Similarly, the criteria for the 'democratic legitimacy' or 'moral capital' Field Analysis were drawn from the Global Governance literature. Where McKeon cites transparency, inclusivity, accountability, representativeness and Clapp and Fuchs cite subject to regulation and Practices. These also correspond to Keohane's six standard criteria for the legitimacy of Global governance (2011)[75], plus economic capital.

[75] Keohane defines these criteria for legitimacy within liberal democratic principles as: 1. Minimal moral acceptability (government institutions should not persistently commit serious injustices). 2. Inclusiveness 3. Epistemic quality (consisting of two qualities: institutional integrity and transparency) 4. Accountability and 5. Compatibility with democratic governance within countries. Multilateral institutions can sometimes do the opposite by a) promoting special interests b) violating the rights of

Symbolic Capital Table 10: Criteria and Measures of Political Legitimacy

This is drawn from literature on democratic legitimacy. As with political capital, the measures of these criteria were applied to the top four organisations from each sector to give a scalar value. This gives the results for the second Field Analysis on the relationship between economic capital and political legitimacy in the GFG Field. A comparison of the two Field Analyses of political capital and global governance Legitimacy provides an interesting tool for thinking about global governance not only as a contested arena of many competing actors but also as a realm for effective governance, policy-making, problem-solving etc. The comparison between high political capital and legitimacy is examined in the results section, which details which organisations have both, which have neither and which have only one form. Consideration is given to questions such as are they mutually exclusive terms and what can be done to ensure that organisations with high legitimacy (and a raison d'être of low self-interest) can also increase political capital to ensure more effective governance over food security.

Attributing the Criteria and Measures

Firstly, data on both the legitimacy and political capital of actors in the public domain was sourced from primary sources, where possible. No data source was taken at face value so there was cross checking and fact checking as well as examining methodologies of indices e.g. as with the Transparency Index. This data was patchy so a further measure was undertaken to standardise and underpin the data set: twenty-one major actors in the GFG Field were contacted to request further data on legislative outputs, lobbying expenditure, committee membership and political roles in GFG. Lastly, where this request was declined, the data was sought from secondary sources such as trade publications and meeting reports.

Political access was determined from the 'revolving door' of personnel so databases such as Lexus Nexus were accessed to view the previous appointments and other positions held by the board/head personnel of these organisations.

Measuring the Criteria

Each of these criteria of the two alternative symbolic capital sets (political legitimacy and political capital) could then be ascribed a value from a three point scale of -1 to +1 (see Tables 6 and 7). This scalar value is awarded on the basis on the measure to which the component is demonstrated by meeting/not meeting the criteria of each variable. Of course there are risks of only subjective measuring but reflexivity in the researcher raises awareness of this possibility - there is however, still some subjectivity in measuring these criteria. The 'top' organisation in each sector was decided on by the most recent annual income available (2012), the top four of each sector being selected. In the first dry run/pilot of this Field Analysis it was clear from clustering in the field that the data for the two types of symbolic capital was too thin and so the data was augmented by data requests and further investigation in the interests in obtaining thicker, richer data.[76] In its

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minorities c) diminishing the quality of collective deliberation. With 'perverse effects' such as these, multilateral institutions may be categorised as 'illegitimate' (Keohane, 2011). (ibid).

[76] An aside on obtaining the data was that it became clear that the participant observation and other ethnographic research which Bourdieu's team of researchers carried out would have been necessary then to achieve the results for the symbolic capital in the non-digital twenty years from the 1960's

entirety this research approach and process enables the symbolic capital tables for the two x-axes to be completed to a degree which is both methodologically viable and objectively vigorous enough to provide at least a measure of the economic and political legitimacy and power of the GFG field.

onwards but interesting to reflect if Bourdieu had access to data through digital sources such as on-line databases and statutory instruments available for this research, if he would have needed his research team?

Appendix 5: The Economic Capital Of The Global Good Governance Major Actors (With Notes)

Organisation	Net Worth	Annual Income	No of Staff	Type of business	Regulation mode	Public/private	Lobby expend (2012)
FAO	n/a	$2.4b	3,570	UN food agency (IO)	Open	public	n/a
CGIAR	n/a	$887m	8,322	Ad-hoc International organisation (IO)	Open	Public	n/a
IFAD	$1.06b PWB	$144.14m	600	UN food agency (IO)	Open	Public	n/a
WFP	n/a	$3.7b	12,000	UN -Food agency (IO)	Open	Public	n/a
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	$37b	$36b	n/a	Pro-food security Private Foundation (aid) (PF)	Open	private	n/a
Oxfam International	n/a	$1.26bn*	n/a	Charitable organisation (NGO)	Open	Private – charity status	n/a
Action Against Hunger Int'l	n/a	$63.586m	n/a	Charitable organisation (NGO)	Open	Private – charity status	n/a
World Vision	n/a	$1.019b	n/a	Charitable organisation (NGO)	Open	Private – charity status	n/a
ADM	$28.9b	$1.24b	30,000	Food Merchant (TNC)	Closed	Private	n/a
Bunge	$17.6b	$430m	32,000	Food Merchant (TNC)	Closed	Private	$1m
Cargill	$21.8b	$1.28b	142,000	Food Merchant (TNC)	Closed	Private	$1.2m

Syngenta	$38b	$1.7b	27,000	Biotech (TNC)	Closed	Private	$1.1m
Monsanto	$54b	$2.5b	20,000	Biotech (TNC)	Closed	Private	$6m
Bayer	$76.3b	$2.57b	111,000	Biotech (TNC)	Closed	Private	$6m
Potash	$39.5b	$2.14b	5,700	Fertiliser (TNC)	Closed	Private	$20k
Mosaic	$23.5b	$1.9b	8,000	Fertiliser (TNC)	Closed	Private	$800k
Yara	$11.7b	$1.7b	7,348	Fertiliser (TNC)	Closed	Private	$150k
La Via Campesina	n/a	$2m§	10	Civil Society Org (CSO)/ network	Closed	private	n/a
FIAN	n/a	$1.96m*	50	Civil Society Org/ network	Open	public	n/a
GRAIN	n/a	$0.794m	n/a	Civil society Org/network	Open	public	n/a
Urgenci	n/a	$0.166m*	8	Civil Society Org/ network	Open	public	n/a
Catholic Relief Services (CRS)	n/a	$699m	n/a	Faith-based organisation	Open	public	n/a
Act Alliance	n/a	$38.41m	25000	Faith-based organisation	Open	public	n/a

Table 8: The Economic Capital of the Global Food Governance major actors. Net Worth is based on Enterprise Value (EV) rather than Market Capitalisation as EV represents the entire cost of a business, including debt and equity. Annual income is based on Net Income of private companies. All above figures as of June 2013 from company and NGO annual reports and figures supplied and listed on New

York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ and S&P Capital IQ (McGraw Hill). Some lobbying expenditure estimates for other years is available and may be used in the Field Analysis.*= converted from euros at historical exchange rate as at 2/4/2012 of 1.32 Euros to $. §= estimated income due to non-disclosure. n/a = not available. This is rated up from income for LVC UK is £10,000 x 73 countries in network =$1.167m at 2/4/2012 conversion rates (1.5989). Plus estimated secretariat running costs = (approx.) $2million, in line with similarly-sized FIAN. N.B. This table does not include Financial Organisations or Nation-States, both of whom are involved in GFG in a tangential/indirect way.

(Explanatory Research Notes on Table 8)

Selection

In Table 8 the economic capital was gathered for 23 organisations from which the final 16 were selected for inclusion in the Field Analysis. This was drawn from the long list of 107 organisations (Figure 10). This comprises four organisations for each of the four sectors of GFG. The selection criteria were the top four by income in each sector and the biggest of each sector have also been selected as a case study in chapter four including (World Food Program, Gates Foundation, La Via Campesina). Although not the largest, Cargill has been selected on the basis of access - that it was the only TNC to give an interview for this research. Otherwise Monsanto would have been the case study.

The International Organisations included in the Field Analysis are (in descending order of annual income) World Food Program ($3.7b), Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) $2.4b), International Fund for Agriculture (IFAD) ($144m) and CGIAR (formerly the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research) ($887m). For the Charitable/Aid sector, the Gates Foundation was included, (although not of charitable status their impact on the field is new, significant, and deserves analysis). Their annual income is $36b. The other Aid organisations in descending order of annual income are Oxfam International ($1.26b), World Vision ($1.01b) and Action Against Hunger (63m). For the TNC sector, one from each of the sub-sectors of Seeds (Monsanto), Food Merchant (Cargill), Syngenta (biotech) and fertiliser (Potash) to represent the spread of the TNC sector. In descending order of 2012 annual income they are; Monsanto ($2.5b), Potash ($2.14b), Syngenta ($1.7b) and Cargill ($1.28b). The Civil society Organisations included are La Via Campesina ($2m (est.)), FIAN ($1.96m), GRAIN ($0.794m) and Urgenci ($0.166m). The two faith-based organisations, although charitable were not included in the selection for Field Analysis because although they are significant players in food aid, their *raison d'être* is propagation of faith in addition to food aid.

Appendix 6 Variables Tables For Political Capital

Criteria/organisation	High Lobbying Expenditure	Good Political Access	Role in Governance	Agenda-setting capability	Contribution to legislative outputs	Moral Capital	Economic Capital	Total Score
WFP	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
FAO	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
IFAD	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
CGIAR	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Gates Foundation	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Oxfam International	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
World Vision	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	5
Action Against Hunger Int'l	-1	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
Monsanto	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	5
Cargill	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	5
Syngenta	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	5
Potash	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	5
La Via Campesina	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	-1	-5
GRAIN	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	-1	-5
FIAN	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	-1	-5
Urgenci	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	-1	-5

Appendix 7: Variables Table For Political Legitimacy

Criteria/organisation	Raison d'être	Inclusivity	Transparency	Accountability	Subject to Regulation	Ethical Practices	Economic Capital	Total Score
WFP	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
FAO	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
IFAD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
CGIAR	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
Gates Foundation	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	5
Oxfam International	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
World Vision	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7
Action Against Hunger Int'l	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	6
Monsanto	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	-5
Cargill	-1	-1	0	-1	-1	0	1	-3
Syngenta	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	-5
Potash	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	-5
La Via Campesina	1	1	-1	-1	0	1	-1	0
GRAIN	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	5
FIAN	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	5
Urgenci	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	5

Appendix 8: Field Analysis of Global Food Governance: Symbolic Capital, Criteria and Measures .



Appendix 9: Appendices for Chapter 4 A:
Pilot version of interview protocol

Interview protocol for Global Food Governance Anon ID No:

Name of Respondent: Job Title:
Company Name:
Nationality:

Introduction to Interviewer

Hello, my name is Kathryn Smith, and, as you will know from the ethics forms, I am researching Global Food Governance. I would like to discuss the following topics: food security, the strengths and weaknesses of current Global Food Governance and your evaluation of the best way to reform Global Food Governance? With these topics in mind I'd like to ask you the following 30 questions. Please feel free to expand the answer boxes to answer as fully and as freely as you wish - all your data will be completely anonymised. All your views are understood to be your own and not representative of your employer. Please note that there is also two opt- in questions at the end for further contact and to be informed of the results. Thank-you for taking the time and care to answer this.

Section 1: Food Insecurity Issues

Tell me about your organisation's involvement in food security?

What is your personal involvement in food security?

Question 1 : What do you think are the main causes of food insecurity?

Answer

Question 2: Do you agree that there is currently no stable and effective global food security regime?

Answer

Question 3: What does it take to establish an effective and stable global food security regime?

Answer

Question 4 : What are the most significant obstacles to establishing a stable food security regime?

Answer

Question 5 : In your opinion, to what degree are market-orientated solutions and ideology a factor in food security?

Answer

Question 6: What do you think is the most overlooked/unaddressed factor in food insecurity?

Answer

Question 7: In your opinion have corporate actors exacerbated food insecurity?

Answer

Question 8: Which change would be the biggest improvement towards establishing Global Food Security?

Answer

Before moving on to the next section, anything else on Food Security you would like to add or comment on?

Section 2: Global Food Governance

Question 9: How would you evaluate the effectiveness of current Global Food Governance?
Answer

Question 10: In your opinion, what are the strengths of the current Global Food Governance system? Answer

Question 11: In your opinion, what are the weaknesses of Global Food Governance?
Answer

Question 12: What do you think should be done to improve the Global Governance of Food?
Answer

Question 13 To what degree do the **role** that Trans National Corporations (e.g. Cargill, Nestle, Tesco etc.) take in Global Governance positively or negatively affect food insecurity?

Answer

Question 14 To what degree and in which ways do the **practices** of Trans National Corporations affect Global Food Governance? (Feel free to specify which practices)

Answer

Question 15 In your opinion, how do the political agendas of International Organisations (e.g. WFP, FAO etc.) affect food security?

Answer

Question 16 In your opinion, how do the agendas of Aid Organisations (e.g. Oxfam, Action Against Hunger etc.) affect food security?

Answer

Question 17 Would you agree with the point which some commentators have made that

there is a diffuse architecture in Global Food Governance? If yes, how does this affect good governance of food insecurity?

Answer

Question Do you agree that there is not enough or no oversight of International 18 Organisations? If so how does this affect good Global Food Governance?

Answer

Question 19 In your opinion, what could make Global Food Governance more inclusive/democratic? (Suggest more than one factor if preferred)

Answer

Anything else specifically on Global Food Governance you would like to add or comment on?

Section 3: Reform of Global Food Governance

Question 20 To maximise effectiveness on reducing Food Insecurity, how should Global Food Governance be reformed?

Answer

Question 21 How and by whom should these reforms be led?

Answer

Question 22 How should the architecture of a new Global Food Governance regime be constructed?

Answer

Question 23 In your opinion how should International Organisations (e.g. FAO) involved in Global Food Governance be scrutinised?

Answer

Question 24 How should Trans National Corporations involved in Global Food Governance be scrutinised?

Answer

Question 25 How should Aid Organisations and Charities involved in Global Food Governance be scrutinised?

Answer

Question 26 How should the membership of a new Global Food Governance regime differ from the current membership in the following areas:

Answer

1. International Organisations?

2. Trans National Corporations?

3. Aid Organisations/Charities?

Question 27 Which Policy Innovations should be at the forefront of reformed Global Food Governance?

Answer

Question 28 Can you detail any reforms you would consider a) essential b) desirable to Global Food Governance?

Answer

Question 29 Which changes in Global Governance would make the biggest difference to Global Hunger?

Answer

Question 30 : How would you evaluate the role of the G8 in ending global hunger?

Answer

Question 31: In your opinion, what is the key thing to understand about Food Security, both now and in the future?

Answer

Anything else on Global Food Governance reform you would like to add or comment on?

Conclusion:

Lastly, anything else you would like to add about this topic in general?

Thank-you so much for your participation.

If you would be willing for me to contact you again in the future, please tick here:

If you would like to be informed about the outcome of this research, tick here:

Kathryn Smith (KS68@st-andrews.ac.uk)

PhD student

School of International Relations

St. Andrews University,

Scotland. U.K.

B: Final Version of Interview protocol

Interview protocol for Global Food Governance Anon ID No:

Name of Respondent:	
Job Title:	
Company Name:	
Nationality:	

Introduction to Interviewer

Hello, my name is Kathryn Smith, and, as you will know from the ethics forms, I am researching Global Food Governance. I would like to discuss the following topics: food security, the strengths and weaknesses of current Global Food Governance and your evaluation of the best way to reform Global Food Governance? With these topics in mind I'd like to ask you the following 13 questions. Please feel free to expand the answer boxes to answer as fully and as freely as you wish - all your data will be completely anonymised. All your views are understood to be your own and not representative of your employer. Please note that there is also two opt- in questions at the end for further contact and to be informed of the results. Thank-you for taking the time and care to answer this.

Section 1: Food Insecurity Issues

Tell me about your organisation's involvement in food security?

What is your personal involvement in food security?

Section 1: Global Food Governance

Question 1: How would you evaluate the effectiveness of current Global Food Governance?
Answer

Question 2: In your opinion, what do you think should be done to improve the Global Governance of Food? Answer

Question 3 Would you agree that there are four main sectors in the Global Food Governance Field: Aid Organisations, Trans National Organisation, International Organisations and Civil Society Organisations? Are there any other sectors or groups?
Answer

Question 4 What is your opinion about the point which some commentator have made that there is a diffuse architecture in Global Food Governance? If yes, how does this affect good governance of food security?
Answer

Question 5 Do you agree that there is not enough or no oversight of International Organisations? If so how does this affect good Global Food Governance?

Answer

Question 6 In your opinion, what will it take to establish effective global food governance? Both ideally and perhaps more realistically.

Answer

Anything else specifically on Global Food Governance you would like to add or comment on?

Section 2: Reform of Global Food Governance

Question 7 To maximise effectiveness on reducing Food Insecurity, how should Global Food Governance be reformed?

Answer

Question 8 How and by whom should these reforms be led?

Answer

Question 9 How should the architecture of a new Global Food Governance regime be constructed?

Answer

Question 10 How should Trans National Corporations involved in Global Food Governance be scrutinised?

Answer

Question 11 How should International and Aid Organisations involved in Global Food Governance be scrutinised?

Answer

Question 12 Which Policy Innovations should be at the forefront of reformed Global Food Governance?

Answer

Question 13 Which issues should the G8 prioritise?

Answer

Anything else on Global Food Governance reform you would like to add or comment on?

Conclusion:

Lastly, anything else you would like to add about global food governance in general?

Thank-you so much for your participation.

If you would be willing for me to contact you again in the future, please tick here:

If you would like to be informed about the outcome of this research, tick here:

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Appendix 10: Interview Records

Record of interviews (on attached CD).

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